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Abstract 
Teams are at the heart of change efforts in public school districts all over the country. 
Within central offices, the nature of systems-level reform generally requires collaboration 
amongst diverse people with diverse perspectives, sitting across bureaucratic silos and 
altitudes, who come together to respond and react to school needs and district priorities. 
Teams are thought of as intrinsic to the work of public education, as a structure that can 
harness expertise and capacity to address complex, seemingly intractable problems that 
have dogged districts for decades. 
 
But are teams really necessary to get the work done? If they are, what chances do teams 
have to flourish or survive amidst the bureaucratic accountability that characterizes most 
school districts – or to advance the tough work of change that district leaders task them 
with? 
 
In this capstone, I explore and challenge what I consider to be a fundamental bias toward 
teams and teamwork in public K-12 school district change efforts. While the intent to 
seek cross-functional collaboration holds potential to unlock innovative solutions, I argue 
that by and large public school districts are not yet set up to enable the success of teams – 
and I question whether or not that matters. Many district change efforts still move 
forward even when teamwork breaks down, largely because of the bureaucracy districts 
were seeking to overcome when they set teams up in the first place. In bureaucratic 
systems, team performance often goes under-recognized as the buck stops at individuals. 
While this approach is certainly expeditious, it has vast potential to undercut vertical and 
horizontal collaboration within organizations as well as to undermine the values and 
priorities that districts like Boston have put forward by exploiting the inequities of 
business-as-usual. Making forward progress toward district goals in spite of teams 
thwarts collaborative teaming efforts in the long run. It leaves little incentive for team 
members to change behavior, it preserves the status quo, and it distances district 
leadership from the system it has envisioned to better address teaching and learning 
needs. 
 
I discuss these arguments through my lens of ten months of residency at Boston Public 
Schools, working on long-term instructional change strategies seeking to organizationally 
alter ways that central office provides supports to schools. I argue that – absent concerted 
efforts to cultivate the right task environment for teams to succeed – teams, their 
individual members, and the change efforts they seek to implement are likely to languish 
as districts fall back on the same structures that have produced limited outcomes for 
decades. 
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Prologue 
I was assigned to Boston Public Schools (BPS) as a facilitator at the weeklong 
summer 2015 Public Education Leadership Project (PELP) institute at the Harvard 
Business School, fortuitously enough as a new leadership team was assuming control of 
the district. Dr. Tommy Chang, the incoming superintendent, was coming in with a lot of 
fresh, new ideas for how to improve instruction in the district, as well as with largely a 
new team in tow (both from outside the district and remixed from within) to get the job 
done. I was – and remain – inspired by his focus on instruction: as observers in the 
education sector know, it is not all that often that someone who really understands 
instruction – a teacher at heart – makes it to the superintendency. I was eager to find out 
exactly what change he was after, I was eager to learn from him and his senior team, and 
most of all I was eager to be a part of the work 
Tommy – as he insists on being called – explained his plans to me over the course 
of phone calls, emails, and the week at PELP, which took place just five days after his 
official first day as superintendent of what is known as one of the highest performing 
urban districts in the United States (see for example NCES, 2015). He explained to me 
his theories on instruction and the ways he believes change comes about in schools and 
districts. He went to great lengths to explain models of adult collaboration around 
instruction – creating what he calls a “culture of we” to collaboratively tackle our biggest 
problems – and described how the central office can be reorganized to better support 
needs of schools. He gave the impression that only through collaboration among experts 
– through the formation of teams up, down, across, and all over the district – could we 
hope to eliminate the persistent opportunity and achievement gaps that have plagued a 
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district like Boston for decades. He argued that teams are a way to disrupt rather than to 
respond to the bureaucracy that characterizes public school districts.  
After I gained an understanding of what his plans were and some of the way he 
thinks, I distinctly remember saying to Tommy in reflection of the priority he was placing 
on them, “You’re making a huge bet on teams.” 
I do not quite remember his response, aside from an acknowledgment that teams 
certainly are the heart of his vision for change. I recall him being even-keeled in his 
reaction, as I have come to discover he is in almost all interactions, but I did not 
understand the gravity of my overly simplistic observation at the time. Tommy very well 
may have understood the extent to which he was leaning on teams as the structure that 
will make the big change happen, but for me it was a huge introduction to the world I was 
about to enter at BPS. I have lived every day of my residency in vivid realization of this 
observation.  
Teams are the heart of nearly every change effort in the district. In my 
observation and estimation, almost nothing is attempted alone. The nature of the systems-
level work generally requires collaboration amongst different people with differing 
views, who come together in some degree or fashion to respond and react to schools’ 
needs. While another possible solution might be bureaucracy, teams are thought of as 
inherent to the work: public education is big, rich, complex, and full of intractable 
problems, so how could anyone do it alone? Teams are a way to harness expertise and 
capacity from within and across functional units of siloed organizations to tackle the 
problems that have dogged districts for decades. As described by Higgins, Weiner, and 
Young (2012), “today, and particularly in contexts such as education where the urgency 
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for change is acute, attention has shifted from solo models of leadership to more 
collaborative forms of leadership. Additionally, pressure has mounted to tackle 
intransigent problems by moving beyond designing new strategies for change to focusing 
on how to effectively implement system-wide change” (p. 20-21). 
Teams are thought of as a solution to the chaos and the immense diversity and 
magnitude of challenges a district faces. Teams can have extraordinary windfall in the 
collaborative experiences they foster, including finding answers and generating new ideas 
to some of the most difficult challenges an organization faces. Teams are a manifestation 
of very diverse sets of knowledge and expertise brought to bear on a system serving a 
student population equally as diverse. The intersections of teams – and the knowledge 
and expertise sets of the individuals who compose them – spread across structures of the 
organization, turning the neat compartments and ladders of hierarchy into a latticework of 
individuals working on problems that cut across the organizational chart. This ultimately 
can create significant problems of accountability, even as teams seem necessary to 
sustain and improve a high-quality educational experience, especially if the ends or the 
means that teams are pursuing or the roles that individuals or teams play are under-
defined. 
Despite the challenges associated with teamwork, my experiences during 
residency at BPS have shown me that teamwork is the instinctual first response to nearly 
every challenge and seemingly an implied assumption about the way work gets done. We 
rely on teams to do everything, bespeaking a hidden commitment that all things are 
possible only through collaboration. This concept is not new to me: I have read dozens of 
district case studies in the course of my academic career documenting these attempts, and 
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I have been part of myriad teams throughout my time in educational organizations and 
governmental institutions. However, I had underestimated the extent to which teams are 
the implied modus operandi for nearly all change the district pursues – and how 
fundamentally biased toward teams we are. This bias even appears in the curriculum of 
the Doctor of Education Leadership program at Harvard University, where study and 
praxis of team membership and leadership characterizes the first-year academic 
experience. Over the course of my residency year, I began questioning this bias, asking 
myself and others whether or not we really need teams to achieve the missions we set out 
to achieve and – if we do need them – whether or not we properly set them up to drive 
organizational performance. 
Truthfully, I did not come into residency expecting to or hoping to write about 
teams. Like many who have endured the toils of large bureaucracies, teamwork can 
sometimes feel like misery in unwieldy organizations. Even a novice bureaucrat will 
recognize the questions that have run through my mind countless times: Why are we 
doing this in a meeting? What does this team even do? Can I go back to my desk now and 
finish this task alone? I did not go out looking for teams, but my conscription onto more 
and more teams and more and more collaborative tasks than I could count certainly 
pushed me there. 
 With all of this in mind, I set about this capstone with the following guiding 
questions that I then relate to my time at BPS:  
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Guiding Questions: 
 
1) Who or what is in a team?  
2) What specifically are we asking teams to do?  
3) How are we intentionally nurturing and sustaining teams to realize the big bets we 
are making on them?  
4) How are teams called to account for their performance within the context in which 
they operate? 
 
In this capstone, I begin by providing key context for my work at BPS and a 
description of the project and work I was brought on to perform. I then provide a brief 
review of relevant literature in seeking out answers to these four guiding questions. Then, 
I posit a theory of action for how I, as Director of Instructional Strategy for the 
Academics and Student Supports for Equity Team (ASSET) at BPS, might best support 
my roles on various teams within the organization to create impact in our long-term 
instructional priorities. I turn to a review and analysis of my real, lived experiences on 
teams within BPS, reflecting both on my own perspectives and accomplishments in the 
work and those of my colleagues in attempting interdependent teamwork and tasks to 
achieve organizational objectives. After presenting and analyzing my findings, I close 
with implications from my work on and study of the teams at BPS, teams more broadly 
leading reforms in urban school districts, and for myself as a leader in these 
environments. 
I caveat my findings by drawing attention to the limitations of my findings and 
conclusions. By no means is what I present intended to be representative of experiences 
and outcomes across BPS leaders, employees, or affiliates. While I come at my guiding 
questions and diagnosis of the work with rigorous, analytical, and methodical approaches 
to evidence gathering and analysis, the capstone is also a thoughtful, personal reflection 
on leadership (my own and that of others) through ten months of lived experience in an 
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urban school district. While I take great efforts to represent and reflect the direct input of 
others at BPS, the conclusions and reflections here are ultimately my own and do not 
stand as an organizational reflection, endorsement, or statement of Boston Public 
Schools.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Context and Description of Strategic Project  
 James Q. Wilson (1989), a scholar of bureaucracy, once noted that bureaucracies 
were formed when several people realized they could not perform a task acting alone, but 
if they got together, they could accomplish the task. The problem was, he claims, once 
they got together, they forgot about the task.  
During my residency year at Boston Public Schools (BPS), I sought to learn 
whether and how initiatives launched from the central administrative office (herein 
referred to as “central office”) were implemented through the use of teams. I led with this 
teaming focus partly because of the observation that the problems teams sought to 
address cut across organizational boundaries – both from staff to line, and across different 
problem areas in performance. The commitment to teams somehow seemed deeper than 
the requirements for cross-boundary collaboration; it seems as though a commitment to 
teams and to collaborations permeated everything that BPS does. This bias toward teams 
could be great if the teams actually do work that improves the performance of the 
schools; it also could be troublesome if it wastes time or distracts energy or attention 
from what is most important in achieving real improvements in instructional performance 
across all students.  
In large part, my line of inquiry centered on whether or not teams are actually able 
to make progress toward the tasks they have been assigned, and then – in the case of 
failure or success – what might be the reasons why they fared the way they did. While my 
findings over a ten-month period fall far short of being able to observe improved 
outcomes in student performance, my approach required me to learn about teams and 
their capacities and behaviors to achieve the lofty vision of change toward which they 
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aspire. In keeping with this line of inquiry, I have thought about my work at BPS in two 
broad categories: a narrow mandate and a wide mandate. I first describe key context 
surrounding my work through a description of the district’s Strategic Implementation 
Plan. I then describe the narrow mandate and the wide mandate individually. I use both 
mandates to generate my personal theory of action for my residency at BPS, which 
appears in Chapter 3. 
Key Context  
Overall, my work at BPS is focused on support and implementation of select 
instruction-centered components of the Boston Public Schools’ Strategic Implementation 
Plan, “Stronger Schools; Stronger Boston: A Plan to Foster Equity, Coherence, and 
Innovation throughout Boston Public Schools” (herein referred to as “SIP” or “the Plan”). 
The Plan was released in draft in June 2016, presented to the Boston School Committee 
in July 2016, and finalized and formally adopted by the School Committee and the 
district in August 2016. 
 The SIP lays out a long-term vision for instruction and operations of the Boston 
Public Schools, spanning from the time of its release in 2016 through 2021. It spells out 
the challenges facing BPS and its students and puts forward a path to generate school and 
system-wide improvements in opportunity and achievement for all Boston youth. It is 
rooted in the Boston School Committee’s “Strategic Vision for the Boston Public 
Schools,” which the Committee unanimously approved in 2015 (prior to the appointment 
of current Boston Superintendent Dr. Tommy Chang) following eighteen months of 
engagement with the community. The School Committee’s vision contained five 
aspirational goals for the next five years and served as the substantive basis for the 
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Strategic Implementation Plan as put forward by Superintendent Chang for approval by 
the mayoral-appointed School Committee in 2016 (Boston School Committee, 2015). 
After his appointment in March 2015 and throughout his first year in office (July 
2015 – June 2016), Superintendent Chang continued the outreach, engagement, and 
learning the School Committee started in assessing the current state of BPS and the 
efforts needed to catalyze reform. As an encapsulation of what his administration learned 
and the vision of change they seek, a transition team laid out a 100-day plan and three 
core values to drive forward all of the work of the district and its over 10,000 employees 
across 125 schools and one central administrative office (Boston Public Schools, 2016). 
The values of equity (“eliminating system bias and providing authentic learning 
opportunities for all students”); coherence (“focusing BPS’ business model on teaching 
and learning, and building an efficient way to use resources to deliver services and 
obligations within and outside the organization”); and innovation (“building a culture of 
change; generating new solutions, not just relying on current operational models”) were 
selected as galvanizing forces to address the problem of practice the district has identified 
for itself: “BPS does not consistently provide authentic learning opportunities for our 
students who are most marginalized to develop into self-determined, independent 
learners, able to pursue their aspirations. Our failures lead to disengaged students and 
significant achievement gaps” (Boston Public Schools, 2016, p. 4). It is noteworthy that 
BPS’s problem features first-person narration and reflects a plain-stated admission that 
district actions and inactions in the past have yielded the inequitable and inconsistent 
patterns of instructional achievement and opportunity that students experience today.  
A taxonomy of the Plan (see Figure 1.1) communicates the vast ground covered 
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by it. Guided by an instructional theory of action that names adult learning as the key 
lever for spurring change (see Appendix A), the wide-ranging Plan contains a multitude 
of focus areas, initiatives, and milestones that describe what BPS will do to drive 
improvement in teaching and learning in all BPS schools and increase efficiency and 
quality in key operational and business areas. The five “focus areas” define the broad 
domains of the change efforts; within each focus area, “initiatives” describe the projects 
to be tackled to achieve that change (ranging from 3-13 initiatives per focus area); within 
each initiative, “milestones” communicate key deadlines and progress points in achieving 
those projects (which range from 3-12 per initiative). It touches on a wide array of both 
the day-to-day work that takes place across schools and within central office, while also 
addressing strategic and long-term challenges that will take time to fully diagnose and 
take action.  
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Figure 1.1 
 
Taxonomy of the Boston Public Schools’ Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) 
 
 
 
While the Plan is lengthy and fairly comprehensive, some high-profile work-
streams and outputs for the district (including its Opportunity and Achievement Gap 
Policy, as well as its Long-Term Financial Plan) are only alluded to in the SIP; they exist 
largely as standalone efforts and documents. This makes the SIP fairly comprehensive in 
its reflection of district priorities, but still is one of several in a constellation of critical, 
long-term work-streams the district is tackling. 
It is also worth noting that a defining feature of the Boston system is the extent of 
autonomy school leaders have to make decisions about instruction and operations of 
schools (including staffing and budget). Known as “principals” in grades K-8 school 
configurations and “headmasters” in grades 7-12 school configurations, the central office 
channels resources and support to school leaders and holds them accountable for school 
Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) Terminology 
[Term: definition (quantity)] 
Focus Areas: big buckets of 
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(aligned to our priorities) that will be 
completed by specific dates (213 in 
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Actions: steps we will take (with 
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performance. The full extent of this autonomy is far-reaching, and nowhere is it greater 
than in the area of instruction. Empowered by the philosophy that those closest to 
instruction know best what is needed, Superintendent Chang readily embraced the long-
standing Boston paradigm of principal and headmaster as chief instructional leader (a 
belief he had held prior to his appointment at BPS) as well as operating manager. School 
leader autonomy is seen as central both to problem diagnosis and to the prescription and 
implementation of solutions for performance challenges at schools. While the centrality 
of school leader autonomy is thematically alluded to in the SIP, the exact parameters for 
the district’s approach to school autonomy (e.g. autonomy for which decisions, autonomy 
in the presence of corrective action, variations in autonomy based on designated school 
type within the system, etc.) are largely absent from the Plan. I note this because school 
leader autonomy is very highly valued in the district, and so its omission from a strategic 
planning document communicates in some ways the extent to which this autonomy is 
implied or even enshrined in district practice. The ways that the district goes about school 
leader autonomy largely is not codified or described in great detail. 
Narrow Mandate  
I was brought onto the BPS’s Academics and Student Supports for Equity Team 
(ASSET) to serve as the Director of Instructional Strategy, a position created for me as a 
doctoral resident to help shepherd and support the implementation of the seven 
instructional initiatives that are “owned” by the ASSET team in the Strategic 
Implementation Plan. These seven initiatives fall under Focus Area #1, which commits 
the district to “implement an inclusive, rigorous, and culturally and linguistically 
sustaining pre-K-12 instructional program that serves the development of the whole 
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child” (Boston Public Schools, 2016, p. 13). The initiatives span a variety of instructional 
supports, services, resources, and investments that aim to expand access to high-quality 
instruction for all students. They do this by providing “quality curricular and instructional 
guidance and resources to support instruction that develops literacy, language, and 
knowledge acquisition across contents, while promoting social emotional wellness;” and 
expanding rigorous, diverse coursework including through a pilot program to increase 
access to higher rigor and more diverse curricula and intensive enrichments (Boston 
Public Schools, 2016, p. 13). The milestones also reflect commitments to targeted 
subpopulations of students that may have become marginalized within the district, 
namely: English learners, students with disabilities, students of color, and early learners. 
See Appendix B for full text of ASSET-owned SIP initiatives. 
 In my capacity as Director of Instructional Strategy, I support the work of the five 
offices that comprise ASSET in implementing and attaining their long-term strategic 
goals in the SIP (see Appendix D for organizational charts). In effect, I am the support for 
the support for those who teach and lead at the school level in the district. I also hold the 
team accountable for its progress toward strategic objectives. My work entails tracking 
progress toward milestones; providing guidance and assistance in implementation or 
timing of initiatives; and fostering organizational learning alongside execution of the 51 
milestones that fall under ASSET’s purview in the Plan’s initiatives 1.1 - 1.7 in School 
Year 2016-17. This entails working closely and collaboratively with the Assistant 
Superintendents who are accountable for each initiative to identify Key Performance 
Indicators (KPIs) that reflect inputs and process metrics toward the long-term goals (e.g. 
interim writing or revision deadlines for new policies toward sequential arts education 
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programming or expansion of dual language classrooms) as well as emerging evidence of 
success from the our strategic efforts (e.g. reduction in rates of chronic absenteeism for 
students experiencing homelessness or a drop in suspensions for minor/non-violent 
offenses). These KPIs, while not solely attributable to the offices’ strategic efforts, 
attempt to keep offices focused on the chief symptoms we have identified in the district’s 
problem of practice.  
Day to day, my responsibilities include convening and running strategy meetings 
with ASSET assistant superintendents and executive directors to discuss progress toward 
strategic goals; troubleshooting, assisting, or offering support in implementation for 
fulfillment of long-term goals or with concrete implementation tactics; providing counsel 
to the Deputy Superintendent or Superintendent on monitoring and planning around the 
organization’s long-term and strategic goals; communicating out and reporting up within 
the organization areas of success or redirection/learning; and facilitating adult learning 
around performance on Plan initiatives and milestones, especially when those initiatives 
or milestones are implemented through cross-functional or cross-office teams.  
Broader Mandate  
My work at BPS can also be viewed through a wider-angle lens, going beyond 
solely the Strategic Implementation Plan to additional aspects of ASSET teamwork and 
(explicit and implicit) instructional strategy. This broader mandate, so to speak, 
recognizes a few key dimensions in the role of doctoral resident that I have taken on as a 
student of systems and a learner at BPS. 
 First and most importantly, a wider lens is crucial for me to gain a thorough and 
authentic diagnosis of the environment in which I operate at BPS and the environment in 
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which BPS operates as a system. I cannot move ahead my work of making change in the 
system, nor can I understand the system’s lived theory in use, without first understanding 
and exploring the assumptions and mental models for how the organization and the team 
performs its day-to-day and long-term change work. Surfacing this mental modeling is 
also crucial for me to be able to successfully implement my narrow mandate as described 
above (e.g. in figuring out exactly how the Plan came into existence, whose ideas and 
authorization it reflects, and the logic it embodies in creating the change the district 
seeks). 
 A second key dimension for my broader mandate is the creation of ASSET itself. 
The formation of the Academics and Student Supports for Equity Team is relatively new, 
dating back only to April 2016 (prior to my arrival at BPS). What previously existed as 
five separate offices in three distinct organizational units all merged together to become 
one larger division within BPS. See the rendering below in Figure 1.2, and organizational 
charts in Appendix D: 
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Figure 1.2 
 
Academics and Student Supports for Equity Team (ASSET) as “Instructional 
Roundtable” 
“AS” = Assistant Superintendent 
 
 
 
 
The idea for ASSET was encapsulated in the language of SIP Focus Area #1 
itself, i.e. that in order for BPS to achieve the ambitious charge laid out to “implement an 
inclusive, rigorous, and culturally and linguistically sustaining PK-12 instructional 
program that serves the development of the whole child,” the organization must 
reorganize to facilitate an instructional roundtable in which diverse skillsets and expertise 
came together to provide more unified support attuned to the full needs of a child (Boston 
Public Schools, 2016, p. 13). Prior to this reorganization, business-as-usual was generally 
described as siloed in the central office for mostly functional and oversight purposes. 
Respective offices tackled fragmented components of the child’s identity (e.g. language 
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or disability status), a legacy owed mostly to decades of funding streams and programs 
from federal and state education agencies that (out of compliance and/or support) 
bureaucratized central offices around discrete aspects of a child’s identity. This approach 
took decidedly less consideration of the end-user experience as recipient or consumer of a 
BPS education (i.e. student or family). Shifting central office’s orientation more toward 
meeting the needs of whole children represents a major pivot in the history of Boston’s 
central office, attempting to bring coherence and collaboration to historically deep roots 
of incoherence and division. Because business-as-usual would not suffice for this vision 
laid out in the SIP, ASSET was formed in order to take on the tough work encapsulated 
in this ambitious vision of better meeting the needs of students and families – and the 
teachers and school leaders serving them – across Boston’s communities. The vision for 
ASSET is that of an instructional roundtable, where seemingly distinct or competing 
viewpoints can come together to forge equal partnerships in action toward truly 
addressing needs of the whole child.  
In many ways, my job at BPS is coach of the newly formed leadership team that 
provides direction and day-to-day management of ASSET as a division and the five 
offices that compose it. Working both with a team of eight other leaders, as well as with 
the staffs of five organizational units, I serve as a facilitator to help leaders and their 
teams to better coalesce and collaborate around the district’s vision for instruction. With 
the Deputy Superintendent of ASSET (to whom I report), I have established and 
supported many of the structures and mindsets for successful teams that I discuss in 
Chapter 2 so that this new and unprecedented division can come together to 
fundamentally do business differently. As a division in and of itself, ASSET represents a 
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big “bet” on how the district’s leaders believe we must be doing the day-to-day and long-
term strategic work. I use the gambling metaphor intentionally: the district has placed a 
high value and priority on this team to lead instruction differently, but it comes with some 
inherent risk in erring back toward the siloed way BPS has always done business. Much 
of my daily work, thus, is setting up intentional teaming experiences to promote 
perspective taking, empathy and respect building, cross-functional learning, and 
collaborative execution of projects and initiatives to attain the vision of the good we 
believe we can only attain by crossing our organizational boundaries. I work with each 
member of the ASSET team individually, in small groups, and as a whole unit in 
developing the sense of team we profess to need and want as a district to attain the vision 
we seek for student opportunity and achievement. 
Further, it is also incumbent on me to pursue this broader mandate so that I can 
more fully understand whether or not we are generating value and achieving our mission 
as a BPS central office in line with the expectations of our authorizing environment. The 
products created by central office (e.g. professional development, instructional tools, 
access to data) only have value insomuch as those who would consume or benefit from 
them similarly believe in and want their value. I often refer to this conversationally with 
my colleagues as the “vision of the good,” but it can more broadly be characterized by 
Moore’s (1995) concept of public value: what do we believe good teaching and learning 
looks like in Boston Public Schools? And from this understanding, to what ends are BPS 
graduates contributing to the community, society, and democracy of Boston? How do our 
high-quality teaching and learning experiences bring BPS graduates toward these ends? 
Achieving a shared understanding of public value within the central office environment 
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alone (among the individuals, teams, and offices that Moore would consider part of the 
organization’s operational capacity) can be a significant challenge; expanding that to the 
broader authorizing environment (among the public figures and interests who Moore 
would say offer legitimacy and support to BPS’s efforts) can be even more elusive. 
Despite our silos, and even given the semi-autonomous nature of our schools, 
Superintendent Chang has called on and empowered teams to work through disparate 
viewpoints and come together to provide the operational capacity to implement the 
instructional vision.  
Firmly grounding my work in the overarching public value proposition the district 
is putting forward is essential for any degree of successful implementation of strategic 
objectives. As Childress (2004) noted on strategy in public education, “strategy is about 
choosing – choosing what to do, and just as importantly, choosing what not to do” (p. 1). 
For me, navigating my work in supporting the 7 initiatives and 51 milestones owned by 
ASSET in the Strategic Implementation Plan thus must necessarily entail seeking to 
understand the value being generated by the district within and apart from the Plan 
through the lenses of those in our authorizing environment, who feel varying degrees of 
agreement in what the district has chosen to do and what not to do through its express and 
implicit strategy. While public-facing relations may not be an explicit component of my 
strategic project, it was critical to focus on making meaning through the eyes of those 
consuming or producing central office work products. Not incorporating their perspective 
would significantly inhibit my contributions and render nearly meaningless the efforts we 
put toward strategic aims. 
In summary, all of these pieces – from the narrow mandate of implementation and 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 24 
support of SIP initiatives 1.1 – 1.7, to the broader mandate of understanding value 
considerations within and beyond central office – come together to form my role as 
resident and Director of Instructional Strategy for ASSET at BPS. While additional 
projects were also added to my portfolio over the course of my ten months with BPS, the 
themes of planning, executing, and reflecting on performance toward key strategic 
objectives was the throughline of all my efforts. I have fleshed out this approach to the 
work in greater detail in my theory of action for residency year, which appears in Chapter 
3. First, however, I look to the literature and research to understand core theoretical 
underpinnings that make both teams and districts work in the context of a city like 
Boston.  
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Chapter 2: Review of Knowledge for Action (RKA) 
Herein, I explore four key questions central to the work of teams in the context of 
leading instructional improvement at scale in the setting of an urban school district like 
Boston Public Schools (BPS):  
Guiding Questions: 
 
1) Who or what is in a team?  
2) What specifically are we asking teams to do?  
3) How are we intentionally nurturing and sustaining teams to realize the big bets we 
are making on them?  
4) How are teams called to account for their performance within the context in which 
they operate? 
 
 The literature on using teams to improve organizational performance is 
dominated by several important authors and works. A close review of this literature 
reveals an important tension between the principal theories advanced. One group of 
authors – teaming scholars Wageman, Nunes, Burruss, and Hackman in their 2008 book 
Senior Leadership Teams – focuses on a combination of the structural conditions that 
those in positions of authority use to create, manage, and hold accountable particular 
kinds of teams. Another – teaming scholar Edmondson and her 2012 book Teaming – 
focuses on the more psychological and cultural characteristics of the members of a team, 
and the way their interactions with one another are facilitated at the micro level by 
particular kinds of behaviors. While Wageman et al. (2008) explain in great detail the 
way to maximize performance of a senior leadership team through “essential 
characteristics” of structure and design, Edmondson sometimes flouts the notion of these 
essential characteristics, questioning whether they can exist (or, at the very least, actually 
do exist or persist) in many organizational contexts. Teams are an exercise in dynamism 
according to Edmondson (2012), characterized by “the mindset and practices of 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 26 
teamwork” (p. 41), whereas Wageman et al. would suggest that structures and design 
elements of teams are most critical in ensuring team effectiveness. Teaming, Edmondson 
(2012) argues, “involves coordinating and collaborating without the benefit of stable 
team structures, because many operations…require a level of staffing flexibility that 
makes stable team composition rare” (p. 41). On the other hand, Wageman et al. extol the 
need for teams to be both bounded and stable in order for them to even be considered a 
real team.  
I have found both perspectives to be helpful in understanding teams across BPS. I 
have also found the theories that both sets of authors bring forward to be limited in the 
real-life context of a bureaucratic public sector institution like an urban school district. A 
variety of authors who have studied the context of the local education agency (including 
Moore and Alonso, 2014 and Cohen and Spillane, 1992) lay out critical context to 
understand how teaming efforts may be undermined in a bureaucratic context, either by 
design or as a casualty of large systems-level forces. Other authors (including Higgins, 
2012 and Weick, 1976) explain that many of the essential conditions and enabling 
structures may not actually be as necessary as Wageman et al. would argue, in large part 
because of the inherent instability of school districts. My goal is to use these dueling 
perspectives to demonstrate what theory says is necessary for teams to be effective in 
driving organizational performance while also elucidating the limitations of theory in the 
context of public education. I hope also to draw out the tension in both the verb form of 
team (i.e. teaming and teaming processes the way that Edmondson describes) in order to 
get to the productive end-state of teams in a noun form in the way that Wageman et al. 
describe (i.e., moving toward highly interdependent, bounded, and stable entities). In 
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later sections, I draw on this synthesis to explore the efforts and impacts of BPS in 
creating change by relying on teams, and my own personal efforts to diagnose, evaluate, 
and support these efforts. 
1. Who or What Is in a Team? | Team Members and Essential Characteristics 
 “Unfortunately, [this] is a question that most executives either ignore or 
assume they’ve answered – until they begin to experience the frustration 
of a dysfunctional team” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. XV). 
 
Who or what is in a team is something I have found surprisingly hard to nail 
down, as teams across Boston Public Schools (BPS) often face porous boundaries and 
unclear membership. Seemingly the simplest question is: where and how does one draw 
the line of which members are on a team and which members are not?  
Wageman et al. (2008) identify “three essential characteristics” of teams: they are 
interdependent, bounded, and stable. In Table 2.1, I summarize these characteristics: 
Table 2.1 
 
The Three Essential Characteristics of “Real Teams,” adapted from Wageman et al., 
2008 
 
Interdependent ! “Members share responsibility for achieving a collective purpose” 
(p. 43) which draws “heavily on their colleagues’ special 
knowledge, skill, and experience in the work they do together” (p. 
16). 
Bounded ! “Real teams have clear boundaries. Everyone knows who is a 
member and who is not” (p. 16). 
!  “If you do not establish clear boundaries, your team cannot 
develop the collective identity that it needs to interact as a unit 
with external constituencies” (p. 48) or “the identity and shared 
sense of purpose that are needed for intense collaborative work” 
(p. 48-49). 
Stable ! Real teams “have stability, and members have the time and 
opportunity to hone their ability to work together” (p. 16), with 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 28 
“stable membership long enough to get to know one another’s 
special strengths and limitations” (p. 43-44). 
 
It has been my experience at BPS that team boundaries are generally loose, with a 
core concentration of leadership (though not always one designated leader) and more 
porous lines of general membership. Wageman et al. (2008) acknowledge this 
phenomenon of porous boundaries in that less than 7% of the 120 leadership teams they 
studied from across sectors and industries had agreement on who the members of the 
team were: “Simply asking the CEO to give us a list of team members provided 
diagnostic data about how clear the boundaries of the team were…and what chance it had 
of operating as a real team” (p. 12-13). 
Wageman et al. (2008) argue that membership on the team should be as directed 
by the team leader and should reflect the unique value that each team member brings to 
the task and the purpose the team is being asked to perform. Selection of members goes 
beyond the individual experiences and skill sets members bring: it should also be a 
reflection of the teaming skills each individual can bring to the team being recruited. 
Chief executives must “make it clear that membership on the team requires certain 
teamwork capabilities beyond technical skills,” which means that once members are on a 
team, they must be willing to engage and be led on how to leverage their differences to 
contribute to the task at hand (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 84). This may mean that team 
members may have to not only discipline their own ego, but also in some ways set aside a 
commitment to the unit from which they have been drawn and its particular interests and 
structures of accountability to embrace accountability to the new team’s purpose. This is 
particularly tough when team members have been selected at least in part because of the 
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specialization that has been attached to their non-team organizational role. This 
understanding of purpose and accountability to a structure outside of one’s functional unit 
is critical for successful sustaining of a team: without it, claim Wageman et al. (2008), 
“the work of the team inevitably feels less important than the work of the individual 
members, and they wander away to focus on what they see as the most important of their 
accountabilities” (p. 61). 
 This quest for diversity of viewpoints and perspectives must still be bounded in a 
reasonable number of team members. To take into account one type of team, Wageman et 
al. (2008) argue that most senior leadership teams are too large, and that in order to create 
“a thoroughly crafted us” (p. 82), senior leadership teams must be constrained in their 
size to be useful – typically to no more than 8-9 for real decision making (Wageman et 
al., 2008). Higgins et al. (2012) say that size can be even smaller depending on team task. 
In their study, the authors claim the best teams have been among the smallest. Even at 
lower levels of interdependence, the larger a team is, the more challenging it makes it to 
meaningfully tackle the tasks set before it. When teams are unconstrained in size, “the 
space needed for real interdependence, meaningful contribution, and team decision 
making tends to be squeezed out,” as the number of relationships that must be managed 
expands and so too do the relational issues and coordination challenges that a team lead 
will have to deal with (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 19).  
Once this small number of team members is selected, team members must know 
that “they are being selected for the project for a reason” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 98). This 
notification sounds like a small and obvious step, but one that is not always expressly 
stated across teams or organizations. Doing so builds the “intellectual and emotional 
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commitment to the implementation process and acts as an invitation to others to 
participate in shaping the specifics of the effort, in addition to helping execute” 
(Edmondson, 2012, p. 98-99). 
Plausibility of team attributes. The core attributes of “real teams” – 
interdependence, boundedness, stability – may sit at the center of theory, but in the 
domain of school systems, their value may actually prove to be less important. In a study 
of teams in public education, Higgins et al. (2012) coined a term for a new type of team – 
“implementation teams” – that they defined as “a team charged with designing and 
leading the implementation of an organization-wide change strategy” (p. 1). These teams 
are cross-functional in nature, requiring individuals from across organizational silos and 
levels of hierarchy to come together around a strategic plan, aim, or interest. In their 
study of implementation teams, looking at team member learning as the key outcome 
variable in question, the authors found that “none of the ‘real team’ measures had a 
significant relationship with team member learning” (Higgins et al., 2012, p. 12).  
While Wageman et al. (2008) traditionally think about individual people when 
describing the attributes of real teams, Higgins et al. (2012) suggest that – in the context 
of K-12 public school systems – grounding team interdependence, boundedness, and 
stability to individuals “may be less relevant than tying the same dimensions to team 
members’ roles” (p. 18). Because implementation teams face dynamic, cross-cutting 
work, the individuals on the team may come and go but the team may remain intact, 
bounded, and interdependent through the roles or positions represented on the team. The 
authors explain this phenomenon through the identities of those represented on these 
teams: “members of implementation teams are both representatives of different 
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constituency groups in the organization and members of the implementation team,” in 
effect holding dual identities based on their team membership and their level of seniority 
within the organization (Higgins et al., 2012, p. 3). This makes the people who compose 
the team both team member and stakeholder, creating and designing the change effort as 
well as living with and working through any decisions the implementation team makes. 
“With multiple identities in tow” (p. 4), Higgins et al. argue that the individuals on the 
team matter less for stability and that stability of roles that comprise a team matter more 
in this context: “stability may indeed be one important dimension of an implementation 
team, but that team stability may stem more from maintaining role membership than 
people membership” (2012, p. 15-16). 
It is important to note that the traditional view of theory may not even 
characterize implementation teams as “real teams” with their fluctuating membership. 
Higgins et al. (2012) argue that sacrificing the team designation of implementation teams 
would cause real detriment to the organization, as implementation teams exhibit 
“potentially important and far-reaching impact on an organization’s change efforts” (p. 
18). In a contrapuntal response to Wageman et al. on key characteristics of teams, 
Higgins et al. recommend the dimension of stability be reconsidered in the K-12 
education context, calling these teams demonstrating role stability “very ‘real’” and that 
labeling teams with high individual turnover as defunct (or leaving them unsupported) 
could be a real mistake for the organization (2012, p. 19). !  
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2. What Specifically Are We Asking Teams to Do? | Team Purpose and Task 
“The best top teams are those whose leaders know exactly where they 
want to make the enterprise and have a strategy to get there, and who 
have articulated an explicit purpose for the team that focuses on the 
unique contributions it can make to realize that strategy” (Wageman et 
al., 2008, p. XVIII). 
 
As I entered BPS, I quickly observed a lot of talk not only about teams but also 
about tasks, i.e. the specific assignment, work, or job to be done. Indeed, in the same way 
that the organization emphasizes teams in order to make change happen, it also speaks 
fluently about task as the intersectional nucleus inside the instructional core (see City et 
al., 2009) – where all the pieces come together in the relationship between student, 
teacher, and content: 
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Figure 2.1 
 
Instructional core with task at center 
 
 
When I took to the teaming literature, I was equally impressed by the centrality of 
task in gaining an understanding of a team purpose’s and interdependence. How 
interdependence is constructed into the task the team performs – and according to a 
team’s express purpose – says a lot about whether or not the team will be successful. 
Wageman et al. (2008) argue that teams must be created, authorized, and used to 
“focus exclusively on what is this team for that no other entity in the organization could 
accomplish” (p. 22). Creating a team begs close, concise reflection on the specific actions 
that some specific mix of people can partake in to achieve some very specific end. 
Especially in the context of organizational silos, the concept of interdependence is 
introduced as a key ingredient to the success of these teams. 
It is critical to define what exactly the interdependencies among members of a 
team are, and this can be done through the crafting of a compelling team purpose. A well-
crafted team purpose highlights the interdependencies among members of the team; it can 
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then be used as a way to identify or vet which specific tasks the team leader decides 
should be taken on by the team. To land on a substantive degree of interdependence, 
Wageman et al. (2008) argue that leaders must articulate to their teams a purpose that is 
“not merely the sum of the individual members’ contributions” nor simply “the purpose 
of the organization,” but rather a purpose specific to that team that is “consequential,” 
“challenging,” and above all “clear” (p. 17).  
A consequential purpose is one that is “crucial enough to be treated as the main 
job of the leaders and not as a side job when their individual roles are done” (Wageman 
et al., 2008, p. 59). A consequential purpose conveys that the products of the team must 
be important, and must only be able to be produced by the members of that specific team. 
With purpose as a statement of consequence, members of the team (and certainly the 
team’s leader) should easily be able answer the question, “what are the few, critical 
things that only this team of senior leaders, of all the people in this organization, can 
accomplish?” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 59). They should feel as though the 
responsibilities they are in charge of as a team are at least tantamount in importance to 
their own individual responsibilities or those of their office.  
Team purpose must also be “challenging enough but not impossible” (Wageman 
et al., 2008, p. 59). On the one hand, this means not restricting the team to trivial tasks or 
low-level decisions that could easily be handled by an individual on (or off) that team; on 
the other hand, the team must also not be over-challenged by tasks that demand too much 
of them or do not reflect a balance with their individual responsibilities. If tasks err too 
much in either direction, team members will begin to associate team membership and 
purpose with a self-reinforcing negative experience. These two patterns emerged in 
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Wageman et al.’s (2008) research into setting the right level of challenge: team leads 
often over-challenged members in their individual leadership roles, “holding them to the 
highest performance standards and constantly raising the bar to test individual 
capabilities,” but demanded too little from the leadership team as a whole (p. 60). As the 
authors question, “why challenge the individuals but restrict the team to trivia?” (p. 60).  
Finally, the importance of clarity in team purpose cannot be understated – 
according to Edmondson and Wageman et al. but also starkly reflected in my experience 
at BPS. “Clarity of purpose makes the extraordinarily challenging and consequential 
work of senior leadership teams feel possible,” according to Wageman et al. (2008, p. 
62). However, of the three attributes of a strong team purpose, clarity is also the most 
elusive. It is threatened in an absence of shared understanding, manifesting through: 1) a 
leader’s assumption that members’ understanding or acknowledgment of the 
organization’s mission statement leads automatically to understanding of a senior 
leadership team’s purpose; 2) a lack of shared understanding of the organization’s 
strategy, i.e. understanding explicitly the organizational logic and mental modeling of 
how resources and processes come together to achieve desired priorities; and 3) the level 
of sheer emotional courage that it takes to achieve and sustain clarity, especially as 
purpose gets refined and can threaten relationships by ruling out members’ priorities, or 
uncovering discrepancies or conflicts about what members think their roles or 
contributions are or should be.  
Purposes are often shrouded in assumptions, and it is the team leader’s job to 
surface those assumptions for the sake of shared mental modeling for how this team will 
produce cause and effect. According to Wageman et al. (2008), organizational 
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researchers have emphasized the importance of team members having well calibrated 
mental models of their organization’s strategy. It is not adequate, they claim, to assume 
that having heard the strategy or even being able to say it in the same words is sufficient: 
“Members must talk about the strategy as a team and play out its implications in direct 
conversation with one another” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 65). Edmondson (2012) points 
out that effective teaming “requires integrating perspectives from a range of disciplines, 
communicating the different mental models that accompany different areas of expertise, 
and being able to manage the inevitable conflicts that arise when people work together” 
(p. 52). This is an incredibly challenging skillset for any individual member of a team to 
naturally come by or even grow into, demanding dexterity in “interpersonal skills related 
to learning (inquiry, curiosity, listening) and teaching (communicating, connecting, 
clarifying)” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 52). Surfacing and working through tacit assumptions, 
understandings, and beliefs about the baseline way that team members or their respective 
units work or pursue change is crucial for any team to truly achieve interdependence in 
purpose or task. 
Teaming authors offer a wide array of typologies of teams, often relying on 
degrees of interdependence to draw boundary lines amongst team types. A team’s 
purpose may range from something minimally interdependent like exchanging 
information to something much more highly interdependent like making decisions. This 
is not to necessarily to imply that all teams exist solely for implementation of specific 
tasks. While all teams come together around some specific purpose, and that purpose is 
exemplified through the tasks that the teams perform, teams exist for reasons beyond 
execution of specific tasks. The degree of interdependence that teams must exhibit, 
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according to their purpose, offers a useful way to differentiate among types of teams. 
While by no means exhaustive, I highlight two schemas for categorization of 
teams according to the degree of interdependence their purpose requires below in Figure 
2.2. It is worth noting that these categories are not mutually exclusive, and often times 
teams can be characterized by more than one of these team types at the same time. 
Wageman et al. (2008) claim that there are four principle types of senior leadership teams 
according to the interdependence of the purposes and tasks they pursue. Similarly, 
Christensen and Kaufman (2006) borrow from Wheelwright and Clark (1992) in also 
putting forward four different categories of teams that rely on degree and predictability of 
interdependencies to draw boundary lines for team types. Both typologies emphasize 
what would be needed across large, complex organizations drawing cross functionally on 
expertise and knowledge sets from different silos to achieve different aims. 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Select typologies of teams according to degrees of interdependence 
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More
Interdependence
Less
Interdependence
Decision-Making 
Teams
make decisions that affect the entire organization and reflect 
contributions and input from leadership across the enterprise
Coordinating 
Teams
execute strategically important initiatives and actively 
manage interdependent tasks
Consultative 
Teams
help align leaders and members across organizational 
functions and obtain counsel on key initiatives
Informational 
Teams
share information and make leaders and individual team 
members better informed across the enterprise
Autonomous 
Teams
innovate outside of existing business units to create 
disruptive new processes or products
Heavyweight 
Teams
manage unpredictable interdependencies in the development 
of new processes or products
Lightweight 
Teams
Manage predictable interdependencies in the development of 
new processes or products
Functional 
Teams
execute tasks within operational units without significant 
contribution or coordination from other units
  Wageman et al., 
2008
Christensen and 
Kaufman (2006) 
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In the schemas presented in Figure 2.2, it is important to emphasize that teams 
often do more than execute: they serve functions and have subsidiary benefits that go 
beyond task execution to enhance other aspects of organizational performance. One way 
of considering these effects is through what Wageman, Hackman, and Lehman (2005) 
define as the three dimensions of team effectiveness. While the first dimension considers 
execution of the task and whether it met or exceeded the standards or expectations of 
those who evaluate or consume the team’s work, team effectiveness is also defined by 
“how well members worked together now to enhance – rather than undermine – their 
capability to work together in the future” and “whether the group experience, on balance, 
contributed positively to the learning and personal development of individual team 
members.” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 10-11). While excellent performance in the latter 
two dimensions pay dividends to the team itself, their benefits also extend to individual 
team members and their organizational domains. The learning the team members acquire 
through the team experience helps them to better understand the context of their own 
work and the ecosystem in which their contributions are situated. Team experiences help 
individuals make connections between their own personal accountabilities (or those of 
their office) with those of others. Even at lower levels of interdependence such as 
coordination or information sharing, members can continue to grow and learn in ways 
that help them enhance their own personal performance through increased understanding 
of organizational strategy. Greater understanding of the task environment also stands to 
strengthen organizational performance as individuals and offices can make choices that 
better cohere or align with broader organizational strategy. The team experience, thus, 
strengthens not just the execution of discrete tasks but can have positive impacts on tasks 
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far beyond what a specific team has been charged to do. 
As team purpose ascends in interdependence, the core work and number of tasks 
the team attempts should become quite limited. The tasks the teams perform should 
mirror the membership the teams boast: they both should be “large in impact and few in 
number” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 46). Great teams perform “only genuinely meaningful 
tasks,” which are concrete, “whole, and strategically important pieces of work” 
(Wageman et al., 2008, p. 114 and p. 19). Reaching this threshold of interdependence is 
justifiably a high bar. In their research, the authors found “clear and strong tendency for 
struggling teams to be cursed with overly simple and trivial team tasks,” when in order to 
be successful members need “a short list of well-defined tasks that are mission critical” 
(Wageman et al., 2008, p. 114 and p. 117).  
Challenges to clarity of team purpose. As the tasks teams tackle increase in 
interdependence, so too must the collaborative spirit with which team members approach 
the work. Framing the team’s work in a way that feels consequential, challenging, and 
clear for the team is hard enough; doing so in a way that transcends organizational 
boundaries and encourages team members to actually expand their decision-making 
perspectives beyond their own interests or the interests of their organizational unit is an 
immensely challenging undertaking. In both of the illustrative schemas described in 
Figure 2.2, more highly interdependent tasks require team members to take action and 
make decisions on behalf of the entire organizational unit or organization and not just out 
of regard or perspective for their own business unit. If team members are not asked to 
perform tasks that entail the exchange of strategic information, coordination of 
enterprise-wide initiatives, or the making of vital decisions on behalf of the organization, 
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the teamwork will feel less important than their individual responsibilities, and (to repeat 
a previous statement) they will “wander away to focus on what they see as the most 
important of their accountabilities” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 61).  
Even the teaming authors admit the ideal level of clarity in team purpose and 
adherence to an exclusive and small list of tasks is hard to come by. Many team leaders 
are all too eager to pile additional tasks onto the team’s plate if the need exists. Efforts 
toward teaming are also undercut by organizational features that run more toward 
division than integration. Institutional forces and organizational structures (like offices, 
units, and divisions) often reinforce a siloed mentality that is tough to overcome, 
especially in the environment of public sector bureaucracy. Even tasks that seem 
interdependent at surface level can backslide into a series of successive independent tasks 
according to the function of the individual or unit. Edmondson (2012) characterizes this 
phenomenon as “when the work is interdependent but teaming doesn’t occur:” work 
would unfold more smoothly if only team members coordinated their actions “as if they 
were members of a high performing team rather than individual specialists completing a 
series of separate tasks” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 45-46). This pernicious persistence of 
organizational silos has the ability to torpedo what otherwise might feel like more 
interdependent team purposes or tasks into highly choreographed routines – a kabuki of 
interdependence – in which “each person performs a task as efficiently as possible based 
on the needs of his/her specialized department” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 48).  
Cohen and Spillane (1992) explain that these divisions within local education 
agencies (LEAs) and their central administrative offices are not accidental, and as a 
consequence they do not foster the most fertile ground for teaming. LEAs are governed – 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 42 
formally and informally – by an ever-growing array of differing demands from public 
and private constituencies, down to the neighborhood level and up to the federal level. 
Local schools feel compelled to respond to these demands because they are locally and 
democratically governed. Further, the assistance and support that federal and state 
governments provide to LEAs has a byproduct: the creation and reinforcement of internal 
organizational silos. Both of these circumstances not only create internal fragmentation 
within LEAs, but they also weaken overall central organization in relation to sub-units 
that serve specialized missions and interests. 
Cohen and Spillane (1992) explain how historically and “extraordinarily 
dispersed” power and authority have been in public education for decades, especially in 
the arena of instruction (p. 4). The authors argue that this foil is intentional: divisions 
were “carefully calculated to inhibit the coordinated action of government,” leaving 
authority most intact the closer you get to the local level or more granularly the student 
level (p. 5). While this line of reasoning draws into question whether or not central 
administrative offices can really influence what is happening at the classroom level, 
LEAs still maintain a great deal of control or influence over budget, staffing, 
programming, and other resources. Assuming it is possible for leaders and centralized 
staff to influence instruction through these levers, the organizational structure of districts 
makes the feat extraordinarily difficult.  
Despite the relatively weak influence federal and state education agencies 
maintain in comparison to national ministries of education in other countries, the ways in 
which money flows from or through these entities to LEAs has come to necessarily 
divide up district central offices into a variety of silos. These silos exist to ensure that key 
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functions like the protection of civil rights for English learners, students with disabilities, 
and students of color are properly administered. LEAs comply with these dividing forces 
in exchange for funding – expressing, by extension, “an abiding hope for the power of 
government and a wish to harness it for social problem solving” and agreement with the 
theory that specialized attention (and resources and support) for marginalized groups of 
students will improve learning outcomes (Cohen and Spillane, 1992, p. 8).  
That hopeful notion is stubbornly persistent in nearly all urban school districts, 
divvying up staffs around fragmented aspects of a student’s identity rather than uniting 
them cross-functionally to tackle the whole set of a child’s needs. As expressed by the 
authors, “nearly all of these policies and programs sought to solve problems that crossed 
jealously guarded jurisdictional boundaries among and within governments” (Cohen and 
Spillane, 1992, p. 8). These kinds of divisions within central office staff make it hard to 
establish and share a common, compelling purpose – one that is consequential, 
challenging, and clear enough for everyone involved in the task. While not impossible, 
institutional forces all but incentivize working against the more common aims that teams 
are often asked to achieve.  
This kind of division also makes the shared mental modeling that Wageman et al. 
and Edmondson discuss as so important to teams much more challenging to come by. 
Divisional boundaries help establish and reinforce purposes within individual 
organizational units, but make it more difficult to understand across these boundaries. 
This is especially true in what Weick (1976) calls the “loose coupling” of K-12 
education, referring to the fragmentation and incoherence that marks many (or most) state 
and local education systems and individual schools. In Weick’s argument, this loose 
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coupling is strategic: it maximizes flexibility within organizations by diminishing 
permanence of relationships between and among the composite units and entities within 
the organization, thereby allowing teams or alliances to come and go as the situation 
requires. In effect, loosely coupled parts of an education system “are responsive, 
but…each retains some identity and separateness” and “their attachment may be 
circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects” (Weick, 1976, p. 4). Loose 
coupling, the author argues, connotes “impermanence, dissolvability, and tacitness, all of 
which are potentially crucial properties of the ‘glue’ that holds organizations together” 
(Weick, 1976, p. 4). In such a schema, anything within a system can be tied together – 
but generally speaking done so only weakly, irregularly, or impermanently; the end result 
is a minimal degree of interdependence with relatively low regard attached to it. 
This conception of loose coupling of the components of education systems stands 
in sharp contrast to “the prevailing image that elements in organizations are coupled 
through dense, tight linkages” (Weick, 1976, p. 2). Composite parts of a system are 
bound together through some commonly held mechanism, such as a task or 
accountability, but at their core Weick argues that the identity and separation of units 
leads to only temporary attachment. While conventional authors might disagree, Weick 
argues this is positive, allowing for swift, localized adaptation of policies at the school 
and classroom level and avoiding the dangers of standardization in applying rigid 
solutions to diverse circumstances. This schema, though, holds vast pitfalls for teams 
within organizations – especially when it comes to establishing a common mental model 
for how the organization works or seeks to make change. In this understanding of reality, 
it becomes challenging to develop shared understanding of how a team’s unique purpose 
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fits into a broader organizational strategy—the same logic cannot be applied in all 
circumstances because relationships vary based on the situation. This leads Weick to 
argue that “parts of some organizations are heavily rationalized but many parts also prove 
intractable to analysis through rational assumptions” (1976, p. 1). While this makes 
organizational leadership more challenging, Weick would argue that this is actually just a 
more honest portrayal and representation of the state of affairs in education bureaucracies 
and their relative impotence in effecting change: “there is the even greater danger of 
portraying organizations in inappropriate terms which suggest an excess of unity, 
integration, coordination, and consensus…loose coupling is also a non-rational system of 
fund allocation and therefore, unspecifiable, unmodifiable, and incapable of being used as 
means of change” (1976, p. 5 and p. 8). 
3. How Are We Intentionally Nurturing and Sustaining Teams to Realize the Big 
Bets We Are Making on Them? | Team Behaviors and Learning 
“Creating a solid structure for your team may not feel like an urgent 
leadership task. . . . But they need structure. Well-chosen team members 
are capable of handling their individual responsibilities, but most have 
very little experience in working as a member of a truly interdependent 
leadership team” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 115). 
 
While the inclination toward teaming can be beneficial, effective teams need 
structures as well as mindsets and beliefs to facilitate the actions that will lead them to 
success. Edmondson (2012) remarks that “effective teaming requires everyone to remain 
vigilantly aware of others’ needs, roles, and perspectives,” as it requires both “affective 
(feeling) and cognitive (thinking) skills in order to learn to relate to others better and 
learning to make decisions based on the integration of different perspectives” (p. 2). Both 
Edmondson and Wageman et al. argue that these kinds of behaviors and mindsets are 
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“anything but natural acts in large organizations” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 2). 
In the discussion under the previous two questions, I have predominantly 
examined teams by looking at intentional design choices in structuring teams. 
Edmondson (2012), however, prefers to think about teaming more as verb than as noun, 
defining “teaming” as “the activity of working together to carry out interdependent tasks” 
and characterizing teaming as “an active process, not a static entity” (p. 2). In reality, 
effective teaming relies on a mixture of structures as well as mindsets and beliefs. 
Edmondson puts these together by describing four key behaviors that team members must 
engage in to make the teaming process successful. I discuss each of these four key 
behaviors below, with additional detail underneath each one about structures, mindsets, 
and beliefs that undergird each key activity. 
  Speaking up. Of the four key team behaviors, speaking up is most critical for 
facilitating honest, direct conversation among individuals or as a group, for giving and 
receiving feedback, and for discussing success and failure. Speaking up is highly 
complicated, though, with real or perceived power dynamics on teams or within 
organizations causing subordinates to often hesitate or feel loathe to voice anything that 
may feel like a critique of superiors.  
While challenging initially, speaking up can be facilitated through the setting of 
deliberate structures that make an environment safer and more egalitarian for members to 
exercise voice. This structure is characterized by adherence to a strong set of team norms, 
or established expectations for behavior that govern team members’ actions both within 
and outside team meetings (Wageman et al., 2008). While sometimes characterized (or 
playfully lampooned) as the formal or informal list of “do” and “don’t” behaviors, a good 
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list of team norms discusses actions team members should abstain from and actions that 
members should proactively engage in to promote the health and productivity of the 
team. Wageman et al. (2008) found that the presence of clear norms of conduct had “the 
largest impact of any sub-feature of the six conditions on whether a leadership team was 
effective” in their study (p. 114). On a strong team, “members know precisely what is and 
what is not acceptable behavior in the team” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 114), and 
“whatever behavior the leader tolerates becomes part of the rules” (p. 132). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly then, team norms and expectations for behavior are intimately related to 
the size of the team and have enormous implications on the ability for the team to 
successfully perform the task with which they are charged: “the bigger the team, the 
harder it is to establish and enforce the rules of engagement” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 
117). “Teaming” as a verb can really come to life through the course of the team’s work. 
Members begin to understand and self-govern each other on “how to interact” through 
the development of trust and deep knowledge of each other’s roles (Edmondson, 2012, p. 
12). Once structures like norms are in place, they become all but invisible as teams begin 
to work interdependently on the tasks they have been assigned in alignment with the 
team’s unique purpose. 
Collaborating in a spirit of mutual respect. This behavior is as much a mindset 
as it is a behavior on highly functional teams. While structures like norms (with repeated 
and persistent practice) help to set a foundation of mutual respect for teams, collaboration 
does not just magically occur though once a team comes together with a clear and 
compelling purpose. Teams need real resources and supports in order to enable 
interdependent collaboration. Even though leaders often recognize the importance of 
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investing resources and time into the front-line teams they lead within their 
organizational unit, many chief executives starve their leadership teams of the resources 
they need to be successful (Wageman et al., 2008). While ultimately “the mindset of 
teaming has to be focused on how to get the job done with the team resources available” 
(Edmondson 2012, p. xii), outstanding senior leadership teams (as compared with 
mediocre and poor teams) “do not skimp on support resources” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 
141). Wageman et al. describe resources needed for effective teams in four categories:  
• Material resources – like time, space, staff support, and mundane odds and ends – 
keep the basic needs of the team satisfied so that they can perform their work.  
• Rewards – at the team level, not just the individual level – recognize and reinforce 
teams for delivering on their purpose or succeeding in their tasks. This includes 
the extent to which employees perceive that good team performance is recognized 
or rewarded in the organization. 
• Education – including for the team leader – includes training and development not 
only on business unit functions but also on how to be an effective team member. 
This includes helping members to be able “to engage in robust but constructive 
debate with other team members and to think strategically about the enterprise as 
a whole” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 82). The authors claim that, second only to 
rewards, education about teamwork is the resource that made the most difference 
between outstanding teams and lower-performing teams.  
• Information – relevant to the task the team must perform (including measures that 
allow members to assess their performance as a team) is a critical but often 
overlooked resource for teams. While some teams experience a dearth of data, 
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others suffer from information overload – often because they rely on the same 
information systems serving the rest of the organization, which were “built for 
other people and other purposes” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 147). Teams end up 
patching together their own understandings, “relying heavily on anecdotal 
information gathered informally through conversations that occur in the course of 
other work instead of systematic business intelligence” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 
148).  
 
It is important to underscore the challenges that teams face without systematically 
collected data for members to make meaning of through shared assessment, 
interpretation, and analysis. Edmondson (2012) even argues the learning work is not 
possible absent systematically collected data on both process (formative measures) and 
outcomes (summative measures) – both of which are key elements in organizational 
learning.  
Experimentation and reflection. Experimentation and reflection, the third and 
fourth key behaviors of successful teams, critically recognize that “teaming involves a 
tentative, iterative approach to action that recognizes the novelty and uncertainty inherent 
in every interaction between individuals” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 52). Edmondson (2012) 
refers to action cycles as “trial and failure,” recognizing that “experimentation means 
expecting not to be right the first time” (p. 55). This may seem like a subtle shift in 
mindset, but the tacit expectation that employees will do right the first time runs deep in 
organizations. Whether expressed implicitly or explicitly, most individual team members 
– especially in the context of accountability – are highly reluctant to take risks that may 
result in failure, or to take a risk in speaking up when they recognize a failure is taking 
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place. Without failure and openly admitting to failure, an organization will not only 
deprive itself of lucrative opportunities to engage in the cycles of reflection and learning 
that lead to organizational improvement, but they will continue to inefficiently and 
ineffectively operate as they repeat (or even deepen) the same mistakes that yielded 
failures the first time around. 
When teams take any significant action – including taking on new processes, or 
even tweaking existing processes – teams must actively engage in reflection to 
authentically understand whether or not the actions taken in experimentation actually 
worked. Reflection must be frequent and ongoing, “on a consistent basis that reflects the 
rhythm of the work,” in order to uncover learning for the team as a unit, as well as for the 
individuals composing the team to assess their own practice and contributions to the 
success or failure (Edmondson, 2012, p. 52). Reflection includes explicit and intentional 
surfacing and discussion of observations, questions, processes, and outcomes. 
Edmondson emphasizes that the process of teaming in and of itself is learning: about the 
members of the team, about the task and purposes the team aspires to achieve, and about 
the context or environment in which the team exists. She calls the overarching orientation 
and mindset toward organizational learning “execution-as-learning,” reflecting an 
organizational or team-based commitment to learning by doing and (especially) learning 
through failure. Great performance, Edmondson (2012) claims, is “trying something that 
fails, figuring out what works instead, and telling your colleagues all about it – about 
both the success and the failure” (p. 28-29). 
Having such a dogged persistence and attitude toward recognizing, 
acknowledging, and understanding failure reflects the commitment that Bryk and others 
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have postulated in the field of improvement science. Learning is characterized as 
collective and individual processes of gathering information, reflecting on it and 
assessing it, and modifying behaviors to produce desired outcomes as a result of that 
information. Execution-as-learning, thus, is “a way of operating as an organization that 
combines continuous learning with high performance…getting the work done while 
simultaneously working on how better to do it” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 30). As an 
organizational posture, its defining attribute is its “integration of constant, unremarkable, 
small-scale learning into day-to-day work,” as a sort of “reflection-in-action, rather than 
reflection-after-action” that is assimilated into the processes of doing the work itself 
(Edmondson, 2012, p. 30). Members of teams are constantly engaged in learning cycles 
actively during their practice, surfacing and making use of each member’s distinct 
knowledge and perspective to find ways to better deliver on their task and work better 
together.  
Challenges to the learning imperative of teams. This friendly approach to 
failure is anything but automatic for most individuals and teams. As Edmondson (2012) 
points out, “it’s a cruel irony [that] our success depends on effective collaboration and 
learning, the essence of teaming, but these don’t come naturally either for individuals or 
the social systems we create;” she continues, “it can be hard for people to muster both the 
humility and the genuine curiosity that is needed to really learn from others” (p. 62). 
Failure is “emotionally unpleasant and can erode confidence,” and team members often 
wrap failure up in the self-worth they have for themselves or that the worth they perceive 
others (especially leaders) have for them (Edmondson, 2012, Ch. 5, Sec. “The 
Inevitability of Failure,” Para. 1). 
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Recognizing and analyzing failures requires persistent coaching and leadership, 
exercised not only by the team lead but by each member of the team as well, in order to 
continuously expand team capacity to identify and diagnosis problems. These behaviors 
take failures as grist to perform hard-lined introspection of the team as a unit: high-
performing teams constantly assess and re-assess themselves to check on their 
interdependencies, purpose, and level of effectiveness. This introspection is aided 
through what Edmondson (2012) calls an inquiry orientation, a set of traits and behaviors 
needed for learning from failure that involves motivation “to embrace the difficult and 
often emotionally challenging lessons that failures reveal,” “a spirit of curiosity and 
openness,” “exceptional patience and a tolerance for ambiguity” (Ch. 5, Sec. 
“Developing a Learning Approach to Failure,” Para. 1), and unwavering belief in “our 
individual and collective fallibility” (Ch. 7, Sec. “Swimming Upstream,” Para. 1). While 
challenging to cultivate team-wide, these beliefs, mindsets, and practices have 
remarkable potential to unlock team learning – and limitless organizational growth – 
when they become instilled in teams. 
This inquiry orientation can be quashed, however, in the presence of looming 
individual or team-based accountability or in the context of politicized and highly visible 
public agencies—these can cast a much more scornful light on mistakes and failure than 
is tenable for learning. It is a tricky dynamic to straddle: the need for accountability in 
public systems holding inordinate amounts of taxpayer money to create a public good 
(e.g. an informed citizenry), while also giving the space and safety for expert contributors 
holding diverse arrays of knowledge and expertise to figure out how best to come 
together to serve a vast, intricate web of student needs. Edmondson (2012) attempts to 
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straddle this dynamic in her discussion of psychological safety, a term she defines as “a 
climate in which people feel free to express relevant thoughts and feelings without fear of 
being penalized” (p. 77). She argues that, because teaming requires coordinating and 
integrating actions across complex tasks, teaming flourishes with psychological safety 
and diminishes without it. Psychological safety is built on the premise that “no one can 
perform perfectly in every situation when knowledge and best practice are moving 
targets” (Edmondson, 2008, p. 6).   
In a visceral way, psychological safety is about team members feeling 
comfortable participating “without excessive concern about what others think of them” 
and having difficult conversations “without the need to tiptoe around the truth” 
(Edmondson, 2012, p. 77 and p. 118). Members of teams instinctively internalize the pain 
they feel when they are excoriated for doing something wrong, for overreacting, or for 
looking dumb in front of superiors or peers. The self-censorship or silence team members 
employ to cope with or obviate that pain can come with high cost to the function of the 
team or service to the team’s mission – even at the expense of human life, as Edmondson 
(2012) illustrated in the lead-up and aftermath of the space shuttle Challenger explosion. 
Team members choose to “stay silent not because they don’t have something to say” but 
because of a “subtle but pervasive fear of what others, particularly those in power, might 
think of them” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 119), thereby discounting the harm that could be 
caused to others or to the team in favor of our own self-preservation and self-protection 
from castigation. This type of fear can be exacerbated in the presence of strong 
accountability systems: admitting failure works directly contrary to the objectives of self-
preservation and self-protection in this organizational environment. 
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Psychological safety is in essence a social contract within a team or organization; 
its presence can help determine whether or not individuals choose to believe or to act in 
the tiniest situations and decisions. Edmondson discusses a “tacit calculus” as the internal 
deliberation happening within an individual’s head, assessing the personal risk associated 
with a given interpersonal behavior before taking making a move, often effortlessly or 
automatically, at a “micro behavior decision point” (Edmondson, 2012, p. 119). She says 
it is staggering the “degree to which interpersonal fear can dominate modern work life 
and thwart the collaboration that is desperately needed” in knowledge-intensive 
organizations – which would include schools and education systems (2012, p. 117-8). 
That fear stunts risk-taking and the real learning that can come from trying, failing, and 
adapting. The problem is widespread and exacerbated especially in hierarchical 
organizations (like public bureaucracies) where control based on positionality is a 
primary mechanism for fulfillment of tasks or duties. Edmondson (2012) says the “most 
important reason to care about psychological safety in the workplace is that it encourages 
speaking up,” which helps facilitate learning behaviors such as discussing failure (p. 
125). However, without a persistent focus on cultivating safety in culture, organizations 
and teams fall into what Edmondson (2008) thinks of as “predictable self-sabotaging 
traps,” including where “critical information and ideas fail to rise to the top” (the 
message is that “speed, efficiency, and results” are what matter, not “ideas, concerns, or 
even questions”); “people don’t have enough time to learn” (which “delays, discourages, 
or understaffs investments in areas where learning is critical” and can “subtly discourage 
technologies, skills, or practices that make new approaches viable”); and “companies 
think they can do no wrong” (falling prey to “a classic attribution error: the conclusion 
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that the company’s success is evidence of its wisdom”) (p. 4-6).  
Especially considering how individual mindsets and behaviors are both influenced 
by psychological safety and help to fortify the psychological safety (no matter how low 
or high) that already exists, achieving this balance of the vulnerability of learning through 
taking personal risks in the context of hierarchy-based accountability is hard. It relies on 
a deeply personal understanding of self and role within an organization or team, which 
has implications for a team member’s self-concept of identity and even value and worth 
toward the purpose that the team seeks to accomplish. Even in being selected to join a 
team “district leaders may signal not only that one’s personal abilities and talents are 
valued but also that one is expected to represent the identity of other groups across the 
district,” which further raises stakes of participation and pressure to ensure that a team 
member is adequately representing his or her constituency (Higgins et al., 2012, p. 8). 
This salience of role has the potential to be beneficial to team outcomes but can also be 
stifling to individual team members: if safety is lacking to enable all team members to 
freely speak up, especially on a team with a diversity of roles, then a team member may 
feel authorized only to speak on behalf of that particular role for which she is 
representative. For example, “being the only teacher on a senior leadership team is likely 
to raise the salience of that role identity for the team member and, in particular, her sense 
of responsibility to exercise voice on behalf of that constituency” (Higgins et al., 2012, p. 
8). 
As one last wrinkle, anyone who has ever done any teamwork is well aware that 
teams can easily and quickly decline in performance in the face of interpersonal conflict 
or miscommunication among team members. While collaboration has the potential to 
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enhance the quality a final product through the unique contributions of team members, 
these behaviors open up space for miscommunication and conflict – especially in 
knowledge sectors like education. Troubling dynamics are especially magnified in the 
context of accountability. Left unattended, team conflicts can lead to significant depths of 
distrust among team members that will ultimately hinder team performance and 
effectiveness. 
4. How are Teams Called to Account for their Performance within the Context in 
which they Operate? | Team Accountability in the Context of Bureaucracy 
 “…Consequently, the work of the team inevitably feels less important 
than the work of the individual members, and they wander away to focus 
on what they see as the most important of their accountabilities” 
(Wageman et al., 2008, p. 61). 
 
Edmondson and Wageman et al. both argue that there is a clear role for 
accountability on teams. Edmondson (2012) states that holding people accountable helps 
people to understand that “unacceptable behaviors do occur and must be equitably 
addressed,” and that “clearly explaining what happened and why” helps a team and an 
organization to “build fairness and responsibility, which removes the fear of leader 
arbitrariness” (p. 144). This mindset is important in intentionally cultivating and 
maintaining teams in any environment, as it acknowledges that competent professionals 
may make mistakes while still maintaining low or no tolerance for reckless or careless 
behavior. That said, calling members of a team to account for their performance could 
undermine the very inquiry orientation that Edmondson and Wageman et al. both seek to 
advance in the spirit learning through failure. The messages of failure and learning (on 
the one hand) and consequences for or within teams for poor or lacking performance (on 
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the other) stand in tension with each other, and generally can confuse the members who 
compose teams. That tension is significantly exacerbated in the context of the hierarchy 
and bureaucracy that shape the American K-12 public education sector.  
Accountability in the bureaucratic workplace has origins in what Edmondson 
(2008) described as a managerial model of control, in line with the factory work that 
characterized the early to mid-twentieth century. In this regime, the employee was simple 
and controllable, easily able to be directed to perform repetitive tasks largely without 
regard to the individual’s personal motivation, interest, or pleasure (Edmondson, 2008). 
Absent from the logic of this model was the drive that might make a job bearable to an 
employee – or even motivate an employee. In the place of genuine employee interest 
were behavioral principles of control, combinations of carrots and sticks that taken 
together produce “an undercurrent of fear” that Edmondson (2008) reminds us still 
characterizes many workplaces today. Unfortunately, as Wilson (1989) wrote, 
“bureaucrats have preferences:” they have thoughts and opinions about the work they are 
doing and how the work should get done, and they also “have emotional commitment to 
the mission of the agency they serve that fuels their own self-interest” (p. 156).  
 As “citizens take a particularly dim view of initiatives undertaken by bureaucrats 
because they suspect civil servants of being self-serving or of pursuing their own 
idiosyncratic ideas of the public interest,” public managers like school district 
superintendents and principals tend to act like “administrators or bureaucrats rather 
than…entrepreneurs, leaders, or executives” (Moore, 1995, p. 19). In this mindset, public 
managers look downward “toward the reliable control of organizational operations rather 
than either outward, toward the achievement of valuable results, or upward, toward 
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renegotiated policy mandates” (Moore, 1995, p. 17). As a result, the very behavior that 
Edmondson lauds as key for teams to engage in to unlock successful performance – e.g. 
experimentation and reflection – is not much tolerated in bureaucratic settings. There is 
limited appetite for “imagination and initiative among (unelected) public sector 
executives;” such activity is instead viewed as “dangerous and contrary to the public 
interest” (Moore, 1995, p. 19). This squashes much enthusiasm for taking on risk or 
leaving room for error or mistake – let alone exploring innovations or improvements that 
could incrementally or dramatically improve efficiencies in operation.  
A clear chain of command is impressed on workers in order to ensure safe and 
proper use of public resources toward ends of achieving public value. As Moore and 
Alonso (2014) put it, school systems have key leaders – like superintendents, principals, 
and others – who “as public managers and leaders [are] using collectively owned assets to 
achieve publicly defined goals;” they are responsible for “the fundamental task” and “a 
stock of public assets” to “do what they can to maximize the public value that can be 
produced from the skillful utilization of those assets” (p. 10). Holding the fiduciary 
responsibility to employ assets well in creating public value – in schools or elsewhere – is 
a prime reason why bureaucracy came to exist. Barzelay (1992) characterizes 
bureaucracy by describing roles that participants play in it in very specific terms: 
“Specific delegations of authority define each role in the executive branch. Officials 
carrying out any given role should act only when expressly permitted to do so either by 
rule or by instruction given by superior authorities in the chain of command” (p. 5). 
Bureaucrats take on very specific delegations and roles in line with the authority that has 
been provided to them, and their managers seek to command and control their 
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subordinates to not only ensure that value is produced from the resources being poured 
into the enterprise, but that public funds are held to the strictest standards of integrity in 
avoiding waste, fraud, and abuse.  
Lest we think it only goes one way, the senior-most leaders of bureaucracies like 
school districts are “directly accountable up a bureaucratic chain of command to someone 
who has direct political authority over them,” exposing a vast hierarchy of vertical blame 
and accountability structures (Moore and Alonso, 2014, p. 16). Moore and Alonso (2014) 
call this a “cacophony of self-appointed ‘accountability agents,’ each having an interest 
in shaping the conduct and performance of the public schools, and believing they have a 
legal and moral right to demand accountability to them and their purpose as a member of 
the public” (p. 18). Navigating the choppy waters of such intensely political 
conversations about the processes and products intended to yield public value is arguably 
the most important aspect of the job of district leadership – or at the very least the most 
consequential.!Beyond the central office, the environment can be even more rife with 
disagreement about the aims and objectives for the school system, including from: 1) 
leaders and teachers at schools who generate public value in the form of increased student 
opportunity and achievement; 2) city or community officials financing the operations of 
the district; 3) students and the parents and families they come from, who are both 
participants in the educational experience provided but also first-order beneficiaries of 
the value generated; and 4) other interested stakeholders around the city or community 
who are interested in the justice, opportunity, or economic advancement produced by a 
school district. 
Because of how pernicious the effects of hierarchy up and down a system can be, 
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Wageman et al. (2008) point out that members of cross-functional teams have specific 
responsibilities that “keep them working as individuals, each representing a function or 
business unit and not the enterprise – and this structure is at the center of the problem” (p. 
7). More highly interdependent tasks require team members to take action and make 
decisions on behalf of the entire organizational unit or organization and not just out of 
regard or perspective for their own business unit. It is hard, though, to make the 
teamwork feel at least as important to team members as their individual responsibilities. 
If chief executives do not give considerable thought to how they “create, structure, and 
support their top teams,” they may “thereby unintentionally [be] capping the potential of 
their teams’ contributions to the enterprise” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. XIII). To repeat a 
previous statement, absent this shared, compelling sense of purpose, team members will 
“wander away to focus on what they see as the most important of their accountabilities” 
(Wageman et al., 2008, p. 61).  
Legacy constraints on the aspirations of teaming. As discussed under my 
second question of the RKA, higher-level education agencies like those at the federal and 
state level can be powerful forces to drive change and crucial resources for districts with 
a diverse range of student needs. However, federal and state education agencies are 
largely frustrated by their lack of power at the classroom or student level, where 
implementation of instructional reforms are actually made.  
Overall, Americans hold distaste for higher levels of government encroaching on 
the work of schools (which is traditionally considered extremely localized work), 
especially when it is perceived as trying to diminish or take away local determination of 
curriculum or instruction (Cohen and Spillane, 1992). Nonetheless, reform efforts from 
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state and federal governments require a similar degree of oversight and accountability 
that local leaders face in administering public programs. Each new program or initiative 
“had to be outfitted with its own minimum core of administrative operations (budget, 
personnel, evaluation, and the like)” within LEAs through which “to coordinate 
operations across many levels of government, owing to the lack of general administrative 
capacity above the local level” (Cohen and Spillane, 1992, p. 9). In effect, leaders of each 
program had to establish their own systems to ensure proper implementation of funds and 
programs, which yielded “specialized administrative subunits” in every layer of 
education agency “organized around oversight tasks within each program” (Cohen and 
Spillane, 1992, p. 9). While it came with the funding and hope that new programs 
provided, the authors argue that new programs come at a cost to administrative capacity 
of school systems, as they essentially divide up central offices to focus on oversight 
responsibilities for higher levels of government, rather than providing instructional 
support to meet the needs of whole children. 
In effect, in exchange for the funding and support offered by state and federal 
education agencies, LEAs absorbed an overall weakening of central administrative 
capacity in supporting instruction. This occurred not only because of the stigma against 
federal and state programs becoming drivers of instruction, but also because more dollars 
were prioritized for compliance and oversight of these very programs. As LEAs 
continued to expand and develop alongside the intervening role of state and federal 
agencies, the needs for instructional support of schools were slowly overlooked: “the 
administrative expansion added little to central capacity in the core areas of education 
such as curriculum and instruction” (Cohen and Spillane, 1992, p. 10). The end result was 
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(and largely continues to be) a massive bureaucracy driven more by compliance toward 
individual programs or initiatives (and the discrete elements or aspects of student identity 
or need they support) rather than by instructional needs – the latter of which districts are 
uniquely poised to tackle but which have not experienced the same urgency that 
compliance-driven units enjoy.  
Rogers (1968) described the toll that compliance-driven fragmentation can have 
in the context of the New York City school system in the 1960s. Rogers calls the New 
York City Department of Education a “sick” bureaucracy, “a term for organizations 
whose traditions, structure, and operations subvert their stated missions and prevent any 
flexible accommodation to changing client demands” (1968, p. 267). As he states, “it has 
all those characteristics that every large bureaucratic organization has, but they have 
instituted and followed to such a degree that they no longer serve their original purpose” 
(1968, p. 267). This is important to note considering how much we ask school systems to 
do and the many masters they serve. These conditions lead to “vertical and horizontal 
fragmentation, isolating units from one another and limiting communication and 
coordination of functions,” “the consequent development of chauvinism within particular 
units, reflected in actions to protect and expand their power,” and “the exercise of strong, 
informal pressure from peers within units to conform to their codes, geared toward 
political protection and expansion and ignoring the organization’s wider goals” (1968, p. 
267).  
In an environment like what Rogers describes in New York City, teaming is easily 
undermined because organizational incentives are not vertically or horizontally aligned to 
get new work done. If tasks do not fit neatly into established silos, their probability for 
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success is vastly diminished. Resultantly, one could argue that the most important need in 
districts – instructional supports for teachers and schools – can fall through the cracks or 
by the wayside altogether. Wageman et al. (2008) describe how easily this plays out 
using an example from the life sciences industry: quoting the chief executive officer of a 
major industry player on the performance of his leadership team, “everybody came in and 
talked about their piece of the business. Really the only glue was the fact that I asked 
everyone to be there. Everyone was very cordial, but there was not a common goal. There 
was the attitude of, ‘things are okay as long as my area is okay’” (Wageman et al., 2008, 
p. 80). In public education systems, with no clear lines of accountability, instructional 
support becomes a “good-to-have” rather than a “must-have,” at a significant cost to the 
public value the agency has actually sought out to generate (and at massive cost to the 
students experiencing the under-supported system). 
Cohen and Spillane (1992) also make note that these fractures re-create 
themselves outside of LEAs in the external authorizing environment. “As policies and 
programs took shape, networks of interested agencies” like advocacy organizations, 
professional groups, and development and research agencies “grew up around them” 
(Cohen and Spillane, 1992, p. 10). What is yielded then in the present day is a vast 
infrastructure built up around federal and state funding streams, reinforcing the stubborn 
persistence of these silos within LEAs and the hope that they represent for marginalized 
populations of students. These fragmented external entities then become part of the 
“cacophony of self-appointed ‘accountability agents’” that Moore and Alonso (2014) 
describe, each pursuing their own interest in influencing the priorities of the public 
schools and, resultantly, weakening overall administrative capacity to take a more holistic 
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view or approach to the needs of students and schools (p. 18). 
Summary 
While Wageman et al. put forward the three essential attributes for “real team” 
(stability, boundedness, and interdependence) and Edmondson put forward key behaviors 
to make teaming a reality in organizations (speaking up, collaborating in a spirit of 
mutual respect, experimenting, and reflecting), a host of mitigating factors can undermine 
the capacity for teams to persist once formed in public bureaucratic settings like school 
districts. School districts live with the legacy of programs and funding streams that have 
served to fragment central administrative capacity to support schools rather than unify it 
around evolved needs like instruction. This legacy makes it much harder for teams to 
intentionally engage in a limited number of consequential, challenging, and clearly 
interdependent tasks because of the competing demands and dueling accountabilities their 
composite members have. Add to it the ever-present specter of accountability in a 
hierarchical environment, and the learning behaviors necessary for teams to achieve and 
grow in their performance can be diminished or rooted out. The prevailing forces of 
compliance, both for higher-level government agencies as well as in interpersonal 
hierarchical relationships that exist across teams, can also contribute to the loss of focus 
on learning. 
This does not mean effective teams or teaming is not possible in the context of the 
LEA, but that it becomes an extraordinarily difficult feat. Teams must overcome a vast 
ecosystem built up around these divisions and “political chasms,” as “the ingenious 
devices that cope with fragmentation among governments tend to exacerbate 
fragmentation within them” (Cohen and Spillane, 1992, p. 10). Leaders within and 
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outside of LEAs seek to better link incentives between policy and practice so that 
educators and schools can get what they need to dynamically achieve success for students 
– and really, to use teams cross-functionally to overcome the persistent barriers and 
roadblocks that districts have faced in the past in making difficult change and dealing 
with stubbornly low results. However, as eloquently summarized by Cohen and Spillane 
(1992), “the entire fragmented apparatus of American government weighs against such 
ventures” (p. 36).  
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Chapter 3: Theory of Action and Evidence  
  From the point of view of leadership, the work of strategy in a public school 
district is a balance of juggling the long-term initiatives that are assigned priorities along 
with the day-to-day crises and fires that demand leaders’ time. The response to all of 
these stimuli, regardless of or in fulfillment of the intention of district leaders, ends up 
being a district’s strategy, i.e. whatever Boston Public Schools (BPS) chooses to act on is 
implicitly our strategy and a statement of belief of what is the most important investment 
of our limited resources of people, time, and funding. Argyris (1996) refers to this as 
theory in use, or the mental map and model of organizational strategy that an 
organization implicitly ascribes to, through tacit structures, assumptions, and statements 
of priorities through actions taken. The theory in use is far larger than the actions toward 
which we aspire in our Strategic Implementation Plan: it is a sum total of what the district 
does.  
My work on the ASSET team at BPS has focused on both of these dueling strands 
of long-term and immediate priorities by fostering collaboration and learning to more 
fully render visible and discussable how we are operating organizationally in support of 
our long-term and day-to-day goals. I concluded early on in my residency that it would be 
very challenging or nearly impossible to perform the narrow mandate (i.e. what I was 
brought on to BPS to do around our long-term instructional strategy) without also 
performing the broader mandate (i.e. gaining a thorough understanding of the context and 
environment, and pushing forward the teaming and organizational learning work). Using 
a brief review of the teaming literature, I developed a theory of action that reflects both. It 
is meant to synthesize key aspects of the learning from the RKA and blend together the 
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tasks I perform in my real, lived experience in residency. Because it lists “if” and “then” 
statements from both my narrow and broad mandate, the theory attempts to depict my 
best thinking about causes and effects while more broadly reflecting the vast and 
complex organizational environment to which I contribute at BPS. In essence, I attempted 
to coach both on the substance and the implementation of strategic projects, as well as to 
develop the team into becoming a collective actor. 
Table 3.1:  
 
Personal Theory of Action for Residency Year 
 
Reference: Academics & Student Supports for Equity Team (ASSET) leadership team = 
1 Deputy Superintendent + 5 Assistant Superintendents + 1 Special Projects Director + 1 
Data Analyst + 1 Instructional Strategy Director (Ed.L.D. resident) 
 
Introductory statement of belief: I believe in execution-as-learning, i.e. in “the 
integration of constant, unremarkable, small-scale learning into day-to-day work” 
(Edmondson, 2012, p. 31). As an organization, neither BPS nor ASSET will 
fundamentally change the way we perform our mission without dogged, persistent 
attention to and reflection on what and how we are performing as teams (e.g. developing 
a team with a clear purpose, examining the impact we are creating or not creating as a 
team) within the broader BPS environment. 
If I:  
The Purpose 
1) Facilitate teams in developing a shared understanding of what instructional 
improvement looks like for the district and the way that the ASSET team fits 
into it; and  
The Task 
2) Partner with each member of the ASSET leadership team on the planning, 
execution, measurement, and support of implementation of each component of 
the Strategic Implementation Plan; and  
3) Foster and facilitate collaboration among the ASSET leadership team to focus 
on successful performance of tasks that recognize, deepen, or expand 
interdependence and cross-functional learning; and 
The Team 
4) Grow and sustain a real team of mutual challenge, respect, and understanding 
within the ASSET leadership team, including coaching the team to better 
govern and manage itself in service of building capacity to manage a stream of 
strategically important projects, initiatives, and innovations; and  
5) Lead the team in intentional learning cycles (formally and informally) about the 
work itself and how we as a team are performing or failing at it  
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Then: the ASSET leadership team will achieve its School Year 2016-17 milestones in 
initiatives 1.1-1.7 of the Strategic Implementation Plan and will be better prepared and 
poised to perform long-term, interdependent, strategic work in the years ahead. 
 
 In Table 3.1 below, I move from theory to reality by stating select examples of the 
leadership actions I performed during my residency year in line with the “if” statements I 
lay out in my personal, strategic theory of action. I include only a handful of indicators 
for each “if” statements as illustrative examples only: while these examples feel most 
salient to me in my current reflection on my time at BPS, the list is not exhaustive and 
does not capture the entirety of my work.  
Table 3.2 
 
Selected Evidence/Actions Demonstrating Leadership in Alignment with Personal Theory 
of Action for Residency Year at BPS 
 
“If” Statement Selected Evidence of Leadership  
1) Facilitate teams 
in developing a 
shared 
understanding of 
what instructional 
improvement 
looks like for the 
district and the 
way that the 
ASSET team fits 
into it 
• Held ASSET leadership team and cross-functional team meetings 
in which we explicitly discussed and specified a shared vision for 
good teaching and learning in the district, identifying and leaning 
into areas of tension and disagreement 
• Routinely asked questions – as both facilitator of and participant 
in meetings – as to whether or not we have a shared 
understanding of topic at hand (“Are you sure we have a shared 
understanding of [blank]?”) 
• Facilitated and participated in instructional walks with team 
members from ASSET, as well as other central office teams and 
offices, to surface areas of agreement or disagreement in 
identifying good instructional practice 
• Engaged in mental modeling exercises within the context of 
ASSET team meetings and other team meetings, explicitly 
drawing out chains of logic to help us to better understand how 
we believed inputs and activities would yield outputs, outcomes, 
and impacts 
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2) Partner with 
each member of 
the ASSET 
leadership team 
on the planning, 
execution, 
measurement, and 
support of 
implementation of 
each component 
of the Strategic 
Implementation 
Plan 
• Coached assistant superintendents and their leadership and staff 
to create and follow detailed action plans via a template, series of 
meetings, and consultative check-ins 
• Checked in with team and project leaders at least monthly on the 
status of strategic initiatives and accomplishment of milestones, 
including review of formative (e.g. process, input) data around 
implementation as well as review of emerging evidence of 
success (e.g. chronic absenteeism) 
• Assisted team members with implementation of high-profile 
projects, contributing where additional or specialized capacity is 
needed 
• Designed guidance for, refined, and facilitated regular use of a 
dashboard for Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for the ASSET 
team, providing explicit direction on the what, why, and how to 
collect and use KPIs, and used the dashboard to drive discussion 
on strategic performance management  
3) Foster and 
facilitate 
collaboration 
among the 
ASSET leadership 
team to focus on 
successful 
performance of 
tasks that 
recognize, 
deepen, or expand 
interdependence 
and cross-
functional 
learning 
• Convened, set agendas, and ran weekly two-hour strategy 
meetings with ASSET leadership team, with rotating series of 
meeting topics (SIP improvement cycles, school and classroom 
instructional walks, monthly coordination of district-wide 
networked Teaching and Learning Team structure, and data 
dialogues) where we engaged both in coordination, exchange of 
strategic information, and decision-making as a team toward 
strategic projects (see full list of ASSET team structures in 
Appendix C) 
• Facilitated cross-functional learning time across members of the 
team, designing agendas to foster participation, contributions, 
and productive conflict from members over their views on 
instruction, direction of strategic projects, and overall getting to 
know each member’s functional area 
• Called additional meetings (or focused standing meetings) to 
narrow team attention onto truly strategic projects that deepen 
interdependence, structuring conversation to draw out 
intersection points and assigning follow-up to continue to expand 
deliberately interdependent actions 
• Executed After-Action Reviews (AARs) following high-priority 
projects for the ASSET team or with other teams  
4) Grow and 
sustain a real team 
of mutual 
challenge, respect, 
and understanding 
within the ASSET 
leadership team, 
including 
• Facilitated meetings and retreats for the ASSET team with 
intentional structure for forming, storming, and norming as a 
collection of individuals and identities 
• Named and reinforced norms at each team meeting, including 
designating a norms checker to assess and monitor individual 
participation 
• Spent quality time socially with ASSET team members outside 
of work to build deep, interpersonal relationships with each other 
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coaching the team 
to better govern 
and manage itself 
in service of 
building capacity 
to manage a 
stream of 
strategically 
important 
projects, 
initiatives, and 
innovations 
 
on topics beyond education 
• Honored the bounded nature of our team by firmly restricting it 
to the nine core team members on it and ensuring attendance in 
advance (e.g. not holding team meetings with several members 
absent; having stipulations about sending substitutions) 
• Served as connective tissue to help team members work through 
interpersonal conflict with each other, providing counsel to team 
members when they approached me in confidence with conflicts, 
and intentionally grouping team members for collaborative 
assignments in structures for productive struggle 
• Provided opportunities for developing empathy and perspective-
taking among team members on ASSET team and across other 
teams (particularly around areas of tension) in order to push team 
members to better understand each other’s perspectives and add 
humanity and identity to what feels like fractured work talk 
5) Lead the team 
in intentional, 
formal, and 
informal learning 
cycles about the 
work itself and 
how we as a team 
are performing or 
failing at it!
 
• Identified and elevated high-leverage opportunities for 
interdependence, calling out and lingering on tasks that truly 
require real team essentials (interdependence, boundedness, 
stability) to successfully bring them to fruition 
• Surfaced and addressed mistakes and failures made by me or 
calling out other team members to model an environment of 
acceptance of performance deficiency for the sake of learning 
• Delivered frequent and candid feedback to team members, 
including my superiors, in the spirit of improving the overall 
work product 
• Facilitate Before-, Mid-, and After-Action Reviews for the team 
to heighten metacognitive awareness of intentional team actions 
and think critically about the way they individually or 
collectively showed up (or failed to show up) in executing a task 
 
In looking across all five “if” statements and the accompanying actions I laid out, 
I feel like I demonstrated substantial but nonetheless limited progress in my work over 
the course of my residency year. In general, I feel like I have less tangible evidence of my 
work than I would desire, which I think is due at least in part to the very relational 
components of it. What tangible products do exist come in the form largely of project 
management deliverables, including action planning templates, a progress monitoring 
dashboard for team leadership, a separate progress monitoring dashboard of Key 
Performance Indicators on which the team can reflect, and myriad infrastructure 
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frameworks for meetings and team engagement (e.g. agenda templates, norms, consistent 
reporting out of notes and deliverables, etc.). As a colleague from outside of BPS 
jokingly likes to introduce me, “Mary’s an Ed.L.D. resident. She writes things on charts 
and creates meeting agendas” (Personal communication, M. Wall, November 2016).1  
Much of the work that I produced came through careful reading and reflection of 
the dynamics I inherited on the team on which I was placed. Piecing together 
perspectives from a variety of viewpoints (e.g. individual one-on-ones with team 
members, debriefs from meetings with one or more team members, soliciting feedback on 
structure and assignments), I tried earnestly to meet the team where it was, build up the 
foundation that had been laid (interpersonally and related to the work), and focus our 
team efforts on tasks that truly would drive interdependence. ASSET team members 
mostly were responsive to the interventions I provided: they showed up to meetings and 
were mostly engaged and present during them; they completed a good deal of the pre-
assignments or follow-up from those meetings (with some variation and inconsistency); 
and they reflected on progress and performance at least monthly. 
While certainly not a statement of impact on schools in terms of changed educator 
practices or student achievement, the team has made a great deal of progress toward the 
long-term instructional strategic projects that it set out to perform this year. As of the end 
of February 2017, of the 51 milestones that fall under ASSET’s purview in the Plan’s 
initiatives 1.1 - 1.7, thirteen are completed or mostly completed, with another twenty-five 
well underway in progress toward their original or revised completion dates within the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 For confidentiality, I have largely omitted names or identifying characteristics for 
quotations in the capstone, with the exceptions of those who are unable to be anonymized 
(e.g. the Superintendent). 
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2016-17 School Year. Several deadlines had to be revised to provide additional time, but 
these revisions have occurred through processes and structures I set up and facilitated 
with the team to discuss performance and come to realistic expectations for success (see 
Appendix C for ASSET meeting structures). Timelines were modified for the sake of 
getting to a stronger overall product in the end, as well as in reflection of the day-to-day 
operational and support demands that often derail best intentions in long-term work. Of 
the remaining thirteen initiatives for which I do not yet have indicators of progress, 
nearly all are still in ramp-up stages as of this writing, as their deadlines are not 
approaching until later in the School Year.  
While these designations are wholly subjective and determined through my own 
assessment of the work discussed and the tangible products demonstrated, this type of 
formal progress monitoring using any (subjective or objective) indicators is largely new 
for the team. It requires a mix of project management in understanding what initiative 
needs attention with the day-to-day exigencies that naturally arise and take the work off 
course. I believe that keeping a concerted eye on progress – and holding individuals and 
teams to account through frequent, structured performance dialogues – has had a net 
positive impact on the forward motion of the work.2  
Surveys Exploring the Effectiveness of Teams 
Background and methods. In February 2017, I initiated several formal data 
collections to obtain some rough, point-in-time indicators of team effectiveness at BPS. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2
 I am intentionally omitting any mention of outcome or impact on student-level learning 
outcomes or even instructional practice from the new supports and resources provided by 
ASSET for school instruction or operations, as it fell outside of the scope of my inquiry 
and is extremely premature to reliably make determinations of effect on educator 
performance or student achievement. 
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The three inquiry lines I used to drive this data collection are derived from Wageman et 
al.’s (2005) criteria for team effectiveness, a three-dimensional concept reflecting the 
quality of the team’s work and the level of satisfaction that consumers experienced with 
it, as well as how well the team members enhanced their ability to work together as a 
team in the future and how much individual team members learning enhanced their 
wellbeing. I adapted data collection instruments to address each of these criteria. Table 
3.3 presents these lines of inquiry and the data collection instruments I used to pursue 
them.  
Table 3.3:  
 
Survey data collection for illustrative exploration of team effectiveness 
 
Criteria of team effectiveness 
(Wageman et al., 2005) 
Data collection instrument 
1) Whether the performance of the 
team met or exceeded standards of the 
“people, both inside and outside the 
organization, most affected by the 
team’s work;”  
• School Leader Support Survey, an original 
tool adapted from University of 
Washington (2013) on support offered by 
central office teams and level of support 
experienced; administered to school 
leaders 
• Informal interviews and discussions with 
central office leaders 
2) “How well members worked 
together now to enhance – rather than 
undermine – their capability to work 
together in the future;” and  
• Team Diagnostic Survey (TDS) on team 
capacity, perceptions of performance, and 
experiences of individuals, from Wageman 
et al. (2005), with an added section from 
Edmondson (1999) on psychological 
safety; administered to a small selection of 
BPS central office teams 
• Informal interviews and discussions with 
BPS central office team members 
3) “Whether the group experience, on 
balance, contributed positively to the 
learning and personal development of 
individual team members.” (Wageman 
et al., 2008, p. 10-11).  
 
 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 74 
 For criterion 1, I primarily surveyed school leaders (as primary consumers of 
central office resources and supports in the BPS system) to assess whether or not they 
were satisfied with the support they were receiving from central office teams. The survey 
of school leaders did not zero in on one specific team to gauge satisfaction. This was an 
intentional choice on my part, as I did not believe school leaders would by and large be 
able to distinguish which specific supports were products exclusively of any specific 
team. Nonetheless, I did ask on the survey if any specific teams were particularly helpful 
to them in their work. 
For criteria 2 and 3, I employed Wageman, Hackman, and Lehman’s Team 
Diagnostic Survey (TDS) (2005) and added a section from an Edmondson (1999) survey 
on psychological safety. As an instrument intended to help with understanding and 
“practical diagnosis” of team strengths and weaknesses, the TDS presents a “conceptual 
model of the factors that research has shown to be most consequential for team 
effectiveness…to assess any type of work team that operates in an organizational 
context” (p. 375). As suggested by Wageman et al. (2005), the framework generates a 
“diagnostic profile that can help team members and leaders learn about the conditions 
that foster team effectiveness even as they explore the standing of their own team on 
those factors” (p. 375). While I cannot necessarily make reliable, industry- or sector-wide 
comparisons to each one of the dimensions surveyed, looking at results between various 
teams within an organization or even just looking to see relative scale strength can still be 
a helpful diagnostic data point in team improvement efforts. In the added section from 
Edmondson (1999) on psychological safety, I could not reliably yield composite scores 
like on dimensions from the TDS. Nevertheless, I did calculate answer averages to get a 
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sense of the presence or absence of psychological safety in this specific team 
environment. 
Before presenting the survey data, it should be noted that the descriptive data I 
obtained is preliminary, and to some extent, inconclusive. While the cross-sectional data 
collected is limited in its scope and conclusiveness, I believe the mixed methods 
approach still sheds some thoughtful light on the diagnosis of the current state of team 
performance as of February 2017 and provides some points of prognosis for future action 
and implications of teams at BPS in the future. There was only one round of data 
collection, so I was unable to analyze performance before or after any interventions or 
suggest any trends. My intention was not to quantify the impacts of my leadership moves 
on the team. Instead, the data is meant to provide an illustrative, point-in-time snapshot of 
whether or not school leaders say they feel supported, and whether or not those providing 
the support feel like individually or as a group they are building capacity to deliver 
further supports in the future. 
Results: quality of and satisfaction with work products. Table 3.4 lays out the 
data collected on criteria 1 for team effectiveness, focusing on whether or not the work 
products produced were considered satisfactory either to the people consuming them or 
those evaluating or leading the work. Overall, 26 of 125 BPS school leaders responded to 
the voluntary survey, or a 21% response rate, over the course of 3 weeks in February 
through March 2017. Though this rate seems low, it still merited inclusion here for 
illustrative purposes among school leaders in the BPS system. 
Table 3.4:  
 
Results from School Leader Support Survey (n = 26) 
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Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
“Support” in the survey referred to services, resources, tools, professional 
learning/development, capacity, and/or other aid to schools as provided formally or 
informally by individuals or teams at the BPS central office. For the purposes of the 
survey, school leaders were asked to think about their context as the day-to-day 
leadership of their schools. 
 
Item Min Max Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
1. I feel supported by central office.  1 4 2.85 0.88 
2. I feel supported by specific individuals 
within central office.  
3 5 4.54 0.71 
3. I feel supported by specific teams within 
central office. 
2 5 4.08 0.89 
4. I feel supported by my Teaching and 
Learning Team (TLT) (i.e. central office staff 
and/or my peer school leaders in my TLT). 
1 5 3.46 1.27 
5. The support I receive from central office is 
of high quality. 
1 4 3.19 0.9 
6. The support I receive from central office is 
useful and relevant to my practice. 
1 5 3.08 0.93 
7. The support I receive from central office is 
aligned to my own needs and/or learning. 
1 4 2.69 0.88 
8. The support I receive from central office is 
sufficient in addressing the needs of my 
school.  
1 4 2.5 0.99 
9. The support offered by central office is 
accessible to me.  
1 4 2.85 0.97 
10. The support offered by central office is 
accessible to all school leaders. 
1 4 2.6 0.96 
11. I make use of supports offered by central 
office to strengthen or improve instruction.  
1 5 3.15 1.08 
12. I share the same values as central office in 
improving instruction and/or performance. 
1 5 3.62 0.98 
13. I understand what priorities and/or goals 
central office has in improving instruction 
and/or performance.  
1 5 3.15 1.35 
14. I share central office's priorities and/or 
goals in improving instruction and/or 
performance across the district.  
1 5 3.52 1.16 
15. Central office shares my priorities and/or 
goals in improving instruction and/or 
performance in my school.  
1 4 2.8 0.96 
16. It is clear how central office supports are 
designed to improve instructional practice 
1 4 2.46 0.99 
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and/or performance at schools. 
17. The majority of individuals and/or teams 
at central office are “on the same page” in the 
kind of support they provide to schools. 
1 4 2.12 1.11 
18. The majority of individuals and/or teams 
at central office are “on the same page” in 
how they provide support to schools. 
1 4 1.88 1.01 
19. Overall, I am satisfied with the 
level/amount of support I receive from central 
office. 
1 4 2.73 1 
20. Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of 
support I receive from central office. 
1 4 2.77 1.03 
 
The survey additionally asked three open response questions. After answering a 
scaled question on the item, “I feel supported by specific teams within central office,” 
respondents were asked: “Which teams?” Their responses are reflected in Figure 3.1 
below: 
Figure 3.1 
 
Number of Responses by Office, Question 3a, School Leader Support Survey (n = 26) 
 
After answering a scaled question on the item, “I feel supported by specific teams within 
central office,” respondents were asked: “Which teams?” Their responses were: 
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As a second open response question, after answering a scaled question on the 
item, “I make use of supports offered by central office to strengthen or improve 
instruction,” respondents were asked: “Why/why not?” Their responses included 
(organized by theme below): 
• Personal network: 
o “I leverage the expertise of specific individuals with whom I've built 
relationships and about whom I know their specific skill sets. The help I 
am able to secure for the benefit of my school community is more 
grounded in the effectiveness of my personal network than in institutional 
structures.” 
o “Supports offer useful strategies, skills, although I often have to tailor 
them myself to suit my school context.” 
o “Depends on the department.” 
0
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Question 3a. School Leader Support Survey
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• Availability of staff at central office: 
o “All central offices should have staff available as long as schools are open. 
Principals should have a line to call for every office that gets answered.” 
o “When I don't it's because I can't get in touch with the people I need to be 
in communication with.” 
• Dearth of expertise or practical know-how: 
o “There is little expertise in the areas that I need support.” 
o “Seems pointless to request help that can't or won't be delivered” 
o “Some departments are too bureaucratic and have no idea how schools 
work.” 
Finally, an optional open-ended prompt appeared as the last item on the survey. 
While the responses varied thematically, a sample of them appears below (organized by 
theme): 
• Variability by office: 
o “This survey is challenging because my experience varies widely across 
departments and individuals, which is why so many responses veered 
toward the center.” 
o “Central office support is uneven – some teams are very responsive and 
very helpful, others less so.” 
• Opacity of priorities or roles within central office: 
o “I don’t know what central office’s priorities or goals are. I know what we 
espouse as a district (in terms of our current focus on [culturally and 
linguistically sustaining practices]). I do not see us live that across 
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departments and individuals. I wonder how many folks at central office 
know what our current priorities and goals are AND how they fit into 
those goals.” 
o “I’m not even sure if some departments exist anymore, or if they do, what 
is reasonable to expect from them.” 
• Need for more support: 
o “We need the people from central to come to the schools and give the 
school hands-on support. . . . There hasn’t been anyone who has come to 
our school to support teachers. Perhaps I am not clear about the model that 
is being ‘deployed.’” 
o “Schools are routinely being put in the position of having to make choices 
that are impossible and then are blamed for them regardless of what the 
decision is. [Staff] are poorly supported and are given the runaround when 
they ask reasonable questions.” 
• Disorganization within central office: 
o “It often seems like departments are not communicating about due dates, 
timelines, and asks of school leaders. Often we will have a number of 
deadlines that at the same time, particularly around eval and budget 
season. The central office should keep a master calendar of deadlines for 
school leaders so that reports and deadlines can be reasonably spaced out.” 
o “Central office staff needs to return emails and/or answer phone calls. 
Very frustrating to call a department…and not get a response, a reply, or a 
solution to a problem.” 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 81 
o  “It is a challenge to get questions answered. Often conflicting information 
is given by different people in response to the same question. . . . Multiple 
similar questions from different people are heard as a pile on instead of 
understood as a natural consequence of not providing answers the first 
time a question is asked.” 
See full text of open-answer survey questions in Appendix E. 
Results: team capacity and individual wellbeing and learning. Table 3.6 
shows the data collected on criteria 2 and 3 of team effectiveness through administration 
of the Teaming Diagnostic Survey (with psychological safety addendum) which, 
respectively, seek to describe how well members worked together now to enhance their 
capability to work together in the future and whether the team experience contributed 
positively to the learning and personal development of individual team members 
(Wageman et al., 2008). The targeted subject of this survey was the ASSET leadership 
team, which consists of 9 individuals (see Figure 1.2 or Appendix D for an organizational 
chart). Of the 9 team members, 8 responded to the survey, or an 89% response rate, over 
the course of 2 weeks in February 2017. In the table below, scale ranges are listed prior to 
the survey items to which they refer. 
Table 3.6 
 
Results from the modified Team Diagnostic Survey of the ASSET Leadership Team (n = 
8) 
 
Section Topic/Item Description (including illustrative 
text from survey items) 
Composite 
Score Mean 
1 Real team   
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Bounded It is clear who all the members of 
the team are. 
3.71 
 Stable Team membership is stable over 4.31 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 82 
time. 
 Interdependent Team members have to depend 
heavily on one another to get the 
team’s work done. 
3.96 
    2 Compelling Direction/Purpose  
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Clear Team’s purposes are specified so 
clearly that all members know 
exactly what this team exists to 
accomplish. 
2.88 
 Challenging Team’s purposes are so 
challenging that members have to 
stretch to accomplish them. 
3.88 
 Consequential Team’s purposes are of great 
consequence for those served. 
3.63 
 Ends and Means? Do team members specify the 
team’s purposes? Do team 
members specify the means by 
which the purposes are pursued? 
Neither the 
purposes nor 
the means are 
specified by 
others for our 
team. 
    3 Enabling Structure   
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Composition   
 Size Team is just the right size to 
accomplish its purposes. 
4.25 
 Diversity Team has a nearly ideal “mix” of 
members, who bring different 
perspectives and experiences to the 
work. 
4.19 
 Skills Team members have the talent and 
experience (including teamwork 
skills) for the kind of work that we 
do. 
3.50 
    
 Task design   
 Whole task The team performs a whole, 
identifiable, meaningful piece of 
work. 
3.33 
 Autonomy/Judgment The team's work leaves room for 
the exercise of judgment or 
initiative.  
3.63 
 Knowledge of Results Carrying out our team’s work 
generates trustworthy indicators of 
how well we are doing. 
3.13 
    
 Acceptable team behaviors  
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 Norms It is clear what is – and what is not 
– acceptable member behavior in 
this team. 
2.92 
    4 Supportive Organizational Context  
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Rewards/Recognition Excellent team performance pays 
off in this organization. 
2.13 
 Information Teams in this organization can get 
whatever information they need to 
plan their work. 
3.08 
 Education/Consultation Teams in this organization receive 
adequate training for the work that 
they do.  
3.00 
 Material Resources Teams in this organization readily 
obtain all the material resources 
they need for their work.  
3.00 
    5 Coaching   
    
 Team leader coaching   
    
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
 Coaching Availability Teams have access to “coaches” 
who can help them learn from their 
successes and mistakes. 
2.58 
 Focus of Leader's 
Attention 
Among coaching individuals, 
helping team members work 
together, getting the team set up 
right, and running external 
interference, which is the team 
leader's biggest priority? 
Coaching 
individual 
team 
members 
 Helpfulness of team 
leader coaching 
Team leader is helpful in building 
team's capabilities. 
3.38 
    
 Scale: 1 = never, 4 = often  
 Task-focused coaching Extent to which team leader 
focuses on building commitment to 
and implementing task 
2.77 
 Operant coaching Extent to which team leader 
provides appropriate feedback 
2.96 
 Interpersonal coaching Extent to which team leader 
coaching helps resolve 
interpersonal conflicts 
2.31 
 Unhelpful directives Extent to which team leader 
micromanages or provides 
inappropriate direction 
2.63 
    
 Scale: 1 = least favorable 5 = most favorable  
 Summary indicator of Summary indicator all of the above 3.03 
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team leader helpfulness team leader measures 
    
 Peer coaching   
    
 Scale: 1 = never, 4 = often  
 Task-focused peer 
coaching 
Extent to which team members 
promote shared commitment and 
motivation 
2.46 
 Interpersonal peer 
coaching 
Extent to which team members 
resolve conflicts amongst each 
other 
2.13 
 Unhelpful peer 
interventions 
Extent to which team members tell 
other team members what to do 
2.50 
    6 Team Processes for Effectiveness  
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Effort Team demonstrates their 
commitment to our team by putting 
in extra time and effort to help it 
succeed. 
3.83 
 Strategy Team members come up with 
innovative ways of proceeding 
with the work 
3.50 
 Knowledge and skill Team members actively share their 
knowledge and expertise and 
accept ideas based on that. 
3.04 
    7 Psychological Safety   
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Efficacy Team members believe the team's 
goals are within their reach. 
3.38 
 Psychological safety Team members act without 
excessive concern about what 
others think of them or without the 
need to tiptoe around the truth. 
3.54 
 Learning behaviors Team members take time to 
diagnose and learn about the team's 
performance. 
3.06 
    8 Interpersonal Processes  
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Quality of team 
interactions 
Working together energizes and 
uplifts members of our team. 
3.63 
 Satisfaction with team 
relationships 
Team members enjoy talking and 
working with each other as well as 
getting to know each other. 
4.25 
    9 Individual Wellbeing and Learning  
 Scale: 1 = statement is highly inaccurate; 5 = statement is highly accurate 
    
 Internal work Team members feel personal 4.00 
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motivation satisfaction when the team does 
well. 
 Satisfaction with 
growth opportunities 
Team members feel like they learn 
and grow from their work on this 
team. 
4.08 
 General satisfaction Team members enjoy the work 
they perform as a team and feel 
satisfied overall with the team 
experience. 
3.63 
 
Additionally, short answer text boxes were available in each section of the survey 
to relay additional thoughts beyond the scaled questions. While only a few respondents 
provided short answers, their responses appear below: 
• “If I don't always feel a part of the team, it was sometimes too difficult to make a 
choice on the Likert scale for other responses, which in itself seems telling.” 
•  “I really found myself struggling in answering the whole team questions, because 
sometimes I feel that way about my peers but it doesn't always feel I'm on the 
same page with the team leader. Some responses went up or down in number 
because of this disconnect.” 
• “We know who is on the team. I am pretty sure that the field does not know/care 
about the ASSET team as a unit. We are still approached as individual 
departments.” 
• “Team is learning to work together. All are talented and all have much to learn 
from each other.” 
• “Team is learning each other’s assets and skills.”      
• “I appreciate all of the team members and what they all teach me through this 
experience. We do not always get along with everyone immediately and this will 
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take time. I appreciate this taking time, however, I wish there was more 
intentional guidance in how we operate as a team.” 
• “I feel like these scores are not reflective of how invaluable I find my time on this 
team.” 
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Chapter 4: Findings and Analysis 
In this chapter, I have separated discussion into two sections that likely suggest a 
false distinction. The first section – findings – covers the insights I have drawn at the 
team level for the performance of teams within the Boston Public School (BPS) system, 
largely drawing from the teaming survey data reported in Chapter 3. In the subsequent 
section, I zoom out to think about what in the system might be causing teams to 
experience certain challenges or successes. In reality there is a great deal of overlap 
between these two domains; nonetheless, I am hoping the findings and analysis will be 
useful for the sake of diving deeper into diagnosing team performance and the way it has 
or lacks potential for making impact in the broader BPS system environment. While I 
cannot and do not explain every phenomenon I witnessed over a ten-month span, I hope 
to shed light on some of the lived experiences I have shared with a variety of teams and 
team members in the past year at BPS.  
In both sections, my insights are based on my own observations as well as the 
observations of colleagues and peers on and off my team within BPS. I reiterate an 
important caveat up front that my findings are incredibly limited and by no means 
conclusive. I present a necessarily incomplete and biased account that could not possibly 
represent the fullness of the experience from every leadership level and position within 
the organization. I still hope my analysis can serve as fodder for greater organizational 
reflection and discussion on the use of teams in tackling strategic change initiatives. 
Team-Level Findings  
Criteria 1: Satisfaction with product from internal authorizers and external 
consumers. In trying to render an overall impression of whether or not teams met or 
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exceeded standards of the people outside the organization who are affected by and 
consume teams’ works, the survey data is decidedly mixed; only a select few teams have 
demonstrated consistently high performance. What lies in between the extremes 
represented in the data varies, mostly on the lower end of performance (according to a 
limited number of respondents) with impressions reflecting less satisfaction with the 
supports they receive and a perception of disorganization, incongruence, and incoherence 
from the leaders in charge of providing support to schools.  
On average in the sample (n = 26), respondents report lower feelings of 
supportedness (! = 2.85) and lower overall satisfaction with amount (! = 2.73) and 
quality (! = 2.77) of central office support than they do when they describe feelings of 
support from individuals (! = 4.54) and from teams (! = 4.08). There persists a good deal 
of confusion on how the supports and resources that central office teams provide fit 
together into one large coherent picture of improvement of instruction or performance. 
Respondents believed it was not just their inability in understanding it from the outside, 
but instead that central office individuals and teams are incoherent and lack shared 
understanding of how the support they provide comes together around schools. The 
lowest scores on the survey pertained to whether the majority of individuals and/or teams 
at central office are “on the same page” in the kind of support they provide to schools (! 
= 2.12) and how they provide that support (! = 1.88). School leaders did not uniformly 
see how central office supports came together (! = 2.46), and the greatest amount of 
variation in response to question came with whether or not school leaders claimed to 
understand what priorities or goals central office has in improving instruction and/or 
performance (! ! 1.35).  
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 These responses were largely corroborated in the short-answer responses as well. 
In the survey, respondents overwhelmingly praised one team – the Office of Human 
Capital – which far and away received the highest praise in the open response question, 
followed by the budget office in faraway second place. (This also coincides with the time 
of the year when both of these offices are in highest demand.) Beyond that, respondents 
indicated that performance varies widely by individual and by team. Respondents 
indicated that school leaders with social capital and relationships seem to get what they 
needed, but that otherwise they felt like the level of support was inconsistent or varied. It 
is worth noting that ASSET (as a division of BPS) was not named in any of the team 
discussions. While some of the offices that compose ASSET (e.g. Academics and 
Professional Learning, English Learners, Special Education) were mentioned, their 
mentions were neither consistently positive nor negative in tone.  
 It is also worth noting that there is a weak distinction in the minds of external 
consumers about what the distinction is between “teams” and “offices” within central 
office. I intentionally used the term “team” in the survey and was largely met with 
responses mostly about capital-“O” Offices (which surely contain a great array of teams) 
or individuals. I argue that this communicates low operational understanding of the 
distinctions between what historically bureaucratic silos have produced (e.g. formal, 
capital “O” Offices) and which cross-functional teams (which by and large execute the 
reforms of the current leadership administration) are actually doing. The bureaucratic 
mindset seeks out a single point person or point office in order to get things done, but that 
does not always align with the espoused values of the district: as stated by a respondent 
of a separate school leader survey administered in late 2015, “the stated theory of action 
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is the ‘culture of we’ and support, but I have not experienced that culture in action from 
every department” (Boston Public Schools, 2015). 
 The pinch that bureaucratic accountability puts on teaming came through in the 
survey responses as well. One survey respondent pointed out, “Schools are routinely 
being put in the position of having to make choices that are impossible and then are 
blamed for them regardless of what the decision is.” This feeling of blame – across 
central office teams or Offices, or across schools – came up in several responses and 
illustrated both the keen need for leaders throughout the system (at schools and in central 
office) to identify which is most important in their personal accountabilities and to act on 
them. Without that clarity, respondents suggested that acting on one’s own 
accountabilities could come at the expense of others in the system. This pinch makes it 
difficult to want to zoom out and think more systematically. Because of fear of reproach, 
even with a persistent emphasis on teaming, it becomes difficult to zoom out to not only 
see but act on implications of one’s own actions or inactions in a large bureaucracy. This 
reluctance even comes through in the language we use to describe projects of strategic 
importance to the district. As some consultants to BPS pointed out in their synthesis of 
ethnographic research into the system, “BPS leaders tend to speak in terms of ‘initiatives’ 
rather than desired impact. In managing the complex and interconnected realities of this 
system, the initiative is the essential unit in getting work done. However, this way of 
describing their work makes it harder for leaders to gain a strategic view that cuts across 
their organization’s silos. And it makes it harder to communicate to their constituents the 
fundamental change they’re pursuing” (Agncy, 2017). 
 Overall, among the clearest themes that emerged was the impression that central 
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office is not well organized or cohered when it comes to supporting schools. As 
expressed by one respondent, “Central office support is uneven – some teams are very 
responsive and very helpful, others less so. It often seems like departments are not 
communicating about due dates, timelines, and asks of school leaders.” To the end user 
and primary consumer of central office supports, the approach that central office (as a 
monolith) takes feels disorganized and chaotic. School leaders also suffer from the lack 
of clarity among roles in central office: “I think a ‘who to go to for what’ chart would be 
very helpful. Departments have changed their definitions and/or their names and it's 
unclear sometimes who to reach out to. . . . I am also unclear when my Superintendent 
wants to hear from me directly and about what kinds of issues.” To me, the data does not 
suggest the problems are insuperable – it is just that central office has not been thinking 
about them systematically, which comes through as piecemeal understanding to school 
leaders. Said one respondent in a 2015 iteration of a similar survey, “While there have 
been some changes in the spirit of interactions with central departments, the actual 
experience remains to some extent the same. This isn't because people in central are all 
miserable bureaucrats. Many are incredibly competent, solutions-oriented people. But we 
haven't yet created a streamlined way for principals to engage with the various 
departments” (Boston Public Schools, 2015). 
 Criteria 2 and 3: Building team capacity and individual wellbeing and 
learning. The data I collected through my modified Team Diagnostic Survey (TDS) on 
the ASSET leadership team paints a complicated picture of team effectiveness. In some 
dimensions, the team’s work shines and there are encouraging suggestions from the 
experience. In other dimensions, scaled survey responses helped to quantitatively 
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illustrate some of the frustrations that team members have personally shared with me. On 
the whole, conceptions of team effectiveness for ASSET leadership team seem decidedly 
mixed, and the ASSET leadership team emerges as still in development. 
 The TDS provides indexed scores across a variety of indicators, boiling down 
about 100 questions to about 40 indicators that provide a summary reflection of team 
performance. The domains in which the team rated itself highest were in many of the 
formal, structural domains of “real team:” team members reported feeling strongly the 
stability of team members (! = 4.31), the right size of team (! = 4.25), having the right 
mix of people (! = 4.19), and the bounded nature of the team’s membership (! = 3.71). 
 The team’s sense of purpose was less convincing. While team members 
recognized that interdependence is in fact an essential element of the work the team is 
charged with getting done and that they must depend heavily on each other to be 
successful (! = 3.96), they were less clear in understanding exactly what their charge 
was. Even though the work of the team feels both consequential (! = 3.63) and 
challenging (! = 3.88) to team members, clarity – which Wageman et al. argue is the 
most important attribute of a compelling team purpose and direction – was perceived to a 
substantially lesser extent (! = 2.88). This perceived lack of clarity manifested in task 
design as well, with responses toward the middle of the scale in team member assessment 
of whether they perform a whole, identifiable piece of work (! = 3.33) and whether or 
not doing the work generates trustworthy indicators of the work’s results (! = 3.13). On 
the latter, members were somewhat middle of the road in whether or not teams in this 
organization can get whatever information they need to plan their work (! = 3.08). This 
communicates an overall lack of access to information about team performance that team 
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members can use to reliably understand or diagnose whether or not their overall 
performance is satisfactory or producing the results they seek to accomplish.  
As reflected in the literature, “a lack of access to data on failures is the most 
important barrier to managers learning from them. . . . To overcome this barrier, 
organizational leaders must develop systems, procedures, and cultures that proactively 
identify failure” (Edmondson, 2012, Ch. 5, Sec. “Gather Data and Solicit Feedback,” 
Para. 1). These data systems are of especially high importance considering the way that 
we use teams at BPS to tackle some of our most seemingly intractable problems. While 
this approach to teamwork and purpose is laudable, these problems are by nature 
unwieldy and amorphous. Absent reliable indicators that efforts are leading anywhere, 
team members can easily become discouraged by a lack of progress or convinced that 
their contributions do not matter or are not working to make change in incredibly difficult 
pursuits.  
 Perhaps the most perplexing data to make sense of were the responses that 
members enjoyed the personal relationships they have developed on the team but 
experienced difficulty in addressing lingering interpersonal conflict amongst team 
members. These two dimensions, in fact, were amongst the highest and lowest 
(respectively) composite scores on the survey, with satisfaction of team relationships 
coming in at a whopping average of 4.25 and the extent to which team members resolve 
conflicts amongst each other coming in at a measly average of 2.13. Another low-scoring 
indicator on the survey further communicates this phenomenon: members are less sure 
about what behaviors are or are not acceptable on this team (! = 2.92). Team member 
friction seems to be corroborated by the team’s assessment of its own self-governing and 
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coaching: members reported not only low levels of conflict resolution amongst 
themselves and from the team leader, but also in promoting and securing shared 
commitment and motivation in the work (! = 2.46). On the whole, team members seem 
to laud their commitment and effort to making sure work succeeds (! = 3.83) but struggle 
to figure out how the team itself fits together in this task environment.  
 Team members also report not feeling very supported as a team. The modal 
response among four options for the focus of the team leader’s attention was coaching 
individual team members, rather than getting the team structured and running or 
performing external interference on the team’s behalf. The absence of interpersonal 
conflict resolution comes through with the team leader as well, with respondents 
reporting lower frequency of team leader intervening in interpersonal conflicts (! = 2.31) 
than of any other leader coaching behavior (operant coaching, ! = 2.96; task-focused 
coaching, ! = 2.77). Overall, respondents did not reflect feeling like team-based coaching 
was widely available (! = 2.58). 
In the last section of the survey, team members report relatively high degrees of 
personal satisfaction with the growth and learning they experience on the team (! = 4.08) 
and satisfaction with high quality team performance (! = 4.00), but when it comes to 
overall team satisfaction there is noticeably lower (! = 3.63). I speculate that, between 
the lower degree of overall team satisfaction and the higher degree of perceived 
interpersonal conflict on the team, this presents an artificially high report of 
psychological safety on the team. Members self-report a relatively high average response 
across psychological safety questions (! = 3.54) despite verbal admissions to me 
suggesting otherwise, particularly in the presence of the team leader. As expressed by one 
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respondent, “I really found myself struggling in answering the whole team questions, 
because sometimes I feel that way about my peers but it doesn't always feel I'm on the 
same page with the team leader. Some responses went up or down in number because of 
this disconnect.” These responses left me wondering: why does the unit itself – despite 
showing many healthy indicators – still feel “off”? Why – despite our satisfaction with 
each other as individuals – does the teamwork still feel like a chore?  
 Aiding in this lack of investment is the organizational context, which the ASSET 
team spoke resoundingly in stating that good team performance does not pay off in the 
BPS context (! = 2.13). Abetted by the fact that each member of the team has a lot of 
work to do leading their own teams with their own accountabilities, why bother 
committing to a structure with such low degrees of collective return or reward when the 
rest of the system is set up mostly just to recognize individual successes? 
Analyzing Team-Level Findings in the Context of System 
“Teaming failure occurs due to a lack of inter-professional and inter-task 
awareness on the part of the professionals involved in the work. . . . 
Unless people are aware of their interdependence with others for 
accomplishing whole jobs, teaming cannot get underway” (Wageman et 
al., 2008, p. 50). 
 
In this section, I present major arguments analyzing the broader system in which 
teams operate at BPS, reflecting not only on the extent to which teams meet or do not 
meet what the teaming literature would say is needed for good performance, but also 
more broadly on the way that conditions in the system that help or hinder teaming from 
taking place. It is worth noting that the impact of many of the conditions I bring up are 
cumulative; while I represent them in a specific order in the following, the arguments are 
fairly intertwined throughout.  
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1. As a system, we do not share understanding of the desired end state 
toward which all of our efforts aspire (a “north star”). Consequently, we struggle to 
share understanding of the performance problem(s) we face, the solution(s) we are 
using to address the problem(s), and the logic of how we would employ those 
solutions to get to the desired end state. This lack of shared understanding 
undermines our abilities to effectively team. Barzelay (1992) contends, “for a situation 
to be defined as either a problem or condition, people have to decide whether it can and 
should be improved” (p. 21). The trick that public managers are trying to achieve is 
having an agreed upon set of purposes that is broad and abstract enough to feel 
significant and important to many, but narrow and concrete enough to make the 
connection between actions that individuals and teams are actually taking and the 
ultimate goals.  
In BPS, because the district has not clearly defined the north star toward which all 
of our efforts gravitate, it becomes harder to make decisions about whether the conditions 
we are experiencing are the problem we want to tackle or whether they are just 
components of the ecosystem in which we live. Because of this lack of common 
orientation around problem, solution, logic, or north star, individuals and teams struggle 
to understand how they are set up to tackle big problems. Assumptions, by individuals 
and teams, abound in BPS’s organizational context – about how change should work and 
who is driving what. Questions to address or surface these assumptions also abound, but 
are generally removed from system-wide conversations about how these pieces come 
together and from any enforced decision-making structure. The end result is feelings of 
incongruence or confusion, with individuals and teams working toward big-picture goals 
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for the district absent an understanding how the pieces fit together. 
 This conclusion bears out in the data from the surveys I administered, and it was 
echoed very clearly by more impartial observers as well. In November 2016, the Aspen 
Institute made a “Critical Friends Visit” to BPS with a group of district leaders and 
researchers from around the country for one day of context gathering and focus groups 
around a central problem of practice identified by the district: Are any of our instructional 
reforms bearing fruit? What is gaining traction right now? At the end of one day, the 
conclusion from the visitors assembled by Aspen was clear: an inspiring instructional 
vision has been painted for educators, but when asked specifically about what the 
district’s north star was, interviewees struggled to answer. There was no clear vision for 
what Boston kids can do in their lives when they are done with BPS. We did not have a 
“common anchor” toward which all of our work aspires, and “no clear theory of change 
emerged in the conversations” (Personal communication, M. Wall, Nov. 2016). Clear 
themes emerged from existing theories in use, e.g. that principals and Instructional 
Leadership Teams (ILTs) are key roles and structures in improving instructional practice, 
but it was not clear what is supposed to happen after that (e.g. how to support those 
entities, what these entities are supposed to produce, how they are supposed to lead). 
Absent this shared logic, it becomes harder then to make connections back to the way we 
traditionally measure or evaluate performance in the system.  
 My lived experience at BPS largely reflects this as well. I remember from the 
beginning of residency trying to figure out the various names we give to instructional 
priorities, but struggling to decipher which was which. When I pushed on this in 
conversation with others, I was told “I think we all know what the good looks like” by a 
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member of our Academics team, or that priorities “just fall into the category of good 
instruction” by an Instructional Superintendent. This lack of clarity at best may 
demonstrate the intersectionality of these various instructional tenets and approaches – 
but at worst may conflate everything into a big morass, recognizable to the seasoned 
veteran educator but unclear to anyone new to the practice. It took me personally about 
six months to firmly decipher what the district’s instructional priorities were – and 
largely only because I was tasked to articulate them clearly in a presentation for our 
visitors from the Aspen Institute at that time. It led me to believe that individuals across 
the district have so much knowledge and context in their heads, but if they do not take 
time to carefully spell it all out, we miss out on illustrations of logic that would help us 
work better together and all approach change the same way. 
In her book, Edmondson discusses the imperative of well-calibrated mental 
models of organizational strategy for teams to succeed: if teams do not take the time to 
thoroughly understood organizational strategy – i.e. the chain of logic that would lead us 
from our current state experiencing performance problems or challenges, through the 
steps that we would take to get to mutually agreed-upon solutions – then we will struggle 
or flounder in the work we have set out to do. This phenomenon has the potential to 
completely derail teams within the system: if teams are untethered to a clear, 
consequential, and challenging purpose that ideally rolls up into the district’s overall 
strategy (a la Wageman et al.), the uncertainty makes it difficult or nearly impossible to 
reliably understand whether day-to-day efforts in one’s own role and on one’s team are 
really moving the ball forward toward hazily defined aims. This is why Weick (1976) 
discusses – “given the ambiguity of loosely coupled structures” – that “there may be 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 99 
increased pressure on members to construct or negotiate some kind of social reality they 
can live with. Therefore, under conditions of loose coupling, one should see considerable 
effort devoted to constructing social reality, a great amount of face work and linguistic 
work, numerous myths…and in general one should find a considerable amount of effort 
being devoted to punctuating this loosely coupled world and connecting it in some way in 
which it can be made sensible” (p. 13). Individuals in this environment spend a great deal 
of time in sense-making mode, trying to figure out how tasks and purposes align to what 
Weick (1976) dubbed the social realities of the system, leading in excess to a 
“preoccupation with linguistic work” (p. 13). This mental modeling takes a great deal of 
time to work through and, I have found, it often feels like a distraction or an elusive 
target when other, more tangible accountabilities are on the line. In other words, this 
sense-making would be imminently helpful in figuring how to best go about tangible 
tasks, but the linguistic work is so unpredictable and subjective by nature that attempting 
to do so can often feel destined to fail – especially amidst the pressures of time and 
competing accountabilities. In this scenario, teams or individuals are still left with the 
same deliverables they had earlier but with less time to complete them. Team members 
accordingly make choices between these ends all the time. 
A teammate in ASSET nicely summarized this phenomenon: “You can’t aspire 
toward what you can’t articulate” (Personal communication, M. Wall, Dec. 2016). I 
would expand this as you also cannot witness or measure what you cannot articulate. 
While linkages certainly exist in the work, recognizing them or even leveraging them is 
distinct and separate from commonly working toward a north star. As I have come to 
conceptualize, the stars may be near each other; they may even align from time to time – 
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but that does not mean that we have a common orientation of what or where the sun is in 
the sky.  
Role of the School Leader: The most important example I can elevate to illustrate 
this lack of common understanding in the system is the school leader. There is an oft-
spoken but uncodified sacrosanctity about the role of the school leader in driving change 
in the BPS system. I argue that above almost everything else – including closure of 
opportunity and achievement gaps – we honor, respect, and prioritize the autonomy of the 
school leader to determine and address the most pressing performance issues facing 
schools. While this understanding is surely undergirded by research (see for example 
Wallace Foundation, 2004), we do not explicitly share the same logic about the ways that 
inputs offered by central office or elsewhere translate through school leaders into real 
impacts on classrooms. In essence, we have placed so many bets on the ability of the 
school leader to integrate instructional reforms that I characterize the centrality of the 
school leader in Boston as inevitable. I use this word intentionally to underscore that – 
while we share good faith understanding that the school leader is a key lever in making 
instructional improvement happen – we do not have a uniform understanding of the way 
that lever works.  
I have observed that leadership does not have a clear or consistent sense of 
whether or not school leaders are leading with the same priorities that the Superintendent 
and district lead with, namely the elimination of opportunity and achievement gaps. 
Central office teams offer various and sometimes conflicting supports to schools and 
school leaders absent a clear or fully specified road map of how they fit together. School 
leaders are expected to make sense of these disparate inputs (i.e. centrally desired ends 
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and suggested means for achieving them) either independently or through their own 
relational capacity and social capital at central office to identify high-priority areas for 
action and deploy resources to solve them. The determination of problems – which 
manifests primarily through day-to-day actions and micro-behaviors, which certainly the 
school leader is best positioned to observe – is deferred to local expertise. Solutions (vis-
à-vis resources provided by various central office functions like staffing and budget) 
contain contributions from various central office teams, but how school leaders mobilize 
those resources and supports to reach a desired end state is not fully explicated in any real 
procedure and, by its nature, left for discretion at the school site by the school leader.  
This stated philosophy of teams as change agent that we profess in words is 
contested by the individual-focused nature of accountability in the bureaucratic 
environment of a K-12 school system. This theme emerged in the feedback the district 
received from the Aspen Institute: it was clear we are placing bets on principals, and it is 
clear that we are placing a bet on Instructional Leadership Teams (ILTs), but it is not 
clear what is supposed to happen with or through these individuals and teams. It was 
clear also to the Aspen visitors that we as a district have identified adult learning as a key 
lever for making change (see Appendix A for instructional theory of change), but it was 
also clear that there was no consensus around how adults learn best: “That’s a black box, 
both from central office offerings as well as within ILTs” (Personal communication, M. 
Wall, Nov. 2016). It is as if we want teams and team capacity to be the true driver for 
improvement in the instructional core, but because we exist in an accountability-driven 
hierarchy we lean into the individuals (e.g. school leaders) as the primary change agent. 
As we do, we generally raise the ante significantly on what we expect out of individual 
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performance (e.g. that of a school leader) rather than out of team performance (e.g. that 
of an ILT). As a district, we send mixed signals when we proclaim that “reform cannot be 
mandated from top – we don’t control instructional practice” and then we program nearly 
all central office support to individual leaders sitting at the top of school structures 
(Personal communication, M. Wall, Dec. 2016).  
This disposition comes with huge opportunity cost for building capacity in any 
other school-level role or team. In my albeit limited experience, central office often 
overlooks distributive leadership capacity (e.g. from lead teachers, assistant principals, 
directors of instruction, coaches, and other school-based administration and leadership) in 
yielding to the decision-making of the school leader (and, by extension, an individual-
oriented accountability structure). It is even challenging to program support to these non-
principal, non-headmaster roles because of the very deference we have built into the 
existing system, i.e. because we have given school leaders the autonomy to budget and 
staff their schools according to their own diagnosis of need, there is vast inconsistency 
among the functions and responsibilities of school leadership roles that make it hard for 
central office to program professional learning. 
The opportunity cost of this focus on the school leader also extends to the teacher, 
who by and large is subject to professional development and capacity building in large 
majority at the direction of the school leader (Personal communication, M. Wall, Mar. 
2017). Bryk et al. (2013) argued that we, as a reform-hungry nation, have historically 
overlooked the learning needs of teachers in seeking out large-scale reforms: at base, we 
have “a common story of implementing fast and learning slow. As a field, we undervalue 
learning to improve in a way that is systematic and organized, and we lack a 
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methodology to guide it. This should trouble all of us” (p. 6). This need is not unnoticed 
by central office leadership: for example, upon trying to develop a menu of services that 
one ASSET office could offer Instructional Superintendents (to in turn offer to school 
leaders) at a December 2016 meeting, almost all of the requests were targeted at teachers 
– not school leaders. It left me reflecting on a system that programs seemingly infinite 
priorities for a finite group of individuals – 125 school leaders – for sake of ease of 
transmission and accountability while we may be overlooking more than 4,000 additional 
soldiers who could drive critical reforms forward through their interactions with students 
each day. 
2. Because we lack shared understanding, we identify too many items as 
priority for the district. Having innumerable priorities causes us to lead as if we 
have no priorities, because everything is important. This lack of focus undermines 
team capacity and sends mixed messages about the importance of teaming in the 
context of accountability. I was told by a professor very early in the Ed.L.D. program 
that having ten priorities meant having no priorities, and that if everything is important 
then nothing is important. These adages rang true in my time at BPS. Being under-
disciplined with priorities ultimately makes it difficult for team members to discern the 
unique value that only they can produce as a team and how that team fits into a broader 
organizational mission. In the end, this lack of clarity has negative impacts on teams, 
setting them up for interpersonal conflict and erosions of trust within and across teams –
this ultimately has deleterious effects on the work. 
Inside a bureaucracy, the world looks vastly different from each hierarchical level 
and each silo of the organization; thus, while priorities may seem clear to the leadership, 
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the lived experience can feel a lot hazier to those down at lower rungs of the 
organizational ladder. There are legitimate reasons for letting priorities abound and 
staying loose or ambiguous with what is most important: as discussed in Chapter 2, doing 
so allows the district to advance the interests of a wide array of important stakeholders 
(inside and outside central office) on whom the district relies overall for operational 
capacity or legitimacy and support. It also allows for senior leadership to maximize a 
sense of urgency around many problems and thus mobilize resources to accelerate 
progress simultaneously. Wageman et al. (2008) say this is a mistake – that differences in 
organizational direction “will come out in one way or another, even though keeping team 
purposes ambiguous can allow the chief executive to keep [disagreements] off the team’s 
table for a while” (p. 67). As I observed during my residency at BPS, individuals and 
teams compete for attention or resources from top leadership, while there is a sense of 
opacity about decision making about priorities – what priorities truly are or whether or 
not decisions on prioritization are made at all. The situation feels unstable or untenable to 
the individual team member, as (implicitly or explicitly) “senior executives make 
independent choices that reflect only their own perspectives and preferences about 
collective decisions,” and “sooner or later the disagreements will burst out, but the longer 
they are put off, the less likely it is that the team will be able to deal with them 
competently” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 67). 
The teaming literature explains that, in high-functioning teams, members trust that 
other members will “carry their water” for them even when members cannot be present, 
meaning that they will advance their, their office’s, or their role’s priorities even in their 
absence. I have observed frequently at BPS that this trust is less than intact. Its absence 
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has been especially evident during the creation of the district’s Instructional Position 
Paper. Meant to be a comprehensive but comprehensible distillation of the district’s 
guiding principles and philosophies toward rigorous, accessible instruction, it is arguably 
the most interdependent task that ASSET has engaged in during my year at BPS. It is also 
the closest approximation we have made to declaring with specificity what our “vision of 
the good” is for instruction in the district. In collaborating on the Paper, I saw individuals 
become animated defending specific instructional frameworks on which much of their 
own professional practice is based. For example, although countless feedback surfaced to 
strip down the “edu-speak” jargon from the Paper, specific frameworks (like Multi-
Tiered Systems of Support, or MTSS) frequently resurfaced as critical to the context of 
the Paper. While a framework like MTSS is describable in more general terms (e.g. 
academic and behavioral interventions in line with the level of students’ needs), 
contributors clung to their acronyms as though they were nonnegotiable attributes in our 
system’s understanding of good teaching and learning. 
While the Instructional Position Paper is a fairly high-stakes interdependent task, 
it took me time to realize that a side effect of an everything-is-priority paradigm is that 
both individuals and teams may more easily experience threat and loss. Because 
individuals and teams are never really sure whether or not a core component of their 
work – and really of their professional identity – will be taken into account in the master 
scheme of district planning, they do not miss a chance to advocate for it at every moment. 
In the midst of these innumerable priorities is a high presence of what feel like “make or 
break” moments in meetings and exchanges: when it feels as though ground could be 
ceded, representatives from each camp stand up to defend their causes. This explains 
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some of the perceived incoherence from the perspective of school leaders, who observe 
central office members essentially competing for supremacy of their position or interests 
in instructional support. In observing this behavior, I regularly reflected: Why does every 
opportunity seem like our last? Why do we so quickly elevate from day-to-day operations 
to high-stakes consequences? 
I postulate that team members experience more make-or-break moments because 
they do not know if anyone will “carry their water” for them when they are not watching 
or they are not present in the room. In effect, the stakes are permanently raised, leading to 
increasingly psychologically unsafe feelings in the workplace and a persistent vigilance 
that the work will end if they not take every last step to advance it.  
Coherence Derailers. While the above framing paints a picture of the BPS staff 
member stunted in confusion around organizational priorities, there is another side of the 
coin. The everything-is-priority paradigm can have the net effect of pitting priorities or – 
much worse – teams or team members against each other in order to score individual or 
team gains. At a minimum, because of an alleged shortage of time (which as much 
reflects lack of organizational focus as it is does hours in the day), teams often struggle to 
decipher where their true interdependencies lie; absent this clear sense, team members 
make choices about where to invest their efforts. As I was told by a member of our 
Academics team, “We are all competing for the same people's head space”– we are 
always attempting to get the same people to focus on multiple things at once even when 
we know “that's not how the brain works” (Personal communication, M. Wall, Feb. 
2017). In this competition, there end up being de facto winners and losers, where 
priorities either make progress or are left languishing. 
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A less benign interpretation of this competitive edge could be that some teams or 
team members are actually exploiting the incoherence to advance their own aims. In the 
everything-is-priority paradigm, the sophisticated coherence derailer is able to take 
advantage of the loose coupling and lack of systemness in order to become a winner and 
avoid becoming a loser. Wageman et al. (2008) characterize a derailer as a person who 
“publically appears to buy into the program but who actually is quietly working in the 
background to subvert it” (p. 98). Among a constellation of teams across an organization, 
such exploitation of the incoherence can indeed work to subvert the intentional work of 
teams and may have detrimental impacts on intra- and inter-team effectiveness. 
I have identified four types of what I am calling coherence derailers in my time at 
BPS. It is important to reiterate that for all four of them I cannot confirm their motives 
(i.e. I do not know if they are truly seeking to subvert efforts). Nonetheless, the actions or 
inactions of these four archetypes still have the net effect of derailing intentional efforts 
toward system coherence or team performance. As a further repeated caveat, I note that 
these descriptions are based on my perspective and my perspective alone, from where I 
sit in the organization both horizontally and vertically. I also note that – as much as I 
have observed these tendencies in others – I too have exhibited these tendencies from 
time to time during the year. It sometimes feels instinctual to do so when trying to get 
important work done in what can sometimes feel like a confusing or incoherent 
organizational context. I point out these archetypes so organizationally we can see that 
we have choice in using them. While that means appealing to our heart of (coherent) 
hearts to do the coherence building work, individuals may not always be inclined to do 
so. Getting past the exploitation of incoherence requires us to try to trust in the system – a 
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challenging feat for those who feel like they have been repeatedly abused by it. That said, 
absent that trust, it will be hard to ever forge a collaborative path forward to greater 
systemness.  
Figure 4.1 displays these coherence derailers on the axes of influence and interest; 
the subsequent bullets provide description of the archetype associated with each 
quadrant:  
Figure 4.1 
 
Coherence Derailers 
 
 
Quadrant 1: High Influence/Low Interest 
Archetype: Structure Abandoner 
• Description: District leaders add structures like teams to reign in the chaos and 
crazy of the environment. These structures feel different and (at least for some 
initial period) uncomfortable, even sometimes when well run. Because it feels 
uncomfortable, team members find ways to abandon new structures (e.g. they 
arrive late, leave early, do not engage when present, or walk away from them 
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altogether). Unfortunately, they sometimes go on to lament that the chaos 
persists! In effect, the intended outcome for the structure (process or product) 
stops out, which feels of very little consequence or urgency to the structure 
abandoner. 
• Sample quotations: “Aren’t we over-structuring this meeting?” “Can we take 
some of these meetings off the calendar?” 
 
Quadrant 2: High Influence/High Interest 
Archetype: Constructivist Defector 
• Description: High-demand team members who do not attend meetings (because 
leaders were busy, or they did not want to) later cry foul that their views were not 
adequately represented in deliberations. Because the defector does not trust what 
he was not personally present for, he appeals to the powers that be to slow down 
(or stop up) decisions made in their absence. The condition is exacerbated by the 
positional authority or influence level of the defector, which simultaneously 
grants him greater license to skip undesired meetings, to appeal to top brass when 
he does not like the outcomes, and to maintain his own flexibility to act in the 
future. Unlike the structure abandoner, the constructivist defector is invested in 
the outcome of the process. This condition is also exacerbated by an unclear sense 
of final decision-making within the team or organization.  
• Sample quotation: “[Meeting/team] is useless and a waste of my time. I’m going 
to do an end run around this structure to get what I need.” 
 
Quadrant 3: Low Influence/Low Interest 
Archetype: Conscientious Objector 
• Description: Team member never really engages in a new or existing process or 
structure, effectively denying it their operational capacity and hindering full 
deployment into coherence or alignment efforts. Unlike the structure abandoner, 
the conscientious objector never even begins engagement in a new structure; they 
just never subscribe. Like his higher influence counterparts, the conscientious 
objector is making a power play: even those with low influence in the 
organization can starve a new team or effort of resources. 
• Sample quotation: Silence, or excuse after excuse for non-participation 
 
Quadrant 4: Low Influence/High Interest 
Archetype: Systems Over-Thinkers 
• Description: Team member sees systems-level connections everywhere – and 
becomes virtually paralyzed by their implications. Because of positionality, or due 
to lack of clarity in decision-making authority, the systems over-thinker struggles 
to take action because everything has repercussions everywhere else. As a result, 
the task becomes daunting in its enormity, as over-thinkers spin into vast series of 
endless implications. Their intent is good; they are invested in a positive outcome 
for the process. They just cannot see a path forward without also considering or 
taking myriad other paths. The condition is exacerbated when untethered to clear, 
shared systems-level understanding around “north star” vision, problem, strategy, 
or solution.  
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• Sample quotation: “But if we change to a competency-based approach for school 
leader learning, how do we change the professional learning we offer? And the 
way we evaluate school leaders? And how that connects to the teacher evaluation 
rubric?” 
 
The archetypes are meant to be illustrative and not restrictive: they typify some 
ways that I have observed coherence-seeking efforts become derailed at BPS, though 
certainly there are more arguments that derailers may put forward to advance their 
interests. It is important to note that the coherence derailer can use incoherence in the 
system more positively as self-defense and more negatively as a weapon. In either case, I 
have generally observed that those with greater levels of influence and/or positional 
authority within the organization are generally more successful at derailing – though not 
exclusively so, as the reluctance toward or outright lack of engagement of lower-
influence staff members also can yield the derailing effect. In either case, those with 
lower levels of interest generally are more able to walk away from coherence building, 
either because they can lean on their own authority to get things done or because they 
never experience motivation to subscribe in the first place. Regardless of the quadrant in 
which a derailer may be located, the net effect is the same.  
Accountability Context. The everything-is-priority paradigm in many ways is the 
outcome of being unable to say no to key authorizers and operators inside and outside of 
the organization. As the literature points out, the district superintendent serves too many 
masters – making the accountability he or she personally faces feel incoherent (see for 
example Moore and Alonso, 2014). In surveying the broader environment in which the 
public sector organization operates, as well as the various offices and silos within a 
bureaucracy upon which the public manager relies on to produce value, Moore (1995) 
identifies four elements of political management: “building (1) a climate of tolerance, 
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active support, or ongoing operational assistance for (2) a manager, a policy, or an overall 
strategy among (3) those outside the scope of an official’s direct authority whose (4) 
authorizations or operational assistance are necessary to achieve the public purposes for 
which the official will be held accountable” (p. 113). It is highly likely that this great 
multitude of stakeholders and constituents comes with a robust and likely conflicting 
array of demands for district leadership. As Moore and Alonso (2014) state, “because 
many stakeholders think they have the right to call them to account for performance on 
particular dimensions of value of concern to them, they face a relatively anarchic rather 
than coherent system of accountability that requires them to deal with demands for 
accountability that come at them from many different directions with no clear priority” 
(p. 10). While some demands on the district superintendent are predictable, many are not, 
and “the variety, volatility, and intensity of the oversight structure can make school 
superintendents feel they are under siege” (Moore and Alonso, 2014, p. 15).  
It is no easy feat to politically manage this diverse array of interests – and this 
feeling of incoherence is not unique to a district like BPS. There are many tactics for 
managing all of the competing interests, one of which – which I have witnessed being 
employed by the current BPS administration – is saying yes to taking on a great deal of 
the problems or priorities that come their way in order to satisfy the vast array of 
interests. In doing so, though, absent a shared understanding of what problem we are 
trying to solve, there is a danger that it can lead to a tendency of viewing every problem 
or prospective solution as equal in magnitude of importance or urgency.  
Priorities come from inside and outside of the central office building (e.g. tackling 
persistent achievement gaps for English learners, or addressing chronic homelessness 
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among BPS youth), and are situated in an unforgiving political environment in which 
schools have shifted from being primarily ports of access for students to being outcomes-
oriented producers for our society. As schools take on additional roles of driving inequity 
out of our communities, none of the old assignments that school districts were entrusted 
to create public value have gone away – new layers just get added on. At the end of the 
day, honoring all of these demands and roles, which we view largely as requisite by 
circumstance of our political environment, means that we do not get very far in honoring 
any of them. This sort of response most certainly yields an untenable public management 
situation in which (positively) we appear responsive to the needs of many in our 
environment but only (negatively) at the expense of ceding ground and focus on our own 
proactive agenda for change and only weakly serving most priorities. By and large we 
have not yet built the case politically for focusing in and selecting a small array of 
reforms to address specific student gaps – or if we have, it is not discernable in a sea of 
other priorities.  
In this context in which so many things are held up as priority and regarded as 
important or urgent, staff and managers alike do not have a clear understanding of what 
they are looking for in performance. As a result, staff and managers alike struggle in 
understanding the role that accountability plays in day-to-day organizational operations 
or strategic improvement. Precisely because managers are looking for too much, any 
attempt at a formal accountability structure becomes tremendously complicated. 
Problems are frequently presented as the same in urgency and importance; public 
managers and line staff alike cannot possibly follow up on everything and face difficulty 
in discerning which tasks are truly most important to their superiors on a day-by-day or 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 113 
even year-by-year basis. In the context of a team, which may have inherited a purpose 
where everything is defined as mission-critical, team members may find themselves 
confused or struggling to discern what is truly priority and what is not, leading to feelings 
of consternation among members and overall beliefs of inefficacy of the team structure 
itself.  
The lack of clear and consistent accountability may become frustrating unto itself 
for team members, at worst giving the impression that any quality of work is acceptable 
and at best forcing them to exercise significant caution in their actions. This will likely 
yield environments of low psychological safety: it becomes much harder to admit having 
made a mistake when it is unclear if the ball you dropped is the most important one. 
These conditions aggravate fear in a hierarchical accountability structure, because neither 
evaluators nor the evaluated have a clear sense of what to follow up on or what someone 
will followed up on with them. Edmondson (2012) claims, “when uncertainty clouds our 
thoughts and views, especially views that appear to be at odds with others’, we often take 
the path of reduced interpersonal resistance” in order to mitigate or minimize 
interpersonal risk and save face (Edmondson, 2012, p. 125). The end result is a mixture 
of good and bad outcomes, yielded both from actions and inactions taken in the existence 
of nebulous but omnipresent accountability.  
3. As a system, we do not prioritize organizational learning or reflection. As a 
result, we live out incongruities between our espoused values and enacted values, in 
effect perpetuating the problem of practice we have already admitted to having. In 
his bestselling 2001 book Good to Great, Collins described what he calls the hedgehog 
concept as a tool for organizational focus and improvement. In alluding to a famous essay 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 114 
by Berlin, he claims, “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big 
thing” (2001, p. 90). Hedgehogs, he claims, “simplify a complex world into a single, 
organizing idea, a basic principle or concept that unifies and guides everything” (2001, p. 
91). As he rightly admits, sometimes the concept itself is almost too simplistic – but the 
idea behind it is driving organizational focus toward one singular idea that communicates 
clearly “an understanding at what you can be the best at” (2001, p. 98). 
I cite this example from the business literature because it has gained a lot of 
traction around BPS as we try to figure out our organizational focus. I facilitated a retreat 
for the ASSET team in December 2016 where we tried, struggled, and ultimately failed to 
define what our hedgehog is as a team – in large part because we could not figure out 
what the district’s or system’s hedgehog is overall. As was repeated many times in that 
retreat and in subsequent discussions, landing on a hedgehog for an individual unit or 
team is a dicey proposition unless you understand how it fits into the broader strategy – 
into the district’s hedgehog, essentially. We can pick one, my teammates would argue, 
and try to keep working on it through our own accord, but we always risk being 
interrupted by others – by competing hedgehogs also struggling to assert their dominance 
or superiority, absent one unifying understanding of what the district can be best at.  
This line of thinking, then, is what yielded one of my teammates in ASSET to 
declare, “as a district, our hedgehog is ‘go figure it out yourself.’”  
 I continue to be amazed by the astuteness of this assessment. Essentially, in a 
bureaucratic context and an everything-is-priority paradigm, we have become master 
mavericks, figuring out for ourselves how to take advantage of the system as it currently 
stands to get things done. We feel the pinch of accountability amidst a haze of unclear 
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priorities. We operate knowing that our efforts could be impugned at any moment, or 
someone could call us to account on one of many different tasks we have been assigned. 
So, in the context of too many priorities, no clear north star, and with poor reflexes for 
reflection, we exhibit superhero strength to get the job done – often without much regard 
for doing so in intentional team structures we have set up for collaboration or, 
alternatively, in exploitation of the hierarchy so that we can just get things done. In other 
words, despite these challenges the system environment presents, many tasks still get 
accomplished – but largely because of the bureaucracy and hierarchy, and in spite of the 
teaming spirit we embrace. 
This phenomenon was illustrated in a subsequent retreat I facilitated in March 
2017 for the ASSET leadership team. In making sense of the TDS data I presented in 
Chapter 3, the team concluded that we do not perform much peer coaching of each other 
and recognized that it would be a growth edge for us. When presented with an 
opportunity to do so through an activity around intentionally defining team roles, we 
struggled with whether or not to set ourselves up for structures like peer coaching that 
advance the function of our team, or whether or not we default to traditional managerial 
relationships for evaluation and accountability. While we did not come to a clear 
consensus, the tension of this choice was palpable: do we take a chance in intentionally 
building the egalitarian, instructional roundtable team we envision? Or do we just call it 
like it is and use the hierarchy to get the job done? 
Edmondson’s model toward which I aspire in my personal theory of action –
execution-as-learning – requires that the organization take time to step back and digest 
these dynamics of day-to-day performance. But that becomes hard to do when the pace 
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and quantity of tasks is so demanding. Under this condition, and in a bureaucratic 
structure, we continuously implicitly and explicitly reward top performance by those who 
“figure it out” in spite of the system rather than within, because of, or through the system. 
We even aid and abet it, as evidenced by an Instructional Superintendent who told me 
about practices used in her position to help school leaders “get around the system and its 
holdbacks,” saying “we coach [school leaders] on ways to get around systemic 
hurdles…my job is to coach principals on how to break rules or what to ignore in order to 
have the focus to get things done and make real change at school level” (Personal 
communication, M. Wall, Dec. 2016). While such a spirit somewhat falls in line with our 
espoused centrality of the role of the school leader, in effect we are perpetuating 
inequities by exploiting the lack of systemness we have, and we are sending mixed 
messages about the importance of teams as a fundamental unit of change for seemingly 
intractable problems when the buck generally stops at individuals.  
I was frequently and in many ways told during my time at BPS that “we do not 
have the luxury to prioritize,” or to step back and question some of the assumptions under 
which we operate (Personal communication, M. Wall, Jan. 2017). In effect, though, 
absent this reflection, the organization may act as though it is uncontrollably subject to 
the conditions it experiences on a day-to-day basis. In this excess, this can mean 
accepting the system as it is currently constructed. Of course, we do not have the luxury 
to immediately cease being reactive to the authorizing environment or to stop responding 
to urgent student safety or support needs. Nonetheless, doing so just because we have 
become accustomed to it generally ends up perpetuating the existing brokenness in the 
system we have (which is the system we explicitly named in our problem of practice as 
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generating inequity in our district). In other words, if we are not careful and fastidious in 
reflection, we could end up perpetuating the inequities that we originally asked teams to 
vanquish. 
A dearth of organizational reflection and learning is clearly evidenced in the 
inconsistencies and contradictions that the system permits. We already acknowledged as 
much in the system’s problem of practice (see Appendix A) that states that opportunities 
(and thus achievements) are inconsistent and have had the effect of marginalizing 
students. When school leaders get things done piecemeal in a system dominated by their 
own autonomy and individually based accountability, students are at incredible risk of 
falling through the cracks. As a colleague in ASSET told me in his own interpretation of 
the district’s problem of practice, “the savvy of the principal is what determines which 
students succeed” (Personal communication, M. Wall, Nov. 2016). Another colleague 
told me, “the best schools [and thereby the best school leaders] in the district are those 
who have figured out how to work the system” (Personal communication, M. Wall, Jan. 
2017). While only reflecting the views of two central office colleagues, both statements 
necessarily imply that – despite the best of intentions from dedicated educators – some 
school leaders (and by extension their students) get ahead in their hustling for resources 
while others fall behind. Because we have set up tasks to incentivize and reward 
individual behavior and performance, it is much easier to “go figure it out” just for the 
students in one’s school, rather than looking across the system in recognition that BPS 
students (in the oft-repeated phrase) are “all of our kids,” and that they belong to the 
whole system. In effect, individual accountability and currents of change often keep the 
system pulling in opposite directions.  
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Systems-level conditions are often self-reinforcing in driving the organization 
away from reflection: without a clear slate of priorities, it is harder to build out 
infrastructure to meaningfully measure progress toward strategic aims. Absent some data 
infrastructure, and especially in a knowledge-intensive setting, reflection is made all the 
more challenging to understand how we are doing and whether we need mid-course 
corrections. And because of the broader systems-level forces of hierarchical 
accountability, we are especially disinclined to discuss or admit failure for fear of 
repercussions. While it occasionally surfaced, it is rarely mined or systematically 
examined for learning that could be transferred to other pursuits or even to subsequent 
iterations of the same pursuit. 
Looking school by school, rather than systematically across the district, can have 
devastating effects on individual students. In the system as currently structured, some 
school leaders feel at liberty to remove students from their own schools in order to keep 
their school higher performing, at the cost to the school that inherits the same student 
with the same set of needs, and (even costlier) to the student who experiences greater 
transition and instability. This arrangement is what allows tracking into special education 
to persist; as a colleague in that department has stated, “a single principal phone call to 
declare a student is emotionally impaired can derail that student’s entire life” (Personal 
communication, M. Wall, Oct. 2016). Because as a system we accommodate school 
leader prerogative in that moment and handle things on a case-by-case basis, we miss the 
opportunity to reflect on and discover the root causes in the environment that are really 
triggering that student’s failure in the first place. Such a lack of systematic approach can 
have permanent impact on students. While student mobility might occur in good spirit of 
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accommodating real instructional concerns of school leaders and teachers, it can also 
translate into avoidance of tough diagnosis of the problem and of organizational 
reflection and learning to address it. In essence, we can perpetuate the inequity we seek to 
vanquish from the system; unbridled school leader prerogative – in the context of our 
current system – allows vast inequities to persist.  
The teaming literature tells us we need to design tasks intentionally for 
interdependence – but doing so well means being mindful of the entire lifecycle of the 
task, the ecosystem it exists in, and the various pressures that the individuals on the team 
are facing in completing their task (especially in competition with other tasks). A lack of 
organizational clarity – and subsequent lack of reflection on it – has damaging effects at 
central office teams as well: interpersonal conflicts and feelings of inequality with staff in 
a competitive environment in which they cannot always discern whether or not they are 
operating “on the same team” as other colleagues. To fully appreciate the gravity of any 
single task becomes an exercise in empathy. I have noted even just for myself that living 
amidst this organizational chaos becomes a tiring affair; it has tremendous potential to 
wear us down, hindering the tough work that we seek to do. It becomes challenging to 
even pop one’s head out of the haze for a second when you are constantly in execution 
mode, firing on all cylinders. As a professor of mine reminded me when we spoke about 
conditions in the system earlier this year, “It is very consuming to run the status quo in 
education as is, let alone map the strategy for how you want to transform it” (Personal 
communication, M. Wall, Jan. 2017).  
Summary 
 Survey data suggest a dissatisfaction with the supports that BPS central office (on 
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the whole) is producing, as well as a mixed picture of the ways in which one central 
office team – ASSET – can build its capacity for future work and contribute to individual 
learning and wellbeing. Several aspects of our system as currently constructed are salient 
in complicating the high performance of teams toward challenging problems. In general, I 
argue that we do not share understanding of the desired end state toward which all of our 
efforts aspire and we struggle in reaching shared understanding of problem, solution, or 
theory of action. In the absence of that shared understanding, we identify too many 
priorities for the district, which undermines team capacity and sends mixed messages 
about whether or not teaming is really crucial in solving our problems. In large part, I 
argue we do this because it is easier and more expeditious to continue to exploit the 
hierarchy and accountability that bureaucracy provides us, fulfilling many of the tasks we 
set out to achieve. However, it comes at a cost to the values of teaming that we have set 
out to use in addressing our problems, in effect weakening the overall approach or 
product. I argue that we must prioritize organizational learning and reflection so that we 
can critically examine the ways in which these conditions perpetuate the problem of 
practice we have already admitted to having. I present some ways to do so in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5: Implications and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have outlined some implications for the work that lies ahead for 
Boston Public Schools (BPS), the public K-12 education sector, and for myself as a 
leader within both. These implications suggest courses of actions as well as some 
potential reframing for mindsets and beliefs to advance the work of teams in approaching 
the wicked problems that school districts face. I end with some brief concluding remarks 
about the work that lies ahead for teams in public school districts. 
Site Implications 
 In writing my analysis, I struggled a bit in balancing truth with empathy: I both 
sought to be as candid as possible in calling out critical items for attention, while also 
recognizing the nearly impossible parameters that are laid out for district leaders. As 
Moore and Alonso (2014) state, “Making executive decisions in this context can 
challenge even the most determined and confident public manager. It often feels like an 
impossible job, and of the few brave enough to undertake it, even fewer manage to stay in 
the job long enough to shepherd through real changes” (p. 15). The work requires a great 
deal of bravery – both in making commitments and saying yes, and in making tough calls 
and saying no. Either way that a leader responds, the he or she must continue to grapple 
with the risks of diluting his or her own principles for reform. It is a tricky balance, and 
the district still has room to grow in fostering it.  
 I also struggled in writing these implications because I would not want BPS to 
move too quickly to corrective action based on the arguments I presented. If I have had 
even one modicum of impact during my ten months in the district, I hope it has been in 
imparting the value of performing deliberate, deep, and authentic problem diagnosis. Too 
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many site-level implications would suggest a clear or easy path forward, which is far 
from my intentions. It is my hope that district leadership can first take my analysis and 
pick it apart, finding areas of agreement and – even more importantly – having 
discussions about disagreements. Grappling with my perspectives as a relative outsider to 
the district, in combination with the decades of collective experience across BPS 
leadership, would help tremendously in contextualizing the recommendations I make in 
this chapter and in co-creating a shared course of action toward the priorities of teaming 
and of closing opportunity and achievement gaps that the district has put forward. Much 
like how taking the teaming survey can be an intervention in and of itself, I hope my 
analysis can also serve as a jumping-off point for sincere conversation about the mental 
modeling we employ to make change in Boston schools. 
 With that in mind, I lay out several implications and considerations for action that 
BPS might take considering the points I raised in this capstone: 
1. Identify, elevate, and learn from team performance on a deliberately small 
number of highly interdependent tasks. What we ask teams to do now is predictive of 
how they will perform when they are given new tasks in the future. I suggest a modified 
approach to the way we have pursued teaming at BPS in the past that instead focuses on 
establishing small teams producing whole, identifiable pieces of work in response to an 
intentionally small number of tasks. Team leaders must be deliberate in selecting tasks 
that maximize interdependence among cross-functional groups of people and that 
maximize opportunities for reflection and learning, particularly considering the task 
environment in which the work takes place.  
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Opportunities abound for which tasks could be elevated for this intentional 
approach to teaming; in fact, many are already in motion and could be seized on as a 
model (including the district’s development of an Instructional Position Paper and the 
annual school budget process). However, an important complementary to task selection is 
that leaders must give teams the time and mental space to truly work as a unit toward 
collective goals, including for authentic co-creation of work products, planning toward 
implementation goals, and collecting data on performance and impact that will be 
analyzed and brought forward into future action cycles. Absent this complementary, 
teams are bound to suffer from the same pitfalls they face in the current task 
environment.  
“Clearing the deck,” so to speak, means making tough choices to elevate some 
priorities and minimize others. We must stop looking at having so many priorities as a 
permanent and unchangeable condition to which we are subject, and give ourselves 
permission to narrow the focus. With one hundred percent confidence, doing so comes 
with political fallout. But deliberately saying no opens doors to strategically improving 
organizational performance around areas that truly are of greatest importance, including 
unleashing teams on long-held, seemingly intractable problems.  
 Another important supplement to this work is the framing that team leaders give 
to the tasks they assign to the team: team leaders must be unapologetic in framing and 
communicating the interdependencies of tasks. Leaders must set expectations for where 
they expect interdependencies to play out through the course of a task, and be 
plainspoken and honest about where they might expect risks or mistakes to arise. 
Newfound interdependencies are likely to surface conflict as team members work 
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together. It is incumbent on the team leader – especially in the early stages of the team – 
to arbitrate team interdependencies and deliberately choose a finite number of discrete 
tasks that she believes only this team can successfully accomplish. Considering how easy 
it is to backslide into decades of organizational divisions in traditional central office silos, 
the imperative of intentionally interdependent framing by team leaders cannot be 
understated as genuinely interdependent teams slowly move to overcome their 
institutional momentum to keep working in silos. 
Team leaders may ameliorate some of these concerns by setting and advancing a 
clear set of norms and boundaries in the language they would like to hear from their team 
in doing so. One suggestion for how to lightly enter new grounds of interdependencies 
may be to hold team meetings in which members are prohibited from speaking from the 
perspectives that their role would traditionally advocate (e.g. a representative from the 
Office of English Language Learners cannot speak on the linguistic background or needs 
of children). It may seem like a small step, but it could help to force interdependencies in 
new ways by helping to (in the words of Weick) create new social realities in which team 
members make sense of their new experience together and work aligned to their purpose. 
 2. Set up a team launch process and expectations for team performance, and 
celebrate teams that are high performing. A process for establishing and setting up 
teams, including standards or expectations for team performance, could be a powerful 
way to institutionalize and implement the valuable collaborative approach that district 
leadership seeks in using teams to address critical problems. A process could lay out 
steps to ensure that teams can be “real,” in the words of Wageman et al. (2005), namely 
that they are interdependent, stable, and bounded. It could address roles to be played on 
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the team and expectations for contributions among specific members.  
 Most importantly, such a process could force organizational leaders into much 
more precise levels of clarity around team purpose – articulating it in such a way that it 
allows leaders (and team members) to hold themselves accountable to the purposes they 
set up for themselves. Intentionally establishing a team with a consequential, challenging, 
and clear purpose based on a very limited number of high-impact, interdependent tasks 
requires a degree of dogged clarity in the team’s leader that can be elusive and 
emotionally demanding. Even just enlisting members for the team can “uncover 
discrepancies and conflicts about what members think their role is or should be” 
(Wageman et al., 2008, p. 78). This degree of clarity can breed discomfort or even 
awkwardness; navigating it well requires a level of skill in team leaders of big-picture 
thinking and small-scale implementation blended with the emotional and relational 
capacities to specify exactly what your team’s purpose is at all times. However, being 
explicit throughout the process as to these fundamental aspects of team structures just 
brings into light the discomfort that already existed when team terms were left 
ambiguous. As Wageman et al. (2008) put it, “achieving clarity means being insistent and 
unapologetic about exercising your authority to specify your team’s purpose,” even when 
those conversations can be difficult to have (p. 75). 
 This does not mean that once team structures or processes are set they are 
irreversible. It does, however, formalize the approach to teams in a way that aims to 
surface shared assumptions about how things will work from the outset, and can be used 
in learning cycles so that team leaders and members can return with regularity to the 
ways that they have explicitly set out to work.  
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Being clear and unapologetic about team purpose through a formal, 
institutionalized team launch process also makes way for teams that are focused on 
purposes other than execution. Using Wageman et al. (2008) and Christensen and 
Kaufman (2006)’s ways to categorize team based on the extent or profile of 
interdependence they exhibit, BPS can make clear choices when launching teams about 
the degree of interdependence they seek to foster among members. Teams need not 
always strive for the highest degree of interdependence if it is not suitable for the task at 
hand, and as discussed in Chapter 2, teams can hold latent benefits toward other 
complementary or altogether distinct tasks through the extent to which they enhance 
understanding of the organization and the many roles its teams and employees play in the 
relational capacity built in the team experience.  
There is metacognitive benefit for teams in better understanding their own 
structure, the express expectations leaders have for their interdependence, and the 
processes and mental modeling by which they seek to produce or create change. It relates 
back to the low operational understanding of the distinction between “Office” and team 
revealed in the School Leader Support Survey data, in which respondents generally 
regarded the two terms interchangeably. This can be ok depending on the task at hand, 
but it also can create confusion in cross-functional endeavors in which team members are 
not clear how their personal contributions fit into a broader effort or strategy of the 
organization. Teams members, in other words, need not always feel psychologically 
interdependent when the interdependence demand of the task is relatively low; lower 
level contributions may suffice in those scenarios. However, when the task truly demands 
a new way of going about production – akin to what the Strategic Implementation Plan 
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required of ASSET – a backslide into a series of successive tasks (a kabuki of 
interdependence, so to speak) can be detrimental to the desired outcome, as teams may 
produce outputs that may technically meet the task parameters but fall short in achieving 
the level of impact being sought. 
Wageman et al. also contend that among the dedicated resources that teams need 
to flourish are organizational rewards and recognitions for team performance. According 
to Wageman et al. (2008), teams need rewards “that recognize and reinforce team 
members for delivering on the team’s accountabilities” (e.g. tie bonuses to organizational 
performance, not just individual performance) and that “put significant team skin in the 
game” (p. 157). This goes beyond what Wilson (1989) calls three kinds of nonmaterial 
rewards in public sector: purpose, status, and solidarity for producing public value in a 
laudable organization upholding the public’s interest. Team performance must feel 
important to all members of a team and organization. That entails explicitly naming the 
value that teams are expected to produce on behalf of the organization’s mission or 
strategy, and holding up the entire team for achieving milestones together. Survey data 
from leaders within BPS reflected that they did not believe teamwork is rewarded. 
Recognizing and celebrating the authentic contributions of real teams (rather than just of 
individuals, or “team” efforts in name only) is a clear way to let the organization know 
that teamwork is valued – not just amongst leadership, but across and within 
organizational silos and levels of hierarchy. 
3. Establish structures for systematically recognizing and learning from team 
failure. Bureaucratic environments are notoriously unsafe environments in which to 
admit failure or defeat. The district, though, must adopt a growth mindset and learner 
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stance toward everyday reflection and acknowledgement of failure. Not acknowledging 
failure means tacit acceptance of it. While the organization may not have been set up to 
hold organizational learning as priority, failing to systematically seek it out and to learn 
from failure will only perpetuate existing performance problems. 
While we cannot control every single condition or exigency thrown at us, we can 
try harder to structure times for the organization to reflect on how we are meeting and 
falling short of priorities like opportunity and achievement gap closure, adult learning, or 
system coherence. Making it a safe environment in which to fail requires some 
intentional structures. Edmondson recommends setting clear boundaries for what is and 
what is not acceptable behavior in a psychologically safe environment, explicitly 
detailing end results and acceptable processes for trial-and-error that illustrate the logic 
and decisions that team members may face as they engage in team-based 
experimentation. She thinks of these boundaries like guardrails on a bridge: “If the 
guardrails are missing, you’re likely to drive as close to the center line as possible. It’s 
obviously frightening to drive near the bridge’s edge without rails in place. When 
teaming and learning, the equivalent is sticking to safe, trackable behaviors that shield 
you from possible punishment, while avoiding behaviors with interpersonal risk, like 
admitting mistakes, that may be interpreted as ‘outside the lines.’ With guardrails in 
place, you’re more likely to test the limits of current process and knowledge” 
(Edmondson, 2012, p. 145).  
An important addition to these guardrails would be figuring out ways for 
individuals (like school leaders) and teams (like Instructional Leadership Teams) to 
exchange information and collaboratively learn from each other’s efforts. Structures set 
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up around practice by role could help to cross-pollinate and democratize the vast but 
imbalanced knowledge that individuals in our system hold so that it goes beyond the 
lucky few with social capital and can do more good for more students. Formally 
networking individuals or teams to learn from each other is not a new idea (see for 
example Bryk, 2013, on Networked Improvement Communities), and there is already 
hunger for it, as illustrated by one school leader respondent in my survey: “I would prefer 
to be supported by my colleagues. Make time for principals to learn from each other.” 
Creating expectations for what is acceptable behavior, for how and how often learning 
from failure should occur, and connecting individuals across the district to tap into that 
learning has the potential to unleash the power of currently uncodified, unnetworked 
knowledge in seasoned school leaders’ and bureaucrats’ heads. This knowledge can turn 
the organization more deliberately toward innovation and experimentation in attempting 
to address the wicked problems we have set out for teams to solve.  
 4. Develop a three-year scope and sequence for coherence building in the 
system, and celebrate coherence as it unfolds. One of my most striking observations of 
BPS staff is how systemic their thinking is. Truly, since the beginning of my time at BPS, 
I have heard the word “coherence” uttered more times than I can remember, and found 
that staff and leadership alike are both inclined toward systems-level thinking about how 
to build real coherence in our system. 
I suggest leveraging this enthusiasm and balancing it with the practical demands 
that the system currently faces by developing a three-year scope and sequence for 
coherence and system building at BPS. Explicitly co-creating milestones with all 
interested parties would help to clearly articulate the end state toward which the system-
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level thinkers aspire. It would also provide helpful milestones along the way that can ease 
the fears of staff that want to tackle everything at the same time or rush into a system that 
does not presently exist. By (for example) spelling out when we address competencies we 
want to see in staff, how we better align professional learning to those competencies, 
when accountabilities for those competencies set in, etc., staff can know the trajectory 
leadership has in mind for reforming key structural aspects of the system that are widely 
recognized as out of sync or incoherent with our agenda for reform. Such a move would 
demonstrate earnest intent and interest in improving the system we share while also 
continuing to operate in the legacy we have inherited, demonstrating that we can and will 
reach our desired end state for integration in due time. It could also serve as an 
accountability mechanism in holding leadership accountable for important long-term 
system priorities, and for leadership to hold staff accountable for acting as their best 
selves that they have already shown interest in developing – even when it becomes hard 
to act on that virtue day to day.  
A possible corollary to a scope and sequence might also be instituting awards for 
coherence. Such awards could happen at more frequent timelines and celebrate 
contributions that individuals or teams have made in uniting disparate parts of the system 
toward the same principles or priorities. Celebrating coherence can increase the cache of 
the word itself in staff vocabulary, and push staff to discuss coherence more frequently 
and celebrate it as it comes to life.  
Sector Implications 
I think that many of the recommendations I discuss in the implications for BPS 
have relevance for the entire K-12 public education sector, but one link that really stands 
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out to me across these recommendations has to do with the immense importance of 
practicing empathy in taking on leadership of the sector. I use the term empathy 
intentionally, as it is a trait that I feel like I have grown in immensely during my personal 
development within the Ed.L.D. program. In fact, I have come to characterize my own 
understanding of what leadership is through empathetic practice: to me, at its simplest 
level leadership is perspective taking. It is, as Edmondson (2012) describes, being 
“vigilantly aware of others’ needs, roles, and perspectives,” requiring both “affective 
(feeling) and cognitive (thinking) skills in order to learn to relate to others better and 
learning to make decisions based on the integration of different perspectives” (p. 2). It 
means taking time not just to understand the school leader or teacher experience – a call 
that is often echoed by front-line educators working in schools – but also that of the 
bureaucrat in central office who has lost faith in the district’s ability to lead. It also works 
in the reverse direction, with mid-level leaders – as I was in the past year – looking up to 
understand the immense pressures that our leaders are experiencing in making the tough 
choices they must face on a day-to-day basis. 
Building relational capacity among the individuals doing the work can feel like it 
stands in tension with the deliberate role-based structure of teams, but it can flourish in 
the context of a rich task, and it is a key competency for building strong, resilient teams. 
In her 2002 book The Southwest Airlines Way, Gittell describes the term “relational 
capacity” or “relational competence” as the shared goals, shared respect, and shared 
knowledge that empowers individuals to work well together on teams. She argues that 
these tenets are particularly important in environments where tasks are reciprocally 
interdependent (i.e. “when each action taken by any participant has a potential influence 
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on multiple other participants”), subject to high levels of uncertainty (i.e. “requiring 
continuous updates of information and adjustments in plans”), and time bound (i.e. “time 
constraints limit an organization’s ability to use time buffers to reduce the [negative] 
effects of interdependence and uncertainty”) (Gittell, 2002, p. 49-50).  
Gittell (2002) argues that teaming and teamwork ability “can be understood more 
specifically as relational competence – the ability to relate effectively with others” (p. 
85). Team members at Southwest are intentionally trained to build their relational 
capacity as a way to enhance attainment of shared goals (which “motivate employees to 
move beyond what is best for their own narrow area of responsibility and act with regard 
for the overall work process”), shared knowledge (“regarding how their tasks are related 
to other tasks”), and shared respect (“for the work of others” which “encourages 
employees to value the contributions of others and to consider the impact of their actions 
on others”) (p. 35). This triad of core values in relational capacity center on a systems-
level orientation to the work, reinforcing every single member of the team (line and 
leader alike) to act with sincere care for the overall work process rather than staying in 
their narrow lane of responsibility. Company leadership would argue relational capacity 
is not just good for business but necessary for them to get their jobs done, and that 
“relationships of shared goals, shared knowledge, and mutual respect contribute 
substantially to effective coordination and therefore to quality and efficiency 
performance” (Gittell, 2002, p. 26). In other words, exhibiting relational competence is 
not just good for the more emotional side of liking or enjoying the company of one’s 
colleagues (though that sentiment is not one to be ignored); it is about enhancing 
productivity of the organization writ large. Understanding how one’s contributions fit 
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into the broader task environments helps individuals – on or off teams – in better 
understanding how to approach the work. In this way, relationship building becomes 
another way of getting the work done: it builds trust and empathy that have direct and 
latent potential to enhance organizational performance through the perspective-taking it 
fosters in co-producing or even just consulting on tasks. 
The applications of these tenets of relational competence – and an overall 
orientation toward empathetic perspective-taking in the mantle of system-level leadership 
– has vast implications for the public education sector. At the heart of Gittell’s argument 
– much like that of Higgins et al. (2012) in their discussion of implementation teams – is 
honoring and respecting the vastness and value of the identity that each team member 
brings to the work. Gittell (2002) describes the previous experiences of an employee at 
Southwest who had previously worked elsewhere in the airline industry: “It is difficult to 
identify deeply with an organization in which one is encouraged or required to present a 
false self” (p. 115). An empathetic approach to leadership recognizes not only how 
deeply divided organizations are along functional or legacy lines but also how incredibly 
fragmented our own personal identities become in the workplace. As a team, each 
member comes to work daily “with multiple identities in tow,” navigating organizational 
waters that may seem calm on the surface but could very easily turn turbulent – 
especially considering the complex racial, political, and economic histories that run 
through organizations as deeply embedded in our communities as schools (Higgins et al., 
2012, p. 4). Gittell (2002) describes the situation: “The division of labor is a powerful 
source of efficiency and productivity…but it results in alienation and fragmentation of 
human identity. Strong working relationships can serve to overcome the alienation 
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created by the division of labor by creating more holistic, social identities in place of the 
more partial and fragmented identities that lead people to reject their connections with 
others” (p. 43).  
In essence, relational competence means getting to know someone for what they 
do and for who they are, fundamentally respecting them as a person as well as their 
contributions to the organization, their role on the team, and seeing how their many 
identities converge in the work. Building up this capacity can be a way to effectively 
drive organizational performance, creating unifying links within and across teams. Team 
members are united not only by task but more fully by identity, helping teams “to form a 
collective identity with others” and thus enabling them “to engage more easily in 
coordinated, collective action” (Gittell, 2002, p. 42). 
I would argue that this sort of framing is fundamental for creating a safe 
environment and enabling the sort of collaboration needed for Edmondson’s conception 
of execution-as-learning. Characterized by shared recognition and sense-making around 
failures or challenges, execution-as-learning in a highly hierarchical environment can 
easily lead to conflict or avoidance behavior, often about the relationships through which 
the challenge or failures presented themselves rather than about the tasks themselves. 
Because of the difficulty of extricating the relationship aspects from the task aspects of a 
conflict or challenge, it becomes challenging for any team member (or team leader) to 
muster the emotional courage and fortitude it takes to perform serious and sober self-
reflection about how individual actions or inactions contributed to the failure of a team. It 
is even harder to then relate that introspection to the broader organization systems that 
may allow that behavior to take place (or not take place) from the start. If the 
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environment does not feel psychologically safe, it becomes more challenging to look like 
a failure or appear incompetent in front of the group, as team members generally do not 
want to indict themselves in the problem (even when, in the case of Boston, the problem 
of practice already implicates the team as a whole). Intentionally training staff in 
empathetic team building (e.g. building relationships inside and outside the office; 
providing opportunities to shadow and learn what each team member does; encouraging 
team members to bring their whole selves to the experience, including discussion of non-
work topics), builds a foundation of relational competence in the team. It also builds a 
base of empathy that helps team members remember the person behind the point of view 
when conflict inevitably breaks out. It can reduce the emotional toll that generally comes 
with admitting failure, mistakes, or defeat because team members keep in mind a fuller 
understanding of that person and what they are facing in and outside of their failure or 
mistake. It reminds people that we are much more than the one mistake or failure to 
which we have admitted. 
Further, developing relational competence is incredibly important in a sector 
whose leaders never seem to escape the fierce urgency of the problems the sector faces. I 
heard this refrain early on in my time at BPS from an outgoing senior official as she left 
the district at the beginning of the current school year. After spending a year in leadership 
here, she concluded that district leaders in Boston and beyond are task oriented – but “not 
in the right way” (Personal communication, M. Wall, Aug. 2016). She argued that as a 
system we are oriented around tasks rather than being oriented around relationships. This 
hyper task focus, in her view, cultivates a culture of anxiety around getting things done, 
rather than a culture of trust built around relationships and caring for each other. In this 
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culture, the pace beleaguers people, which can cause contributions to diminish in quality 
or quantity as individuals and teams feel constantly under pressure. Without pauses in the 
work to breathe, or to recognize the depth and richness of the collaborators with whom 
we perform those tasks, it is possible to view our colleagues just as conduits of 
productivity without the more unique focus on the interpersonal dimensions of the 
environment that keep many people (like me) motivated to perform. It also becomes 
easier to write off colleagues (superiors and subordinates) and interpret their actions or 
inactions less charitably because there are so many possible opportunities for them to 
drop the ball and an insufficient well of trust for them to fall into when it happens. A 
focus on relational competence helps to build that trust from the beginning, encouraging 
all team members to think of whole people bringing full selves to the work rather than 
individuals toiling but sometimes failing to fulfill their full slate of duties (a formidable 
task considering the amount on each person’s plate). 
 These lessons appear simplistic to me but no less critical as I continue to take up 
the mantle of leadership in the public education sector. As Gittell (2002) noted, “in sum, 
relationships shape our own personal identities: they define who we are” (p. 43). In 
viewing the job of leader as seeking to understand the task (and the world) through the 
eyes of others, we open up to more empathetic understanding of everyone around us, 
which can help us find new ways to effectively lead through such turbulent, complex task 
environments. We also vastly expand the scope of leadership responsibility in doing so: 
“Leadership is better understood as a process that can take place at any level of the 
organization” (Gittell, 2002, p. 74).  
 Finally, in recommending further study for the field, I believe that additional 
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research into the role of teams in implementing large-scale instructional improvement 
efforts and reforms both at central administrative offices for public school districts as 
well as in K-12 schools would be of tremendous value for the sector. As a structure, 
teams continue to be employed in efforts across the sector, often drawing from across 
organizational silos and levels of bureaucratic hierarchy as I described in my case study 
of BPS. It would be of value to continue to build on the work of Higgins et al. (2012) in 
continuing to discern optimal structure for teams implementing change in districts and the 
way teaming structures and behaviors can maximally interact with the bureaucracy that 
permeates public education systems. 
Self Implications 
 Over the course of my residency and study of teams at BPS this year, I have come 
to realize how personally biased I am toward teams and how deeply engrained teaming is 
in me in getting the work done. I continue to remain struck by this fundamental question 
as presented by Wageman et al. in first needing to question whether or not, as a leader of 
change efforts at BPS, I really need a team to perform the specific task at hand. I am 
swayed by the authors’ assertion “to make that decision deliberately,” rather than “being 
strongly swayed either by traditional management models or by fantasies of how 
wonderful it would be if all the orchestra’s senior leaders were in the same harness 
pulling in the same direction” (Wageman et al., 2008, p. 32). Too often I approach teams 
with that same collaborative but nonspecific spirit that I have witnessed in BPS 
leadership, approaching with enthusiasm in place of serious consideration of what is 
needed and best for the task at hand. I need to adopt the same type of rigorous vetting of 
needs and structure before making moves to form teams, much like I describe under site 
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implications for BPS in developing a team launch process.  
In assessing my own performance as a doctoral resident and Director of 
Instructional Strategy, I make a similar evaluation as I did for my team: while the ASSET 
leadership team appears to have made some great progress, I am not certain that as a 
coach I led the team to where it needs to be to sustain the work. While we were able to 
get a lot of the work done, the team is still in development. The team largely agreed in 
recent reflections, with members indicating that we are still in some stages of forming or 
storming, and that we are not yet the team we have hoped for. Nonetheless, with the 
progress we have attained – which has at least as much to do with the courage and 
willingness of this group of leaders to show up and be led as it does with the leadership 
and coaching I provided – I am optimistic for the future state of the ASSET team and 
their capacity to do work together in the years to come. To reflect back on Edmondson, 
teaming is a verb and not a static entity, and the team is constantly in development. Even 
with the journey that is yet to come, the ASSET leadership team retains strong potential 
to keep moving toward its ultimate vision as instructional roundtable for the district.  
However, as a fellow member of the team told me, I am ASSET. In other words, 
in her view, we formed as an ASSET team with insufficient structure in place for 
becoming a real team. I came in and inherited the big bet the district made on the ASSET 
reorganization, entrusted to steward and lead the ASSET leadership team into becoming a 
team. While at first this observation flattered me in realizing how much I was entrusted 
with, my reaction quickly turned to discouragement about the ability for the work of this 
team to keep moving forward. I am cognizant of the outsized role that I have played in 
managing and steering this group to its present state, as well as my personal upholding of 
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many of the structural elements that keep the team forging ahead. I think my coaching of 
the team has been successful in yielding a greater sense of teamness today, but it still has 
a good way to go until it is a fluidly self-governing body. Much of the challenge is due to 
the ongoing interpersonal challenge of taking risks and serving new purposes in an 
environment that – while espousing the values of a flat organization and cross-
functionally tackling problems – still largely operates hierarchically.  
Still another part of the challenge is the overall struggle with system-level 
coherence, making it difficult for the ASSET team to understand its unique purpose and 
role in the broader organizational context. The amount of trust generated in the team 
through their assiduous work on key tasks (essentially performances of their 
understanding of interdependence) gives me hope that the work continues to grow 
organically. However, I worry that I insufficiently planned and executed for transition of 
team leadership over to a more self-governed body – especially in the incredibly 
demanding task environment that is BPS. The team is still mostly only hierarchically 
poised to be pressured toward their own individual accountabilities and not those of the 
ASSET leadership team. Further concern emerged through my own reflection on the 
broader organizational context in which ASSET is situated: as the Superintendent pointed 
out to me, while ASSET has deliberately been integrating amongst its member 
departments and seeking to build coherence as a division, the rest of the organization 
remains largely siloed. Building beyond silos in other parts of the organization is the 
work of continued coherence building. Nonetheless, as an implication for myself, in 
retrospect I should have thought more this year about the ways that a team like the 
ASSET leadership team that is deliberately seeking higher degrees of interdependence 
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might constructively organize and act in the context of a less coherence-driven 
organization. This is not to say suggest that we should find ways to work around 
incoherence elsewhere: indeed, as I discussed in Chapter 4, one can find ways to exploit 
that incoherence if desired. Nonetheless, I could have given greater thought to which 
elements of broader organization-wide coherence we could have sought to complement 
our internal coherence building efforts. 
In further reflection on my personal theory of action for residency year, I am also 
struck by my omission of two explicit “if” statements as well as the foundational 
conclusion of the “then” statement which I sought. First, I omitted an “if” statement 
around systems-level politics and understanding, which in retrospect feels glaring 
considering the number of takeaways I had in this domain in Chapter 4. I recognized its 
value going in (as described by my “broader mandate” in Chapter 1), but I did not 
formally codify it in my theory of action. This omission is telling to me: just because I 
view these actions as requisite and implied, or because it is hard to quantify exactly what 
and how one goes about the politicking and construction of social capital, that does not 
mean it is no less critical to successful execution of the work. This is a particular skill set 
that I am continuously developing and that will be critical in any future leadership 
positions toward which I aspire in the sector. As political work is often shrugged off in a 
sector that would sometimes like to (hopelessly) see itself as “apolitical,” I need to 
continue to think about how I present and portray this critical political work in an 
accessible and nonthreatening way. Performing this type of landscape analysis – and 
getting an understanding of what makes those in the organization really tick – is a 
required part of a coherence building agenda. I will not be successful in asking critical 
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questions about how the system works – let alone in making recommendations or taking 
actions to substantially change the system – without exercising my relational capacity and 
building up a well of trust, capital, and relationship on which to ground all of my efforts. 
I also omitted an “if” statement on some of the more personal aspects of my own 
approach to leadership that undoubtedly played a role in my success as Director of 
Instructional Strategy during my residency year. My supervisor and mentor during the 
year would remind me frequently that she asked me to join the team in this role because 
of the specific ways that she had seen me operate on teams – namely, for my strengths in 
facilitation of bridging divides of difference to allow others’ defenses to come down, to 
deliver truth, and to still maintain team member engagement and productivity afterwards. 
This was not only a huge avowal of her confidence in my leadership abilities, but also an 
enormous reminder for me that I am taking some of my leadership strategies and moves 
for granted, especially when it comes to areas of relative ease, comfort, or strength for me 
personally around the authentically building relationships with others. I believe my 
ability stems from a genuine interest, appreciation, and curiosity for the myriad gifts that 
my peers bring to the team; I try to pose it as an inquiry stance in everything I do. As 
Gittell discusses, learning more about not only the special contributions someone brings 
to the team but also more about who they are helps me to grow closer to them, which not 
only benefits the work through the building of trust and empathy but for me also makes 
the work genuinely more enjoyable. A large part of what has driven me forward in every 
organization I have worked in for my entire career is the quality and extent of the 
relationships I have built with others. These bonds are arguably my greatest leadership 
success: they have not only left the products I have co-produced with my teammates 
  
 
  Mary C. Wall 142 
stronger and more durable, but they have left an indelible impression on me that keeps 
me humble in my continuous learning and in perpetual awe of what I can produce only 
through authentic collaboration with others.  
Additionally, in reflecting on my “then” statement from my theory of action, I 
was reminded by the Superintendent that we will have been successful in our pursuit of 
Strategic Implementation Plan initiatives not just if we achieve milestones but only if we 
genuinely went about the work a different way. As I discussed in my analysis in Chapter 
4, simply accumulating outputs does not guarantee the impact sought after in Focus Area 
#1 of truly implementing a rigorous, inclusive, and culturally and linguistically sustaining 
instructional program that develops the whole child – a peak that we can only reach if we 
climb together. While I think we made good progress toward this big goal this year, I am 
struck by the evolution of my thinking over the course of this year; it reflects how far my 
own learning has come in understanding how and what teams produce. 
Conclusion 
Despite the historical legacy and vast organizational structures that put the odds 
against their success, I believe teams and teaming are the right response to the seemingly 
intractable problems our education systems continue to face in the 21st century. Bearing 
in mind all I have described in my analysis and the thought I have put forward overall in 
this capstone, it would be a mistake to conclude that teaming is fruitless – or a task so 
profoundly misaligned with the current state of public K-12 bureaucracies that it is better 
to invest time and efforts for change elsewhere. I have observed over the course of the 
year that teaming can often be uncomfortable. It takes firm, steady leadership to lead a 
team clearly through the challenges to purpose that it routinely experiences as teams face 
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a deluge of urgent and important tasks. It also takes radical perseverance to keep teaming 
intentionally collaborative and respectful even when the intra- and interpersonal conflicts 
arise amongst and within team members. It can often feel easier to default back to the 
function-specific silos that districts have operated on for decades, yielding to their 
momentum as a reliable (albeit flawed) way to get work done.  
After a year of careful study and experience on teams in Boston’s central 
administrative offices, I maintain full resolve that teams are useful and even a requisite 
path to get to our aspirational end state. Teaming well, though, will require us to go about 
our work differently in order to seek the results we want, asking us to subvert our 
inclination toward the hierarchical path of least resistance to really reconsider and 
reexamine the way we get even basic work done. While the individual maverick approach 
is certainly expeditious, it has large potential to undercut vertical and horizontal 
collaboration within organizations that teams seek to leverage, and in passing over a 
systemic response, it also has the potential to perpetuate or exploit (rather than dismantle) 
the inequities of the current system.  
Absent concerted efforts to cultivate the right task environment, teams, their 
membership, and the change efforts they seek to implement are likely to languish – but 
this is not an uncontrollable fate. Districts like BPS will experience significant benefit 
from taking on the reflection that its leaders know is crucial for adults to learn. 
Organizational reflection and learning is the first step toward more successful teaming in 
districts, taking a comprehensive look at not only the tasks we are asking teams to 
perform but also the environment in which those tasks exist to more thoroughly 
understand what we are asking individuals to do in concert with other individuals and 
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tasks. This is the heart of Edmondson’s (2012) concept of execution-as-learning: taking a 
careful look at the “constant, unremarkable, small-scale learning into day-to-day work,” 
as a sort of “reflection-in-action, rather than reflection-after-action” (p. 30). This effort 
must be assimilated into the processes of doing the work itself. If our behaviors and 
mindsets do not change, then a reliance on teams has potential to turn into work 
avoidance than a method for getting important work (including dealing with problems 
that involve conflict and confusion) done – which ultimately can preserve the status quo 
and distance district leadership from the system it has envisioned to better address 
teaching and learning needs.  
Even amidst the demands and urgency of district leadership, I fundamentally 
believe this type of inquiry orientation and learning stance is possible in a place like BPS. 
On a personal level, it requires district leaders (including me) to recommitment to the 
stubborn nature of systems-level leadership: we must continue to have faith that small 
actions every day are what move massive systems. It has been my experience over the 
last ten months that change happens no other way. Lest I lose heart that change is not 
possible or that it moves too slow, I remind myself of the sage reminder that I have gotten 
from my capstone committee again and again – namely, that education systems were not 
set up for what we are asking them to do today. In fact, like in most governmental 
institutions, they were deliberately devised to make change move slowly and deliberately. 
(Of all times in my life, that last statement has never been more applicable or hopeful.) I 
move forward with a full heart, a sharpened intellect, and a fierce optimism that my work 
in leading the sector is the work of systems redesign, slowly yet deliberately moving to 
build a thoroughly crafted and empathetically defined “us” to get the results we really 
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want to achieve.  
Let’s keep going – together.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
Problem of Practice and Instructional Theory of Action for Boston Public Schools 
 
Problem of Practice: 
 
BPS does not consistently provide authentic learning opportunities for our 
students who are most marginalized to develop into self-determined, independent 
learners, able to pursue their aspirations. Our failures lead to disengaged students 
and significant achievement gaps. 
 
Instructional Theory of Action: 
 
Introductory Statement of Belief: 
As adult learners committed to equity, we must engage in and reflect on systemic and 
individual biases and their impact on our practices. 
If we: 
[1] Invest the entire BPS community in the necessity of this work, including a multi-
year trajectory of developing culturally and linguistically sustaining practices. 
[2] Maintain our focus on cognitively demanding tasks (CDTs) and instructional foci 
(IF) with a specific focus on our most marginalized students. 
[3] Create structures, tools, and coaching to help school leaders and teams confront 
biases and belief systems. 
[4] Analyze and address systemic structures that promote exclusionary practices. 
[5] Provide ongoing professional development and support to create inclusive, 
welcoming safe schools. 
[6] Create structures, tools, and coaching to support disciplinary literacy that ensures 
universal access for all students 
Then…students will be cognitively and socio-emotionally engaged and be prepared to 
be the leaders, advocates, entrepreneurs and innovators of tomorrow. 
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Appendix B 
 
Strategic Implementation Plan initiatives “owned” by the Academics and Student 
Supports for Equity Team (ASSET) 
 
Focus Area #1: Implement an inclusive, rigorous, and culturally/linguistically sustaining 
PK-12 instructional program that serves the development of the whole child. 
 
1.1. Provide quality curricular and instructional guidance and resources to support 
instruction that develops literacy, language, and knowledge acquisition across 
contents, while promoting social emotional wellness.  
 
1.2. Expand, redesign and enrich English Language Learner programming and 
services. 
 
1.3. Expand, redesign and enrich Special Education programming and services. 
 
1.4. Expand, redesign and enrich programming and services for students of color. 
 
1.5. Expand equitable access to high-quality early education seats. 
 
1.6. Pilot, and then expand, the 4th through 6th grade initiative “Excellence for 
All.” 
 
1.7. Expand and deepen access to World Language and Visual and Performing 
Arts. 
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Appendix C 
 
Academic and Student Supports for Equity Team (ASSET) Meeting Structures 
 
“D/S” = Deputy Superintendent 
“A/S” = Assistant Superintendent 
“Dir.” = Director 
 
Meeting  Frequ
ency 
Dura
tion 
Loca
tion 
Atten
dees 
Objectives  Activities  
 
Tactical 1x 
daily  
(M-
F) 
15 
min 
Dial
-in 
1 D/S 
5 
A/Ss 
2 
Dirs.  
 
Raise urgent issues or 
events to be aware of 
from each department – 
in order to 
prevent/address fires 
and foster collaboration 
 
Stand (do not sit) and 
quickly deliver high-
level updates (few 
details, >1 per person). 
No substitute members; 
if you must be absent, 
send bullets beforehand 
that Karla/Mary can 
share. 
 
    Review daily agendas: 
from your schedule or 
workflow coming out 
today 
 
“” 
    Receive key updates or 
to-dos from Sup (e.g. 
“priority of the day”) 
 
End with key due-outs. 
Strategy – 
Team 
1x 
week
ly 
(day 
TBD
) 
120 
min 
Boll
ing 
1 D/S 
5 
A/Ss 
2 
Dirs. 
1 
Data 
An. 
Check in on progress 
and address stuck 
points on SIP goals and 
milestones (collectively 
“holding feet to fire”) 
SIP improvement cycles 
(1x per month): format 
will vary, but each A/S 
will highlight biggest 
areas of progress, 
biggest areas of 
challenge, and broad 
overview of whether or 
not on-track across all 
areas of ownership 
 
    Foster data curiosity 
and collaborative 
consumption/interpretat
ion of data 
Data dialogues (1x per 
month): perform deep 
dive on data related to a 
problem of practice, 
chosen by A/Ss; review 
and prepare for Cabinet 
data dialogue that 
month 
 
    Spark and sustain 
cross-functional 
professional learning to 
foster a sense of what 
high-quality, effective 
School visits (1x per 
month): instructional 
rounds-type approach, 
wherein an A/S picks a 
school and focus 
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teaching and learning 
looks like through each 
departmental lens 
 
question; arranges visits 
to particular 
classrooms; and leads 
debriefs 
 
    Practice collaboration 
as an interdepartmental 
BPS team by tackling 
problems or 
experiences that are 
central to instructional 
practice together, and 
that build value and use 
of our shared structures 
 
IS/OS/ASSET Sync Up: 
(1x per month): TBD, 
but topics to include: 
PD development, 
tuning, norming 
 
     Build unity and 
“brand” as an ASSET 
leadership team 
Use and reference 
ASSET team habits of 
mind. 
 
Strategy – 
Individual  
2x 
mont
hly 
60 
min 
D/S 
offic
e  
1 D/S 
1 
A/Ss  
1 ED 
1 Dir 
 
Check in with A/S and 
ED on management 
and execution of dept. 
Priorities and SIP 
implementation, with 
personalized attention 
and feedback for 
troubleshooting/support 
 
Standing meeting 
agenda categories, with 
items for discussion 
populated by EDs. 
Review progress and 
implementation on SIP 
priorities and timelines 
(jointly held among 
A/Ss as appropriate). 
     Foster team leadership 
development among #1 
and #2s of each 
department 
Questions directed by 
D/S (in dedicated time 
within meeting) about 
the “how” of leadership 
style and tactics to meet 
department goals as 
department teams 
 
Leadership 
Check-In’s 
4x 
yearl
y 
60 
min 
Boll
ing 
1 D/S 
1 A/S 
Engage in two-way 
dialogue and feedback 
on leadership practices 
of D/S and A/S 
Leadership coaching of 
A/S by D/S, with 
additional reflection on 
how D/S can better lead 
A/S and the team 
 
Retreat 3x 
yearl
y 
! to 
full 
day 
Off-
site  
1 D/S 
5 
A/Ss 
2 
Dirs. 
1 
Data 
An. 
 
Take a step back to re-
engage and re-dedicate 
ourselves to our 
strategic priorities 
 
Reflective protocols on 
intended versus lived 
strategies; grounding 
ourselves in the 
imperative of our efforts 
    Build unity as an 
ASSET leadership 
team; spend quality, 
enjoyable time together 
 
Engage in non-
traditional activities 
(e.g. a hike, a 
conference, etc.) 
    (As needed) Tackle 
bigger-picture 
problems of practice in 
Collect list of toughest 
to tackle problems over 
the course of each 
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longer sessions quarter. Bring forward 
through protocols. 
 
All ASSET 
Meeting 
1x 
mont
hly 
2-3 
hour
s 
Boll
ing 
1 D/S 
5 
A/Ss 
5 
EDs 
2 
Dirs. 
All 
ASS
ET 
staff 
Professional learning 
together on high-
priority instructional 
initiatives or needs for 
the district. Norming 
around key terms, 
structures, and 
frameworks that we use 
as a district to pursue 
instructional 
improvement. 
Activities vary: tuning 
of PD modules for 
teachers or principals; 
rollout/feedback of a 
new tool; brainstorming 
on how to tackle 
interdepartmental / 
cross-functional 
challenges; etc. 
Cross 
Functional 
Learning 
Meeting 
2x 
mont
hly 
90 
min 
Boll
ing 
5 
A/Ss 
Learn about each other 
and learn about each 
other’s work. Build 
deeper relationships as 
a cross-functional team 
and as a collaborative 
of cross-functional 
teams. 
[to be determined by 
A/Ss] 
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Appendix D 
 
Boston Public Schools Organizational Charts 
 
1. Academics and Student Supports for Equity (ASSET) on the Boston Public Schools 
organizational chart 
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2. Organizational Chart for the ASSET Leadership Team 
 
 
 
  
Academics & Student Supports for Equity Team (ASSET) 
Leadership Team 
Deputy 
Superintendent, 
ASSET 
Assistant 
Superintendent, 
Office of 
Academics and 
Professional 
Learning (OAPL) 
Assistant 
Superintendent, 
Office of English 
Language 
Learners (OELL)  
Assistant 
Superintendent, 
Office of 
Opportunity and 
Achievement Gap 
(OOAG) 
Assistant 
Superintendent, 
Office of Social 
Emotional Learning 
and Wellness 
(OSELW) 
Assistant 
Superintendent, 
Office of Special 
Education Services 
(OSES) 
Director of Special 
Programs and 
Initiatives, ASSET 
Director of 
Instructional 
Strategy & 
Implementation, 
ASSET 
Data Analyst, 
Office of Data + 
Accountability 
(ODA) 
Administrative 
Assistant, ASSET 
Im
m
ed
ia
te
 O
ffi
ce
 o
f t
he
 D
ep
ut
y 
S
up
. 
A
S
S
E
T 
D
ep
ts
. 
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Appendix E 
 
Full text of open-ended survey questions 
 
11a. After answering a scaled question on the item, “I make use of supports offered by 
central office to strengthen or improve instruction,” respondents were asked: “Why/why 
not?” Their responses were: 
• “All central offices should have staff available as long as schools are open. 
Principals should have a line to call for every office that gets answered.” 
• “I leverage the expertise of specific individuals with whom I've built relationships 
and about whom I know their specific skill sets. The help I am able to secure for 
the benefit of my school community is more grounded in the effectiveness of my 
personal network than in institutional structures. There are lots of individuals with 
tremendous and valuable expertise. OHC seems to be only office that effectively 
leverages the individual skill sets of its people to make a team that is stronger than 
the sum of its parts.” 
• “There is little expertise in the areas that I need support.” 
• “Supports offer useful strategies, skills, although I often have to tailor them 
myself to suit my school context.” 
• “Supports are not shared equitably across the district.” 
• “Seems pointless to request help that can't or won't be delivered” 
• “We have asked for some supports but there seems to be a lack of expertise and/or 
time in our areas of need.” 
• “When I don't it's because I can't get in touch with the people I need to be in 
communication with.” 
• “I feel that I am on my own for instruction and planning at the school. TLT 
Leaders are critical and not helpful. They do not support work with families and 
often cause more confusion. The TLT leaders can be inconsistent among the team 
and with principals.” 
• “Depends on the department.” 
• “Some departments and too bureaucratic and have no idea how schools work.” 
 
Open-ended comments at end of survey were: 
• "This survey is challenging because my experience varies widely across 
departments and individuals, which is why so many responses veered toward the 
center. I don't know what central office's priorities or goals are. I know what we 
espouse as a district (in terms of our current focus on [culturally and linguistically 
sustaining practices]). I do not see us live that across departments and individuals. 
I wonder how many folks at central office know what our current priorities and 
goals are AND how they fit into those goals.” 
• “As a team, OHC is awesome. There is consistent messaging, their purpose is 
clear, they offer clear support in service of getting the best people in front of our 
students, and the team consistently seeks input to continuously improve. Each 
year, there are things to point to that are even stronger than the year before. 
<insert sounds of angels singing>” 
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• “Other departments (OOAG, Budget, ELT, OFSE) have proven useful because I 
have been able to build relationships with individuals within those departments 
who are extremely helpful. But they don't seem as universally effective and 
coherent as OHC is. (It definitely took OHC time to get to that place...it's a whole 
different experience working with them than it was 3 years ago. I could see each 
of these departments becoming that effective.)” 
• “I'm not even sure if some departments exist anymore, or if they do, what is 
reasonable to expect from them. What is the current version of IR&D/Curriculum 
and Assessment? What do they have the capacity to do? It's not clear to me what I 
should expect from ODA. Are there reports or tools they should be offering or 
making us aware of at the school level? Do we have to know about them to ask 
for them?” 
• “We need the people from central to come to the schools and give the school 
hands-on support. . . . There hasn't anyone who has come to our school to support 
teachers. Perhaps I am not clear about the model that is being ‘deployed.’” 
• “Central Office support is uneven – some teams are very responsive and very 
helpful, others less so. It often seems like departments are not communicating 
about due dates, timelines and asks of school leaders. Often we will have a 
number of deadlines that at the same time, particularly around eval and budget 
season. The central office should keep a master calendar of deadlines for school 
leaders so that reports and deadlines can be reasonably spaced out.” 
• “Central office staff needs to return emails and/or answer phone calls. Very 
frustrating to call a department…and not get a response, a reply or a solution to a 
problem.” 
• “The central office does a lot to support schools. My instructional leader…is 
extremely supportive and helps me be a better leader. I have found most central 
office responsive and helpful. Lead BPS is a helpful way to communicate.” 
• “Overall the supports are consistent with most departments. [Some] 
departments…are not as responsive or clear with their assistance or overall 
demands on schools and school leaders. Seemingly items are last minute and not 
well thought out with regards to asks, completion or timeliness.” 
• “I would prefer to be supported by my colleagues. Make time for principals to 
learn from each other.” 
• Regarding a specific office: “Anytime a school or department has high levels of 
turnover, institutional knowledge is nonexistent or not valued, and everyone at all 
times seems to operate in [Cover Your Ass, or CYA] mode, the problem is at the 
top. It is a challenge to get questions answered. Often conflicting information is 
given by different people in response to the same question. Schools are routinely 
being put in the position of having to make choices that are impossible and then 
are blamed for them regardless of what the decision is. [Staff] are poorly 
supported and are given the runaround when they ask reasonable questions. 
Multiple similar questions from different people are heard as a pile on instead of 
understood as a natural consequence of not providing answers the first time a 
question is asked.” 
• Regarding a specific office: “[Office] continues to feel more like an adversary of 
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my work than an ally. I've been continuously blindsided by the outcomes of 
"secret" meetings of staff…who continue to lack transparency and a clear 
understanding of schools. OHC continues to be a standout team; they are helpful, 
responsive, and have a clear sense of what principals are doing. Whoever made 
OHC what it is today should begin working with other offices.” 
 
